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Summary: 
The issue of how governments attract men and women to the armed forces has been a 
principal concern of historians of propaganda since Harold Lasswell first wrote on the subject 
in the 1920s. Yet while a great deal has been written about propaganda texts – posters, films, 
newsreels, radio broadcasts, television programmes, and so on – less attention has been 
paid to the ways in which these texts were produced and their place within the broader 
context of 20th century British history. Through an analysis of key institutions and individuals, 
and drawing on a range of primary and secondary source material, this thesis makes a case 
for a history of recruitment advertising rooted in the experiences and perspectives of its 
practitioners. Exploring a number of recruitment campaigns waged in Britain between 1913 
and 1963, it studies the business of recruitment not through the medium of individual 
advertisements, but via the organisations, ideologies and discursive practices that 
constructed them. Following Liz McFall and Anne Cronin, who argue that advertising can be 
understood only in relation to the particular historical circumstances that give rise to it, and 
that advertising is at any one point the sum of the discourses that embody and maintain it, it 
explores how recruitment campaigns were organised, planned and executed at key moments 
in British history. Crucial to this approach is an analysis of archival records such as 
memoranda, minutes of meetings, production logs, memoirs and reports. By examining these 
records discursively, this thesis encourages a shift from textual readings of recruitment 
advertising to studies of how relevant organisations and individuals defined and understood 
recruitment practices as promotional devices intended to exhort and persuade. By examining 
military advertising through six case studies spanning the wartime, interwar and postwar 
periods, it explores how ideas about promotion shifted from one era to the next. 
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Chapter One 
‘Your Country Needs You’: Military Advertising 
Behind the Image 
In the history of recruitment advertising, few images have attracted more attention than Alfred 
Leete’s ‘Your country needs you’ (see figure one). A partial portrait of Lord Horatio Herbert 
Kitchener, a man regarded by many of his contemporaries as Britain’s finest living soldier,1 
Leete’s design has captivated historians and social commentators ever since it was first 
released as a recruiting poster in the dying days of September 1914. The Great War, the 
conflict to which it owes its origins, is often described in terms derived from the advertisement 
(as a war fought for ‘King and Country’, for example, or as a war won by the armies Kitchener 
himself apparently raised), and the image has also been credited in the popular imagination 
with being the British Army’s ‘most famous’ recruitment poster.2 Alongside Savile Lumley’s 
‘Daddy, what did YOU do in the Great War?’ (see figure two), another iconic image of the 
period, ‘Your country needs you’ has come to symbolise the use of mass media to persuade 
men and women to join the armed forces. Part of a larger recruitment campaign designed to 
mobilise the civilian population for war, it was, according to the historian of ephemera Maurice 
Rickards, the only British poster worthy of artistic distinction: 
Your Country needs YOU is by no means a major work, but its posterly simplicity has 
impact far in excess of any of its contemporaries. His lordship’s accusing finger has 
haunted Britons since they first saw it. It is the archetype of all wartime father figures, 
crib-source for a host of mimics. Like the man himself – brooding, compulsive and 
final – it has entered into the mythology of the nation; it has become a trademark 
figure for World War I.3 
The use of posters to promote recruitment in the armed forces is often regarded as a 
peculiarly 20th century phenomenon. Hoisted onto buildings and monuments and displayed 
on billboards and hoardings, war posters are, as the editor of one anthology recently 
remarked, mechanically reproduced objects with no originals.4 Unlike works of art in the 
Benjaminian sense of the term however, their ‘aura’ is derived not from any authorial claim to 
originality or greatness, but from the quality and quantity of their reproductions – from their 
ability, that is to say, to be seen. Staring ominously into the distance and lifting his right hand 
only so far as to point at the viewer, the Kitchener poster epitomises the all-seeing figure 
whose gaze catches passersby precisely as the eyes of passersby are drawn to the figure. 
[6] 
 
George Orwell introduced a similar character in 1984, a novel that opened with a description 
of a ‘black-moustachioed face gaz[ing] down from every commanding corner’,5 and there 
have been so many reproductions, imitations and parodies of Leete’s design it is not 
surprising that the image of Kitchener has continued to cast a long shadow over British 
history, not least because of what it seems to say about the power of the mass media (and of 
the medium of posters in particular) to persuade, cajole and wheedle its audiences.6  
 
How that power has been exercised and expressed has been a matter of some debate 
amongst historians. According to Cate Haste, author of Keep the Home Fires Burning (1977), 
[7] 
 
for example, the Leete poster represented the ‘most successful poster’ of the First World War 
because it ‘established Kitchener’s image as the embodiment of the nation’s resolution and 
strength’. Kitchener, according to Haste, ‘recalled Britain’s imperial victories’; even 
‘government leaders who later doubted his capacity to manage the war paid tribute to the 
success his image had in inspiring confidence’ amongst the people.7 That one man could 
‘inspire’ so much without actually raising a finger – Kitchener posed for no posters himself – 
may seem remarkable, but eyewitness accounts from the 1914-18 period have indicated that 
Kitchener’s image did have an appreciable impact on the landscapes and cityscapes of 
modern Britain. According to one article published in the Manchester Guardian in 1915, for 
example, ‘Your country needs you’ was just one of many recruiting images whose cumulative 
effect amounted to a visual ‘blockade’ on pedestrians.  
[War posters] grip you everywhere. They assail you from every corner. They take you 
in the streets and in the trains. They threaten, persuade, cajole, and frighten. You 
look on one hand and you see “If this cap fits, join at once”. You look on the other and 
you are asked what the girls and grandchildren will think of you if you hold back. 
Ahead of you Lord Kitchener bars the way with a terrible look and a menacing finger: 
‘I want you’. The eye is subjected to a ‘blockade’ where everything is contraband but 
recruiting appeals.8 
Opposition to advertising in public places was not new,9 but the use of it on this scale to 
promote the armed forces almost certainly was, and has prompted many historians to draw 
the conclusion that the Kitchener poster exerted an unwieldy influence on the wartime home 
front.10 Phil Taylor, who until his death in 2010 was one of Britain’s leading propaganda 
historians, even claimed that a direct (casual) correlation could be drawn between the 
exhibition of Leete’s poster in Britain and the extraordinary rates of enlistment witnessed in 
the opening stages of the war. ‘Recruitment stands set up by the War Office throughout the 
nation found it difficult to cope with the sheer weight [sic] of volunteers, who rushed forward to 
sign up in response to Kitchener’s outstretched index finger inviting them to enlist simply 
because “Your King and Country Needs [sic] You”’.11 Carlo Ginzberg, a prominent exponent 
of micro-history,12 has also suggested the Leete poster possessed the power to hypnotise 
and entrance all those who gazed upon it. Indeed, even though historians today may  
never know how many people decided to volunteer under the impulse of Kitchener’s 
image...[they] can safely assume that the imperatives conveyed by those posters – 
YOUR KING AND COUNTRY NEED YOU, KITCHENER WANTS MORE MEN, and 
[8] 
 
so forth – affected many onlookers. The depiction of authority acted like authority 
itself. A discharge of social energy took place; a command was introjected [sic] and 
turned into a decision which was, literally, a matter of life and death.13 
The notion that official ‘imperatives’ possessed an influence far beyond the media that carried 
them predated both ‘Your country needs you’ and the First World War. As early as 1901, J. A. 
Hobson could write of a ‘knot of men, financiers and politicians’ whose manipulation of the 
press and parliament had ‘capture[d] the mind of a nation, arouse[d] its passion, and 
impose[d] a policy’.14 Hobson’s critique of the ‘manufacture of jingoism’ was aimed squarely 
at Britain’s involvement in the Second Boer War, but it would set the tone for many 
subsequent studies of the nature and ‘effects’ of war propaganda. In the interwar years, a 
number of academics, liberal commentators and Marxists turned their attention to the use of 
propaganda – a term that had recently come into popular usage, and had quickly developed a 
pejorative undertone15 – in 1914-18. Using the Committee on Public Information or ‘Creel 
Committee’ as a case study, the American sociologist Harold Lasswell published what may 
have been the first academic study of the media based on an analysis of ‘significant 
symbols’,16 and he was soon joined by key thinkers associated with the Frankfurt School 
whose critique of the ‘culture industries’ and the ‘mass society’ they sustained aligned the 
propaganda of totalitarian societies to the commercial advertising of capitalist ones.17 
Propaganda, however, continues to be regarded as an instrument of state power,18 and it is 
perhaps for this reason that ‘Your country needs you’ was until recently treated as a product 
of the machinery of government. The Parliamentary Recruiting Committee (PRC), a body 
established in late August 1914 to produce recruitment advertising on behalf of the War Office 
(WO), was credited with the production of both ‘Your country needs you’ and ‘Daddy, what did 
you do in the Great War?’, partly because of references to a ‘Kitchener poster’ in the PRC’s 
holdings and partly because Kitchener was himself apparently involved in recruitment 
advertising.19 Furthermore, since the PRC was responsible for well over 100 different poster 
designs, and for more than 54 million reproductions of posters, leaflets and other printed 
ephemera,20 some historians have drawn a connection between its prolific output and the 
popularisation of the First World War’s most famous posters. In two classic works on the 
political and social history of contemporary Britain, A. J. P. Taylor and Arthur Marwick, for 
instance, linked ‘Your country needs you’ to the official recruitment drive, with the latter 
[9] 
 
claiming that Leete’s poster represented the only product of the PRC that deserved creative 
recognition in an otherwise bland and insipid recruitment campaign.21 
 
Since the late 1990s, however, the belief in the official origins of ‘Your country needs you’ 
was placed under sustained scrutiny. In an article published in the now-defunct Imperial War 
Museum Review, Nicholas Hiley challenged the idea that there was a palpable connection 
between the Leete design and the PRC. Suggesting the ‘sheer volume of the PRC’s output 
has served to distort the picture of wartime recruiting’, Hiley claimed the attention lavished on 
images like ‘Your country needs you’ and ‘Daddy, what did you do in the Great War?’ has 
[10] 
 
obscured the complexity of the conditions of production that surrounded these images and 
removed them their historical context.22 Offering a close reading of primary sources including 
production logs and responses to the official recruitment campaign recorded in the press, 
Hiley dismissed references to a ‘Kitchener poster’ in official files as references to another, 
completely different image (see figure three), and repeated Phillip Dutton’s earlier observation 
that there was in fact no official series number for ‘Your country needs you’ or reference to 
Leete himself in the PRC’s holdings.23 The tone of the Leete and Lumley designs, 
furthermore, clashed with the dominant style of the PRC’s campaign which veered towards 
the conservative, and Hiley suggested these posters were produced not by the government’s 
propaganda body, but by a ‘new breed of commercial advertiser and graphic designer whose 
involvement in the recruiting campaign was widely resented’ by the British public.24 
 
[11] 
 
The evidence for Hiley’s thesis is compelling. Although ‘Your country needs you’ has been 
widely identified with the machinations of the state, it began life not as a recruitment poster or 
even as a recruiting appeal in the conventional sense of the term, but as a front cover for a 
magazine. On September 5th 1914, the topical and illustrated weekly London Opinion led with 
Leete’s design in an attempt to reverse flagging sales.25 Contrary to many national 
newspapers, whose circulation appears to have ballooned at the outset of the war,26 London 
Opinion struggled to retain the 160,000 weekly-audience it had built up before the declaration 
of the war on August 4th. Sensing that drastic action was required to claw back some of its 
lost circulation, Lincoln Springfield, the magazine’s owner-editor, commissioned Leete to 
produce a front cover that captured the ‘spirit’ of the age and abandoned London Opinion’s 
typical style of ‘genial, pleasant, good-natured persiflage’.27 Within a week of the September 
5th edition hitting the shelves, Springfield started to receive letters from readers requesting 
reproductions of the front cover. Within a fortnight, he had begun selling copies of the original 
front cover on postcards at 1s 4d per 100.28 It is about this time, and probably using the same 
printing firm commissioned to produce the postcards, that the Leete design was converted 
into a recruiting poster and displayed on hoardings in and around London. However, the 
transformation of the image into a poster does not appear to have been made with the 
sanction of the PRC or any other government department, and nor did Leete himself, then a 
freelance artist and graphic designer, appear to have any connection to the armed forces until 
he enlisted in the Artists Rifle as a corporal and served on the Western Front in 1917-18.29  
In the wake of Hiley’s intervention most historians have tended to be more cautious in their 
use of the Leete and Lumley designs, especially insofar as they relate to the work of the 
official recruitment campaign. In his recent survey on the war poster, for example, the cultural 
historian James Aulich has acknowledged the ‘iconic status’ of Leete’s poster, but suggested 
its notoriety has ‘little to do with its effectiveness as a recruiting tool’ and a lot more to do with 
the ways in which it could be adapted and appropriated by other poster designers. According 
to Aulich the ‘direct and unequivocal address to the viewer’ encouraged by ‘Your country 
needs you’ provided a ‘pattern for other designers to follow’, with the original image 
contributing to a ‘popular visual language of repetition’.30 Keith Surridge’s paper on 
Kitchener’s legacy and the image of the British military hero, meanwhile, claims that it is a 
‘moot point’ whether the transformation of London Opinion’s front cover into a recruiting 
poster was ‘responsible for enticing over 2 million volunteers’ to the New Armies. Referencing 
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Hiley, Surridge suggests that ‘Your country needs you’ was ‘part of an unofficial recruiting 
campaign and as such its success cannot be accurately gauged’, and that ‘as an aid to 
recruiting, the impact of Leete’s poster, and others like it, is questionable: most recruiters 
preferred “genial” rather than “bullying” posters and the commercial origins of the posters 
themselves was all too obvious and resented’ by those who lived in Britain in the war years.31 
Whether a poster was distributed by a government or by a private patriotic organisation might 
seem a trivial question to ask; ‘Your country needs you’, after all, contained the same function 
or purpose regardless of whether it was produced or popularised by the state. Yet the origins 
and ownership of a promotional image are crucial for determining its place within the broader 
context of the society (or societies) that create it. For Hiley, the present-day notoriety of the 
Leete and Lumley designs owes less to their ‘effect’ as recruiting appeals than it does to the 
popular backlash against propaganda in the interwar years, when contemporaries wished to 
see such posters as emblems of a callous and overbearing government only too eager to 
plumb the depths of persuasion in an attempt to recruit the ‘lost generation’ to the armed 
forces.32 For Aulich, commenting on a much larger sample, images like Leete’s illustrate the 
‘shifting and symbiotic relationships’ that existed between governments, commercial culture 
and the media industry during the 20th century. Recruitment posters, which may seem like 
archetypal examples of government propaganda, were often produced by private advertisers 
whose previous experience selling products was put to use in the ‘sale’ of war. The language 
of commercial advertising infiltrated the official and unofficial recruitment campaigns for the 
New Armies, but it also had a profound effect on commercial imagery and communication 
which itself began to ape the recruitment rhetoric associated with war.  
During the First World War, war imagery infiltrated the illustrated press, cartoons, the 
popular print, film, theatre and the music hall. It also played a part in advertising for a 
wide range of goods...[suggesting that] the war sold products and products sold the 
war.33 
Behind the Image: The Case for an Institutional History of Recruitment Advertising  
As this brief discussion has demonstrated, ‘Your country needs you’ has been implicated in 
some of the key debates regarding the relationship between war and society, advertising and 
democracy and politics and the mass media in Britain in the 20th century. Though it has been 
held up as an icon of the First World War and of recruitment advertising more generally, 
recent research has questioned its place within the pantheon of famous government posters. 
[13] 
 
In the absence of clear evidence tying ‘Your country needs you’ to the activities of the PRC or 
another official recruiting body, it is difficult to accept the popular view of the Kitchener poster 
as the apotheosis of government propaganda.34 Although it appeared to convey an official 
directive and even depicted the very man responsible for issuing that directive,35 ‘Your 
country needs you’ seems to have been utilised as a marketing tool to sell magazines long 
before it became entwined with the practice of recruitment advertising. It seems to have 
grown out of the world of commerce, in other words, before it grew into and helped to shape 
the world of government communications or ‘propaganda’. 
This dual status – that of being both a commercial and a political construct – is a good point 
of departure for thinking about the complex web of interactions, interrelations and connections 
that lie behind images like ‘Your country needs you’. Though they may seem fairly self-
explanatory (and there is little room for misinterpretation in the case of ‘Your country needs 
you’, a text that thrives on the simplicity and brute force of its address), recruitment 
advertisements cannot be treated as straightforward historical documents whose function or 
purpose can be elicited from a close reading of the messages or directives they convey. To 
make accurate predictions about their status as historical artefacts, historians need to search 
beneath the advertisements themselves to the particular social, economic and political 
circumstances that gave rise to them. They need to explore, in other words, the institutions 
and individuals who both produced and distributed them. 
This thesis, which examines images like ‘Your country needs you’, is concerned with these 
institutions and individuals and with the ‘shifting and symbiotic relationships’ that bind them 
together.36 Moving beyond the study of individual advertisements to the ‘organisational fields 
and institutional settings’ that envelop them, it addresses what media theorists sometimes call 
the ‘problem of inference’: how to determine the ‘possible explanations, motivations or 
reasons’ that inform the production of media texts.37 Determining how a media text was 
made, by whom and for what reasons takes historians far beyond the realm of 
advertisements (which include, but are not limited to, posters, films, newsreels, radio 
broadcasts and television programmes) to studies of the institutions and audiences that 
produce and consume them. In media and cultural studies, a large body of literature already 
exists that seeks to place production at the heart of the communicative process or ‘circuit’,38 
but the literature on recruitment advertising or propaganda has been slow to take up the 
[14] 
 
slack. Indeed, with a few notable exceptions much of the commentary on recruitment 
advertising has proceeded from the general premise that advertisements rather than the 
business of advertising39 provide the best source of information for understanding how 
recruiters tried to persuade civilians to join up, and how recruitment campaigns were 
themselves organised.  
In this respect, the literature on recruitment advertising mirrors a similar tendency within the 
literature on commercial advertising or ‘promotional culture’. Until the early 2000s, much of 
the research published within the latter discipline constructed accounts of the past drawn 
wholly or mostly from analyses of individual advertisements. Raymond Williams’ classic 
article, ‘Advertising: A Magic System’, originally written as a chapter for The Long Revolution 
(1961) but only published in 1980,40 epitomised this approach. Analysing a series of 
advertisements from ancient times to the present day, Williams used textual analysis to make 
a broader point about the development of advertising as an ‘institutionalised system of 
commercial information and persuasion’. Arguing that this system had passed through a 
series of transformations that could be gauged through the changing fashions of 
advertisements’ rhetoric, he pinpointed the First World War as the era in which a new kind of 
‘psychological advertising’ came into being. ‘Slowly, after the war, advertising turned from the 
simple proclamation and reiteration...of the earlier respectable trade, and prepared to 
develop, for all kinds of product, the old methods of the quack and the new methods of 
psychological warfare’. Advertising, according to Williams, became a ‘knowing, sophisticated 
and humorous’ practice which would come to represent the ‘official art of modern capitalist 
society: it is what “we” put up in “our” streets and use to fill up half of “our” newspapers and 
magazines: and it commands the services of perhaps the largest organised body of writers 
and artists, with their attendant managers and advisers, in the whole society’.41 
Using advertisements to provide an insight not only into the advertising trade but the wider 
societies of which it was a part, became a favoured technique of advertising historians in the 
wake of Williams’ intervention. Yet it is an approach that has attracted its fair share of recent 
critics. In the work of Sean Nixon, Liz McFall and Anne Cronin (all sociologists by trade) a 
number of important counter-arguments to the text-centred approach to the history of 
commercial advertising have been put forward.42 Working from the perspective of producers 
rather than texts, these authors have offered more sharply defined accounts of commercial 
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culture that emphasise, in Nixon’s words, ‘the differentiated and multiple forms through which 
commercial relations and cultures are articulated’ and expressed at given historical 
moments.43 Moving away from the notion of a single or universal logic of commercial culture 
to studies of commercial cultures, their work rejects the division of advertising history into a 
series of discrete periods or ‘epochs’ in favour of more detailed empirical accounts rooted in 
the activities of practitioners. This shift in emphasis from texts to the institutions that made 
them has begun to change the ways in which historians portray the commercial advertising 
industry. The belief that advertising has gotten progressively more complex as time has 
passed by, for example, has been discredited, but there has as yet been no attempt to apply 
comparable methods to the history of recruitment advertising. For its part, where recruitment 
advertising is studied it is usually explored as a form of government propaganda, an approach 
that lacks the theoretical rigour of recent contributions to the debate on promotional culture 
and tends to overlook the important contributions recruiters made to the development of 
political communication. 
This thesis, which argues that the time is ripe for a reinterpretation of recruitment advertising 
in light of new approaches to promotional culture, offers an account of the work of recruiters 
over the course of a 50-year sample beginning just before the First World War. Following 
McFall, it endeavours to provide not a comprehensive history, but a series of ‘snapshot[s] of 
how advertising operated as a way of generating different ways of thinking about its 
contemporary and historical formations’.44 These snapshots have been chosen because of 
what they say about the work of recruitment advertisers at specific moments during the 
course of the sample. Some of them (see chapters four, five and six) represent case study 
analyses of individual recruitment campaigns waged before or during the world wars. Others 
provide detailed accounts of events, practices or developments associated with the business 
of recruitment advertising, such as the emergence of official public opinion polling during the 
Second World War (chapter seven) and the reform of government communications 
undertaken by the Attlee governments of 1945-51 (chapter eight).  
By analysing recruitment advertising not as a developmental or ‘teleological’ process (see 
below), but as a phenomenon that can be understood in relation to the particular historical 
circumstances that give rise to it, this thesis illustrates how recruitment advertisers interacted 
with other institutions, individuals and groups within British society. Furthermore, while it has 
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not eschewed questions of media power it has expressly avoided any attempt to measure or 
gauge the efficacy of recruitment campaigns, an approach to studying recruitment advertising 
that has gained traction in recent years in the United States.45 Instead, this thesis tries to 
demonstrate how recruitment campaigns were organised and carried out, how recruiters 
sought the attention and acquiescence of the public, and how the various institutions and 
individuals involved in recruitment work interacted with other agencies and bodies. To get an 
idea of how recruiters operated, and how the study of their history can improve existing 
understandings of British society during the 20th century, we shall now return to the First 
World War to explore how recruiters operated during that period. Their work, as we shall see, 
can be used to say something important about the nature of British society in the 20th century 
and the kinds of historical explanations that have been used to explain it.   
Commercial Advertising, War Propaganda and the First World War 
London Opinion, as we have already seen, played a vital role in introducing ‘Your country 
needs you’ to the wider British public, but it is worth noting that it was not the only ‘private’ 
organisation involved in recruitment for the armed forces. The Caxtons Publishing House, a 
small mail-order publisher that also specialised in direct mail advertising, worked directly for 
the WO promoting recruitment in newspapers and magazines. The so-called Pals Battalions, 
units raised independently of WO oversight by local authorities, industrialists or committees of 
private citizens,46 organised their own advertising with the resources available to them. 
Following the example set by the PRC, a group of commercial advertisers set up their own 
‘Voluntary Recruiting Committee’ and began promoting recruitment in the press from 
November 1914 onwards;47 and a number of newspapers, including the Evening Standard 
and many of Alfred Harmsworth’s (or Lord Northcliffe’s) titles, also promoted recruitment to 
the New Armies using a mixture of editorial publicity and special reader campaigns.48 The 
Evening Standard, for instance, published its own ‘Help Series’ to give its readers advice on 
how to channel what it called Britain’s ‘unorganised, diffuse mass of civilian patriotism’ into 
something beneficial to the government, and even went so far as to form its own unofficial 
‘Recruiting Committee’.49 Mixing the sale of products with the promotion of war and using Bert 
Thomas’ ‘Arf a ‘Mo, Kaiser!’ (see figure four), the Weekly Despatch, one of London Opinion’s 
competitors, ran its own poster campaign to raise money for tobacco for soldiers, while the 
same title was also responsible for the distribution of ‘Will They Never Come?’ (see figure 
five), a recruitment poster that targeted spectators at football matches.50 
[17] 
 
 
The range and breadth of this ‘private’ recruitment campaigning has tended to be treated by 
social historians as evidence of a groundswell of ‘war enthusiasm’ in Britain that was only 
seriously challenged in the wake of crippling defeats on the field of battle.51 Yet it can also be 
regarded as a sign of a burgeoning symbiosis between the state and private industry that not 
only changed the ways in which the military was represented in the mass media, but also 
collapsed the distinctions that had historically prevailed in British society between public and 
private and politics and commerce. Economic historians have tended to account for the 
opening stages of the Great War with reference to a phrase reportedly coined by a 
commercial advertiser: ‘business as usual’.52 Wed to the three principles of free trade, free 
enterprise and free currency, Asquith’s Liberals responded to the declaration of war not by 
assuming control of key industries (though the railways were commandeered), but by 
doggedly retaining the laissez-faire wherever feasible.53 Yet the same intransigence and 
obstinacy was not to be found in recruitment advertising, which developed because of a 
desire on the part of politicians and civil servants to borrow from and appropriate the methods 
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and techniques of a profession that had hitherto remained divorced from the state. The PRC, 
after all, turned to posters, leaflets, placards and display cards, all established mediums in the 
world of consumer promotion; the Caxtons Publishing House, to illustrated newspaper 
advertisements. Though such an encroachment should not be confused with state 
intervention in the market – no advertising agencies were nationalised, though controls on the 
use of paper were introduced in 191754 – it did suggest a willingness on the part of recruiters 
to assimilate, in the words of Hiley, the ‘basic grammar of opinion control’ found in the 
‘language of the mass market’.55  
 
Nevertheless, while advertising furnished the government with a new ‘language’ that seemed 
to provide an answer to its recruiting needs, it has not been accredited by historians of 
propaganda with any significant impact on the operations of the wartime state. Indeed, where 
the subject of government communications in 1914-18 has been discussed, it has tended to 
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focus on the work of a series of institutions and departments that had only a fleeting 
connection to the business of military recruitment. The War Propaganda Bureau, known 
colloquially as Wellington House, has been examined for the ‘literary propaganda’ it created 
under the auspices of its director, Charles Masterman.56 The National War Aims Committee, 
established in 1917 to concentrate solely on domestic propaganda and to combat public 
dissent and disorder, has been studied for the ‘hate-inspired war propaganda’ it created.57 
The Department and later Ministry of Information, finally, have been treated as evidence of a 
new, centralised propaganda machine in Britain that reflected the desire of policymakers and 
civil servants to attain total control of public opinion.58  
The literature on these institutions, and on war propaganda generally, has tended to treat 
recruiting bodies like the PRC as relatively unimportant digressions in the broader history of 
war propaganda. Marwick, to pick an early example, described the PRC as a ‘do-it-yourself 
propaganda body’ concerned with the ‘mundane problem’ of promoting enlistment in the Army 
which paled in comparison to later attempts to engineer ‘complete control of public opinion’.59 
Haste, following Marwick’s lead, wrote of recruitment advertising as a matter of mere ‘routine’ 
that was largely negligible because the British ‘population supported [the government’s] 
policies’ at the start of the war.60 Both authors bought into the idea that the history of First 
World War propaganda could be subdivided into two distinct phases: the first, a period of 
relative harmony when no ‘systematic’ attempt was made to control public opinion because 
‘war enthusiasm’ had run the propaganda machine ‘practically under its own steam’;61 the 
second, from around 1916 onwards, when ‘more concerted efforts to sustain the will to fight 
among the civilian population were [made]’.62 This interpretation has exerted a powerful 
influence on historical understandings of the emergence of propaganda. Because it seems to 
suggest the most significant attempts to manipulate public opinion were made towards the 
end of the war, it has eschewed analysis of those bodies that operated in its opening stages, 
with the notable exception of Wellington House. As Haste argues, 
At the beginning [of the war], the government did not need to establish organized 
propaganda, since the population supported its policies. It was only later on, in 
response to increasing criticism of the conduct of the war, that the government set up 
machinery actively to manipulate public opinion.63  
Since she devotes an entire chapter of her book to recruitment advertising, it is unclear why 
Haste draws a distinction between early and later ‘organised’ propaganda.64 A cursory glance 
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at the work of the PRC reveals not only one of the largest single advertising campaigns in the 
history of the profession, but a massive public meetings programme designed to bring the 
subject of military recruitment to every borough, county borough and county in England, 
Scotland and Wales; a nationwide ‘census’ or survey that represented an early attempt to 
systematically monitor public opinion; and the widespread lobbying of national newspapers 
and magazines to include material in the press that was beneficial to the recruitment 
campaign. One would struggle not to describe the combined efforts of the various arms of the 
PRC’s work as ‘organised’ propaganda, and there are equally good reasons for arguing that 
‘machinery...to manipulate public opinion’ was not only pioneered by recruiters, but 
subsequently emulated by many of the later, supposedly more influential propaganda 
agencies. The National War Aims Committee, to pick an obvious example, took from the PRC 
the strategy of using local authorities and party constituency organisations to organise public 
meetings and speeches and to distribute its own promotional materials. 
Alongside the literature on institutions is an equally sizable body of scholarship that examines 
the contributions of specific media. Readers have become all too accustomed, to name a few, 
to treatises on the war poster, the war film and the war broadcast,65 but while such studies 
can reveal a great deal about the ways in which media were appropriated by the state in 
times of war, they run the risk of providing fractured, incomplete and media-centric accounts 
of propaganda.66 The many claims made on behalf of ‘Your country needs you’, and of war 
posters generally, attest to this, and illustrate the problem of divorcing media from their social, 
political and economic contexts. Furthermore, since recruitment campaigns were by definition 
multi-media events, it makes little sense to isolate a single medium when attempting to 
assess the overall impact of a campaign.  
A final problem associated with the literature on war propaganda, though one that is more 
closely related to its conceptual and epistemological underpinnings, is the obstacle of the 
term itself. As many theorists and historians have pointed out, ‘propaganda’ remains a 
divisive term which has come to imply, in popular usage at least, the wilful manipulation of the 
public.67 Despite Phil Taylor’s best efforts to imbue the term with a degree of objectivity, 
propaganda continues to be identified with media effects and with the many controversial acts 
of governments in times of war.68 In studies of the First World War, for example, ‘propaganda’ 
has been used to describe the atrocity stories peddled by Britain and the Entente, while in 
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studies of the Second it has developed a lasting association to the propagandising of the 
Nazis.69 Tainted by association, propaganda has, according to the media theorist John 
Corner, become ‘too crude [a concept] to catch at the more stealthy, partial ways in which 
discourses of power are at work in culture’. The ‘play of power over meanings’ generated by 
the mass media, Corner suggests, is ‘routinely exercised in ways too complex and subtle to 
be captured by the idea [of propaganda]’, which is ‘embedded within a modernist perspective 
on society and on communication’ that is at best ‘critically under-defined’.70  
Echoing Corner’s reservations, the media historians David Miller and William Dinan have 
argued that ‘propaganda sounds like a quaintly old-fashioned term which is perhaps more 
relevant to communication in times of war, if it has any remaining purchase at all’.71 Yet it is 
precisely the application of ‘propaganda’ to war that creates the various problems associated 
with its use. Prior to 1914, propaganda was an esoteric term used mostly in reference to 
ecumenical matters. In his eyewitness account of the manipulation of the British press during 
the Anglo-Boer war, for instance, Hobson chose ‘jingoism’ rather than propaganda to 
describe the ‘primitive passion, modified and intensified by certain conditions of modern 
civilisation’ that tended to erupt in times of war.72 By the interwar years, however, most 
accounts of the communications apparatuses of wartime governments were couched in terms 
of propaganda, a concept which, according to the American observer Will Irwin, had 
experienced a sudden ‘mutation’ in meaning in the wake of 1914-18. Before the war, Irwin 
claimed, propaganda was ‘mostly an elite word’; thereafter, it came to mean the ‘next thing to 
a damned lie’.73 The term’s pejorative undertone has, as Corner suggested, been ‘built into 
most modern definitions’,74 and is connected to the concomitant belief that propaganda is an 
essentially effective practice that convinces all or most of those to whom it is directed. 
Reflecting on the atrocity stories of the First World War, many interwar commentators sought 
to explain the naive ‘war enthusiasm’ that prevailed in Britain and elsewhere in August 1914 
with recourse to the propaganda activities of governments, and the same idea has infiltrated 
the historiography of the conflict, both in the literature on propaganda and in more general 
social and political accounts.75 
The idea that media are vehicles of hypnotic persuasion was central to early studies of mass 
communication, and will be examined in detail in the following chapter, but it has long since 
fallen out of fashion within media and cultural studies and the literature on promotional 
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culture.76 Early studies of war propaganda often revealed more about the anxieties and 
prejudices of authors, many of whom were liberal scholars fearful of the prospect of an 
unhinged ‘mass’ of people, than they did about the media itself. Furthermore, though 
propaganda presupposes a passive audience onto which ideas can be readily ‘imprinted’ by 
propagandists, empirical analyses of audiences’ reactions to media texts tend to reveal a 
heterogeneity rather homogeneity of responses.77 It is now conventional within media studies 
to regard audiences as active rather than passive entities comprised of individuals who 
‘negotiate’ textual meaning in relation to their personal experiences.78 
The move away from effects has led many media scholars to abandon the term ‘propaganda’ 
in favour of ‘advertising’, ‘public relations’ or ‘promotional culture’. While historians of wartime 
communication continue to use the term ‘propaganda’, in some cases uncritically and in some 
cases as a neutral description of a process,79 media theorists have turned to promotional 
culture to describe the range and complexity of media representations and the range and 
ambiguity of audience reactions to them. Promotional culture, according to the Canadian 
theorist Andrew Wernick (who may have been responsible for introducing the term in 1991), 
is not characterised by a linear model of communication that ties media producers to media 
consumers. On the contrary, it represents a ‘strangely transformative, even engulfing practice’ 
that extends well beyond the ‘immediacies of buying and selling’ to the ‘common cultural pool’ 
from which all forms of promotion draw. A ‘promotional culture’, in other words, provides a 
model for understanding the many different ways in which advertisements and advertisers 
speak to audiences while at the same time interacting with and borrowing from other forms of 
media or popular culture.80 For this reason, this thesis interchanges between ‘advertising’ and 
‘promotion’, using ‘propaganda’ only when it has been adopted in the work of other authors or 
when it has appeared in the records of recruiters. 
A Structural Outline: Military Advertising as a Series of ‘Snapshots’ 
This thesis has been divided into ten chapters (or eight excluding the introduction and 
conclusion) and begins by providing a discussion of the relevant literature. In chapter two the 
historiography of war propaganda and of promotional culture are assessed to give readers an 
idea of how recruitment advertising has been discussed by historians and theoreticians, and 
how it might be discussed as part of an institutional history of recruitment advertising. Crucial 
to this chapter is an analysis not just of existing literature, but of how the terms ‘propaganda’ 
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and ‘advertising’ came to be used by contemporaries and historians over the 20th century. 
Implicated in a series of important debates and discussions on the nature of the mass media 
and the ‘mass society’, propaganda and advertising are concepts that need to be historicised 
before they can be researched.  
While chapter two deals mostly with the available literature, chapter three examines the 
spread and diffusion of the archival sources that make up the basis of this thesis’ case 
studies. A methodological survey that demonstrates how the thesis was designed, 
researched and written, and how archival sources were themselves selected and utilised, it 
introduces the concept of discourse as a general framework for analysing military advertising. 
This framework is based on the general premise outlined above: that recruitment campaigns 
and the institutions and individuals associated with them can only be studied in relation to the 
specific historical circumstances that gives rise to them, and that the analysis of both 
advertising and advertisements requires an awareness of the discourse of advertising. Yet it 
also explores contrasting approaches to the study of discourse, and suggests that the more 
Foucauldian work of authors like McFall and Cronin can help to complement the critical 
discourse analysis of authors like Guy Cook.81 
Chapter four, which opens the six case studies, explores three recruitment campaigns waged 
in England, Scotland and Wales in the run up to and during the First World War. The sources 
of these campaigns have already been mentioned – the PRC, established at the outset of the 
war to aid the WO’s recruitment campaign, and the Caxtons Publishing House, a body that 
actually began recruiting for the Army before the war began and continued to promote 
enlistment until the end of the period of voluntary enlistment in 1916 – but chapter four 
examines in greater detail how these institutions approached the subject of enlistment and 
responded to various challenges presented by the pre-war and wartime periods. Recruitment 
advertising is here placed in the context of existing debates about the ‘rush to the colours’, 
the two-month period in August-September 1914 when almost half a million men enlisted in 
the armed forces before enrolment rates began to drop off. Historians have tended to explain 
the spike in enlistment during this period as evidence of a culture of ‘war enthusiasm’ in 
Britain and elsewhere, and as an event that was a long time in the making,82 but this chapter 
reveals the various, sometimes unsung attempts made to create an atmosphere conducive to 
public displays of patriotism and to recruitment. These attempts extend beyond the production 
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and dissemination of advertisements to public meetings and events, and though historians 
have examined the former little work has been carried out on the latter. 
The second of two First World War case studies, chapter five examines recruitment in Ireland, 
a country which, unlike the rest of the United Kingdom, was fundamentally divided in the run 
up to the Great War. The Irish experience of the Great War has attracted its own specialised 
literature,83 but while some historians have sought to integrate Irish experiences of the conflict 
into broader historical studies this thesis has drawn a distinction between the recruitment 
promotion carried out in England, Scotland and Wales during the 1913-15 period and the 
campaign work which occurred in Ireland from 1914 until 1919. This distinction was borne 
partly of chronology; voluntary recruitment continued in Ireland throughout the war and even 
after it had finished. Yet it was also a reflection of the general approach taken to recruitment 
in this thesis that emphasised the importance of social and political context when assessing 
the contributions of recruiters. Ireland experienced a series of political and social changes 
during the war, and these had a profound effect on how recruitment was organised. In the 
early stages of the war, the Department of Recruitment in Dublin (set up with British support) 
used techniques and tactics broadly similar to those developed by the PRC and the Caxtons 
Publishing House. Yet in the aftermath of the Easter Rising, an event that inspired a 
revolutionary nationalist movement in Ireland,84 recruitment became exceedingly difficult, with 
the Irish Recruiting Council (established in 1918) failing to attract the required numbers of 
recruits. Despite its perceived shortcomings, however, the Irish Recruiting Council continued 
to operate after the Armistice had been signed, and shifted from producing recruitment 
advertising to ‘educational’ publicity designed to placate the nationalist community.  
Chapter six draws on a key idea in the historiography of British society: the notion that the 
Second World War represented a ‘people’s war’ that united Britain’s citizens into a single 
homogenous (and classless) group.85 This idea is typically associated with the conflict to 
which it refers, but it was actually widely promoted in the run up to 1939-45 in a major 
recruitment campaign. This campaign, aimed at recruits for the various arms of civil defence, 
differed from the First World War campaigns in that it concerned services that were not yet 
operational. Furthermore, while recruitment during the Great War typically involved only one 
Service – the Army – the campaign for the various branches of civil defence involved a 
handful of government departments working in unison. A Central National Service Committee 
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was set up to coordinate publicity, and Public Relations Departments (PRDs), specialist 
bodies established within individual ministries during the interwar years, were marshalled to 
promote what the Chamberlain government called ‘national service’. Mariel Grant is among 
the small minority of authors to consider the role of domestic government publicity during the 
interwar years,86 but little is known of the campaign for ‘national service’. Chapter six explores 
how this campaign came into being, what techniques and methods of persuasion it adopted, 
and how it sought to present an image of war that emphasised collective sacrifice, national 
solidarity and a narrative of everyone doing their part. 
Chapter Seven examines not a recruitment campaign as such, but a practice associated with 
recruitment advertising that emerged during the Second World War and became integral to 
the way recruiters liaised with the general public in the postwar era. Attempts to monitor and 
measure public opinion had been made in the 1913-19 period – one of the functions of the 
PRC was to canvass the national population – but it was not until Social Survey was formed 
in 1940 that the government possessed a formal mechanism for assessing public opinion 
based on ‘sampling’ select groups of citizens. The ‘sampling method’, as it came to be 
known,87 was developed by a host of private opinion polling organisations during the interwar 
years, contrasted with the mostly qualitative work of organisations like Mass Observation, and 
was designed to give government officials an insight into the efficacy of their campaigns and 
the wants and beliefs of their target audiences. As with the campaign for national service, 
surprisingly little is known about the workings of Social Survey. The little literature that does 
consider the organisation is focused almost entirely on its wartime work and not its application 
to matters of military recruitment in the postwar era,88 although a range of studies have been 
published exploring the methods of opinion pollsters. By examining not only the development 
of the ‘sampling method’ during the war years but its subsequent application to matters of 
military recruitment in the postwar era, chapter seven shows how advertisers turned to 
‘research’ on the targets of their campaigns in order to improve their efficacy and 
effectiveness.  
The introduction of conscription in 1939 explains the absence of any major Second World 
War recruitment campaign for the armed forces. Yet the post-war Labour and Conservative 
governments continued to organise voluntary recruitment campaigns even though 
conscription (now termed ‘National Service’) remained in force until the late 1950s.89 Chapter 
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Eight, which examines several campaigns organised by the Attlee governments between 
1946 and 1951, shows how both tri-Service and civil defence campaigns were organised 
against a backdrop of governmental reform. The postwar Labour governments, usually 
recognised for their social reforms,90 were also responsible for the reform, or rather the 
attempted reform, of government communications, attempting to redefine all promotional work 
as ‘information’ and changing the titles of the PRDs of a series of ministries to ‘Information 
Offices’. These reforms, part of a wider ‘rebranding’ exercise designed, it is argued, to justify 
the continued existence of wartime promotional machinery, did not change the ways in which 
recruiters communicated with civilians. In fact, recruitment advertising continued the same 
techniques that had been witnessed in earlier campaigns, and also took on the expanded role 
of attempting to justify Britain’s rearmament programme and its entrance into the Cold War in 
1948. Some work has been done on Labour’s ‘propaganda’ work,91 but little attention has 
been directed towards matters of recruitment, and chapter eight seeks to fill in some of the 
gaps that have emerged in historical literature. 
Chapter Nine, the last of the case studies, examines a second attempt at ‘rebranding’ official 
communications, though one that was restricted to the military. In the latter half of the 1950s, 
the decision was made to end National Service, which in turn obliged the Army to raise its 
recruits voluntarily. This transition has attracted a great deal of attention in the literature.92 
However, while the impact of the termination of conscription on Britain’s strategic thinking has 
been explored, little has been written about how the armed forces responded to the change 
with advertising. In this respect, the appointment of Frederic Hooper as an adviser to the 
Ministry of Defence provides an ideal basis for exploring recruitment in the era after national 
service. Hooper, a public relations expert who had worked in an advisory capacity for other 
government departments in the mid-1950s, was asked to review the existing arrangements 
for attracting and subsequently retaining recruits in the Army in 1960. In two reports and 
correspondence, Hooper made a series of sweeping recommendations for changing how the 
Army recruited. These reforms involved changes to advertising practice, but also a 
restructuring of the ways in which the Army was organised as well. Considered but ultimately 
rejected by the Ministry of Defence, Hooper’s reforms captured the response of one critic to a 
burgeoning ‘youth culture’ in Britain in the mid-20th century,93 and the reluctance of the 
military to change in line with the social change this ‘culture’ heralded.  
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From this summary it should be clear to the reader that this thesis covers considerable 
ground. In the tenth and final chapter, the findings of the previous chapters will be discussed, 
with a particular emphasis on the implications military advertising has for historical 
understandings of advertising, public relations and propaganda. Suggesting that military 
advertising has not received the scholarly attention it perhaps deserves, this chapter will also 
broach some of the criticisms that can be made of this thesis and raise some of the questions 
that it has left unanswered.                                       .
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Chapter Two 
Propaganda, Advertising and Promotional 
Culture: Reviewing the Literature 
For a subject that has captured the public imagination and has even, in its own way, defined 
the representation of war, military advertising has not enjoyed a great deal of scholarly 
attention. Although many authors have studied some of it, and though some authors have 
studied lots of it, there remains no locus classicus in relation to which this thesis can position 
itself, to say nothing of a book-length study that seeks to bring together the myriad institutions 
and individuals involved in promoting the armed forces and civil defences in Britain in the 20th 
century.1 This is not to say that ‘military advertising’ as defined here has escaped the 
attention of historians. On the contrary, as the controversy generated by the Leete design 
suggests (see chapter one), the techniques and methods of recruiters continue to excite 
social commentators and historians largely because of what they seem to say about 
prevailing social attitudes and the responses of governments and armed forces towards them. 
Nevertheless, apart from a few key texts and some well-known institutions, military 
advertisements and the individuals and organisations that produce them have for the most 
part been cast to the fringes of contemporary history. This is true of the literature on war 
propaganda, which tends to downplay the significance of recruitment campaigns in favour of 
other, ostensibly more significant developments, and it is also true of the literature on 
promotional culture which, though it has moved beyond studies of commercial advertising to 
subjects such as politics and education, for example,2 has not yet seriously addressed the 
question of recruitment. 
The absence of a sustained historical critique of military advertising presents its own 
problems. Very little is known, for example, about the campaign for National Service 
conducted in 1939 by the Conservative government of Neville Chamberlain (see chapter six) 
or the reforms to Army recruitment proposed by Sir Frederic Hooper in 1960 (see chapter 
nine). Yet it also provides a measure of opportunity. Without an established academic ‘field’ 
into which the research presented here can be inserted, the history of military advertising can 
be told through the prisms of multiple fields and multiple perspectives. An interdisciplinary 
approach to the study of history can help to break down the institutional, professional and 
communications structures that make up distinct disciplines, and implies a ‘more flexible 
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blending of disciplines’ that speaks to more than one scholarly community.3 Thus, even 
though it has tended to downplay the significance of military recruitment the literature on 
propaganda provides a valuable precedent for analysing government institutions, and is also 
useful when trying to sketch out the general outline of official communications in wartime. The 
history and theory of commercial advertising, on the other hand, provides this thesis with a 
theoretical and epistemological underpinning that is often lacking in studies of propaganda. 
However, although each discipline has its own strengths and weaknesses it is important to 
recognise that there are important similarities between them. The study of war propaganda 
and the study of commercial advertising both deal with matters of persuasion, and as such 
are intimately concerned with issues of media power and its relationship to democracy.  
The bearing these fields have on the history of military advertising remains the principle focus 
of this chapter, but it is also deals with another, related subject: how the study of propaganda 
and the study of advertising each emerged as coherent disciplines, and how each of these 
disciplines were caught up in some of the key debates of the 20th century. Following Mariel 
Grant, whose Propaganda and the Role of the State in Interwar Britain (1994) reviews not just 
the literature on propaganda but the ways in which the meaning of propaganda shifted and 
altered over the course of time,4 it seeks to chart the emergence of the terms ‘advertising’ and 
‘propaganda’ as socio-linguistic concepts that labelled and framed how participants viewed 
and understood promotion at given historical moments. The terms ‘propaganda’ and 
‘advertising’, as we shall see, embodied distinct approaches towards studying and viewing 
the mass media that shifted over the course of time. In the first half of the 20 th century, both 
terms were implicated in a broader debate on the uses and abuses of the mass media in 
western society. In the second half, the academic disciplines associated with either term 
began to take shape, with studies of advertising emerging out of studies of economics and 
analyses of propaganda developing out of political history. Today, although attempts have 
been made to integrate the study of propaganda with the study of advertising,5 most work 
carried out in either field implicitly reinforces the differences between the two practices. 
Arguing that each subject can furnish penetrating insights into the history of military 
advertising, this chapter introduces the reader to some of the key concepts and ideas 
associated with them.      
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Split into two main sections, this chapter begins by outlining how propaganda and advertising 
first came to be used as analytical concepts in the social sciences and humanities. Focusing 
in particular on the period between and after the world wars, the first section suggests that 
both propaganda and advertising were caught up in a new critical sociology of British (and 
more broadly western) society that regarded all forms of commercial and political 
communication with suspicion. It was only after the Second World War, and more specifically 
after the 1960s, that the subject of propaganda and advertising developed into distinct 
academic disciplines, and this section concludes by reviewing some of the main issues and 
debates in each field today. The second section, which outlines some of the key concepts 
and theories relevant to the history of military advertising, suggests that the institutional 
approach to propaganda history provides a good precedent on which to model a history of 
recruitment bodies, and that the theorisation of advertising discourses found within the 
literature on promotional culture can provide an epistemologically richer understanding of 
promotion than one typically found in the historiography of propaganda.  
Reviewing Two Fields: Theories, Concepts and Historiography  
Propaganda, according to the cultural theorist Andrew Edgar, represents the ‘conscious 
attempt to control or change the attitudes and behaviour of a group through the manipulation 
of communication[s]’.6 Advertising, according to the marketing scholar Chris Hackley, is 
‘defined by its explicitly promotional, mediated and paid-for character and differentiated from 
other marketing communications disciplines such as public relations, personal selling, 
corporate communications, sales promotion and so on’.7 The qualities identified by Edgar and 
Hackley would be accepted by most historians today, although they are not necessarily 
definitions shared by those who first used the terms as critical concepts in the early 20 th 
century. As we shall see, advertising and propaganda have meant different things at different 
periods in the last 100 or so years, and given that this thesis aims to assess the discourses of 
advertising as they appear at specific historical moments it is important to recognise how 
these meanings have shifted and changed over the course of time. In the case of 
propaganda, a term that contains a lasting association with war, commentators deployed the 
term to critique the manipulation of the media by governments and armed forces. In the case 
of advertising, on the other hand, the growth of a modern consumer society and the corollary 
development of ‘mass civilisation’ or ‘mass culture’ represented key concerns of 
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commentators. This section, which begins by placing each term within the historical context of 
its use, concludes by outlining how both terms helped to spawn modern academic disciplines. 
Propaganda: Crowds, ‘Jingoism’ and the Manipulation of Public Opinion  
Modern scholarship on propaganda began with J. A. Hobson’s The Psychology of Jingoism 
(1901), a trenchant critique of the popular hysteria generated by the second Boer War. A 
noted economist, Hobson had risen to fame with an 1889 attack on classical economic 
theory, Physiology of Industry, and though this publication effectively cost him his place in 
academia it led, among other things, to his appointment as a correspondent at the 
Manchester Guardian covering the war in South Africa.8 It was during this period that Hobson 
began to develop the theory that imperialism was the direct consequence of the expansionary 
forces of modern capitalism, an idea that would later be adopted by the Russian revolutionary 
Vladimir Lenin,9 but he also turned his attention to the organisation and control of the mass 
media. Attacking what he saw as the clandestine and anti-democratic collusion between the 
British government, the British and South African press and certain South African mining 
magnates, Hobson suggested propaganda (or, in his terms, ‘jingoism’)10 emerged in the 
myriad attempts to arouse the ‘passion of the spectator, the inciter, the backer, not of the 
fighter’, and to ignite a ‘collective or mob passion which, in as far as it prevails, makes the 
individual mind subject to a control that joins him irresistibly to his fellows’.11 
Mob passions, spectators and the ‘minds’ of individuals and groups would represent key 
themes in later writings on propaganda, and demonstrated the debt Hobson owed to an 
earlier work on the social psychology of groups. In 1895, the French psychologist, 
anthropologist and inventor Gustave Le Bon published The Crowd: A Study of the Popular 
Mind to outline what he called the ‘group mind’ or ‘collective consciousness’ that emerged 
when individuals congregated in groups.12 Writing at a time of significant social and economic 
upheaval – the latter half of the 19th century was, as one military historian has argued, a time 
of ‘ominous alliances, desperate arms races and [the] increasing expectation of an eventual 
Armageddon’;13 it was also, as Benedict Anderson has shown, a period in which both 
nationalism and ‘print capitalism’ expanded across the industrialised west14 – Le Bon’s theory 
represented an early intervention in the debate about ‘mass society’ and ‘mass culture’. This 
debate, as we shall see, had a profound impact on the literature on both propaganda and 
advertising, although Le Bon was more concerned with the ‘social psychology’ of groups than 
[32] 
 
the mass media. Suggesting that the crowd was an essentially irrational entity incapable of 
reasoned thought, he claimed the masses could be manipulated by appealing to their 
passions and emotions. The crowd, in other words, could be controlled by a minority of 
individuals who could shape the beliefs of the people to suit their own ends and needs.15  
Though he did not share Le Bon’s unabashed elitism, Hobson drew from the latter’s theories 
of group mentality to try to explain the reaction of the British public to the war. He also, 
crucially, added the element of the mass media, and the popular press in particular, to 
describe what he called the ‘great power...placed in the control of a commercial clique or a 
political party, or any body of rich, able and energetic men desirous to impose a general belief 
and a general policy upon the mass of the people’.16 According to Hobson, in the early stages 
of the Boer war there was ‘miraculous agreement [amongst] the British press’ that suggested 
the fourth estate had been commandeered ‘by business men for business purposes’. This 
‘agreement’ lay at the heart of the ‘jingoism’ that had ‘corrupted the mind of the British public’, 
and concealed the real origins of the conflict behind a facade of mediated promotion.17 When 
war was declared in the summer of 1899, meetings and social gatherings (Le Bon’s ‘crowds’) 
were held in Britain to protest against the escalation of hostilities, but these were quickly 
suppressed by a ‘reign of terror’ orchestrated by a ‘legion’ of ‘Imperialist lecturers...[and] 
missionaries from Cape Colony’ who toured Britain ‘professing to lecture on the history of 
South Africa and to set before the audience in some Literary Institute, Chamber of 
Commerce, chapel, church or political club, their personal knowledge of the facts in South 
Africa’.18 Alongside the manipulation of the press, public meetings and gatherings 
represented a second category of jingoism where the ‘crowd’ listened to live communication 
delivered from the platform and the pulpit. The belief that Britain was fighting a just war was, 
Hobson claimed, ‘drilled into [the] minds’ of the public, with the opinions of ‘influential visitors’ 
to South Africa ‘moulded’ to manipulate any first-hand accounts of the experience of the war. 
This conjunction of the forces of the press, the platform and the pulpit has succeeded 
in monopolising the mind of the British public, and in imposing a policy calculated not 
to secure the interests of the British Empire, but to advance the private, political and 
business interests of a small body of men who have exploited the race feeling in 
South Africa and the Imperialist sentiment of England.19  
The notion that a small group of individuals could manipulate not only the public but the 
Empire itself did not wane in the years that followed the publication of The Psychology of 
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Jingoism, and took on a new meaning in the aftermath of the Great War. In that conflict 
Britain experienced a level of ‘jingoism’ that dwarfed anything witnessed in 1899-1902. By the 
close of the 1920s, several authors had conducted analyses into what was now widely known 
as ‘propaganda’. In 1922, the philosopher and pacifist Bertrand Russell delivered a lecture in 
London entitled ‘Free Thought and Official Propaganda’ which pointed to an absence of 
critical thinking on the part of most Britons towards the war, and pointed to the disciplines of 
government propaganda and commercial advertising to explain why so many ‘young 
people...[are] able to read, but for the most part unable to weigh evidence or to form an 
independent opinion’.20 Russell, who had been involved in anti-recruiting activities at 
Cambridge during 1914-18,21 continued Hobson’s critique of a malign mass media, 
suggesting that commercial advertisers were responsible for furnishing the state with the 
weapons to attack ‘free thought’. Throughout the course of their lives, he claimed, Britons  
[were] assailed...by statements designed to make them believe all sorts of absurd 
propositions, such as that Blank’s pills cure all ills...and that Germans eat corpses. 
The art of propaganda, as practiced by modern politicians and governments, is 
derived from the art of the advertisement [and] the science of psychology owes a 
great deal to advertisers.22   
In 1927, the American sociologist Harold Lasswell continued the critique of propaganda with 
what may have been the first academic monologue on the subject, Propaganda Technique in 
the World War.23 Taking elements from both Le Bon and Hobson, Lasswell proposed an 
examination of propaganda based on the relationship between ‘significant symbols’ and the 
‘management of public opinion’. Engaging in an early form of textual analysis that involved 
stories, rumours, reports, pictures and other forms of ‘social communication’, he claimed that 
the attempt to ‘control’ American opinion by the Committee on Public Information or Creel 
Committee24 had centred on the circulation of ‘significant symbols’ such as appeals to 
patriotic duty or chivalric honour. Adapting a concept previously used by Hobson25 and 
emulating the quasi-scientific style of Le Bon, Lasswell suggested that the propaganda aimed 
at the American public during the latter stages of the Great War suggested the ‘management 
of opinions and attitudes by the direct manipulation of social suggestion rather than by 
altering the conditions in the environment or the organism’.26 
A number of other works on First World War propaganda were published in the 1920s, and 
taken together this body of literature represented the first serious foray into the field of 
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propaganda studies.27 Combined with the ‘critical theory’ of the Frankfurt School (see below), 
it also helped to establish the modern discipline of media studies which (as with the study of 
propaganda itself) began life with a series of attempts to chart the impact or ‘effects’ of the 
mass media on their audiences.28 Questions of media power and influence were crucial to the 
early literature on both propaganda and advertising, and some of this research sought to 
establish a correlation between certain kinds of behaviour witnessed during the opening 
stages of the First World War – war enthusiasm, the ‘rush to the colours’ and a rise in 
xenophobic language and sentiment, to name but a few – with the propaganda machinery set 
up by governments to encourage widespread public acquiescence and support. A persistent 
theme in much of this early commentary was the belief that the audiences of official 
communications, whether heralding from the United States, Germany or the United Kingdom, 
were summarily deceived by a group of unscrupulous politicians, advertisers and journalists 
who contrived atrocity stories as a means of cajoling the ‘lost generation’ into accepting the 
need for war.29 The belief that propaganda exerted a fundamentally malign influence on 
democracy and on public opinion has remained a constant theme in the theorising of the 
subject ever since,30 and can be gauged by the kinds of terminology and nomenclature many 
authors used to describe the propaganda process. The mass media ‘inserted’ or ‘implanted’ 
ideas into the minds of the audiences to which it was directed, and were thus implicated in a 
chain of communication which tied the production of media texts to the manufacturing of 
popular consent.31 
Within media and cultural studies today, such ideas tend to be regarded as overly simplistic 
not least because they rely on a notion of a passive audience that has long since been 
discredited.32 Yet they continue to cast a long shadow over the literature on propaganda 
which is still described in many historical accounts in terms of the ‘influence’ mass media had, 
or did not have, on national audiences. This shadow extends to the general political and 
social accounts of Britain during the two world wars; both A. J. P. Taylor and Arthur Marwick, 
for example, have drawn correlations between the ‘war enthusiasm’ witnessed in Britain 
during the opening stages of the war and the propaganda activities of governments, 
demagogues and private patriotic organisations.33 Yet it also infiltrated several of the 
dedicated historical accounts of propaganda which began to appear in Britain in the 1960s in 
the form of the literature on the war poster.34 Maurice Rickards, the historian of ephemera 
cited in the preceding chapter, may have been the first professional historian (rather than 
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sociologist or philosopher) to pen an account of the First World War poster, the 1968 Posters 
of the First World War, and he was soon followed by others, including Joseph Darracott and 
Belinda Loftus (1972) and Zbynek Zeman (1978).35 Drawing from the archives of the Imperial 
War Museum, an institution that boasts the distinction of holding the largest depository of war 
posters in the world, these authors blended an art-historical approach to the study of the war 
poster with criticisms of war propaganda. For Darracott and Loftus, for instance, posters could 
be studied not only in terms of their artistic merits, but also because of their ‘psychology’ and 
‘undertones’.36    
Studies of war posters were soon matched by studies of other media, beginning with Richard 
Taylor’s influential Film Propaganda, a book published in the same year as Zeman’s Selling 
the War (1978) but one that placed a far greater emphasis on detailed archival research. 
Though posters, like films, represented primary sources in their own right, the literature on the 
war poster had at that point tended to treat them as the most important historical sources 
rather than as only one of many sources require to produce a coherent historical 
interpretation. Taylor’s pioneering work sought to place the medium of film within the context 
of its production.37 By the 1980s, a number of books and articles had appeared on another 
medium – radio – and by 1983 enough interest had been generated in the study of 
propaganda history to justify the publication of the first multi-media anthology – Kenneth 
Short’s Film and Radio Propaganda in World War II.38  
However, during the 1980s the field of propaganda history began to fragment again into a 
number of smaller specialisms. Film history, which began as and has remained a highly 
specialised field of historical enquiry,39 carved a niche for itself in the literature of propaganda 
to focus specifically on the two world wars, while the commentary on war posters retained its 
affiliation to art history and to detailed textual analysis of individual advertisements. Though 
these kinds of historical writing represent different genres or approaches to history, they 
share one thing in common: they are all, without exception, studies of individual media, or 
rather, following the media historian James Curran, they ‘medium histories’: ‘historical 
accounts of an individual medium’ that sometimes ‘[give] rise to fractured and incomplete 
understandings of the historical role of the media’.40 
A second category of propaganda research, and one that does not place so much stock on 
individual media, is the study of propaganda institutions, a genre or approach to historical 
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writing that probably began with Cate Haste’s Keep the Home Fires Burning (1977). Though 
not a historian by trade, Haste nevertheless offered a comprehensive breakdown of First 
World War propaganda that examined not only military recruitment – she devoted an entire 
chapter to the subject of recruitment – but other, and much better-known, propaganda 
agencies such as the War Propaganda Bureau, the National War Aims Committee, and the 
Department, later Ministry of Information (MOI).41 Haste’s approach to the various institutions 
that produced propaganda media, provides a useful precedent for the kind of institutional 
history argued for here. It was soon followed by Iain McLaine’s The Ministry of Morale and 
Michael Balfour’s Propaganda in Wartime, both published in 1979.42 McLaine’s book, which 
adopted a similar approach to the Second World War MOI, shared much in common with 
Taylor’s earlier analysis of film and with Haste’s expansive conception of propaganda as 
something that can be assessed in multiple forms.  
Remarking on the historiography of propaganda in 2000, the media historian James 
Chapman suggested that the study of propaganda in its modern historical sense can be dated 
to the 1970s, and that before that decade studies of propaganda tended lie in the ‘domain of 
political and social scientists, not historians’. Between the wars studies of propaganda tended 
to focus on the power of imagery and rhetoric (and often individual images) to change public 
opinion, and Chapman has argued that ‘new propaganda history, as it has emerged over the 
last two decades or so, has taken the study of propaganda away from the work of the social 
scientists and placed it firmly in the camp of the modern, professional, empiricist historian’. At 
the same time, by Chapman’s own admission ‘new propaganda history’ has continued to be 
couched in terms of ‘how to assess the effectiveness of propaganda’.43 The emphasis on 
media effects presents problems that will be dealt with below, but before evaluating the 
usefulness of the literature on propaganda for the history of military advertising presented 
here, I turn to engager with the literature on commercial advertising.  
Advertising: Culture, the Culture Industries and the Emergence of a ‘Mass’ Society 
At around the same time that the first serious analyses of propaganda began to appear in 
Britain and the United States, the English critic F. R. Leavis published a pamphlet entitled 
Mass Civilisation and Minority Culture (1930). Warning that ‘civilisation and culture are 
coming to be antithetical terms’, Leavis took aim at the ‘mass society’ that had begun to 
flourish across the west in the 20th century. Drawing on the literary criticism of the 19th century 
[37] 
 
poet Mathew Arnold, and equating ‘culture’ with the ivory tower intellectualism of academia, 
he suggested that the acceleration of industrialisation combined with related developments of 
mass production and mass consumption had ‘standardised civilisation’. Little could be done to 
resist what Leavis called, in reference to a D. H. Lawrence poem of the same name, the 
‘triumph of the machine’, which had wreaked untold damage to the ‘conditions of life’ that had 
formerly prevailed in Britain and the US and had imposed upon all people, working, middle 
and upper class, a new ‘mass culture’.44  
This culture, gaudy, garish and vacuous, was to be found in the mass media of print, 
broadcast and film, and sustained by new commodities such as cars and telephones which, in 
the space of a few years, had ‘revolutionised social custom’. Yet it was also conveyed in the 
burgeoning language of advertising which, like the media carrying it, encouraged ‘the 
surrender, under conditions of hypnotic receptivity, to the cheapest emotional appeals’. 
Contemplating the ‘deliberate exploitation of the cheap response which characterises our 
civilisation’, Leavis suggested, ‘we may say that a new factor in history is an unprecedented 
use of applied psychology’ in the world of business.45 By making use of psychology (widely 
regarded at the time as a new form of ‘scientific’ investigation), the profession of advertising 
had acquired the fuel needed to keep the wheels of industry turning, and had done so in a 
way that had both colonised and impoverished the English language in the process. 
Advertising, Leavis remarked sardonically, ‘is doing a great deal for English’ – firstly by 
‘carrying on the work begun by Mr Rudyard Kipling’, and secondly, ‘where certain important 
parts of the vocabulary are concerned, [by] making things more difficult for the fastidious’. 
Commenting on a proliferation of ‘signals’ generated by the media and by advertising, Leavis 
claimed, in a passage that pre-empted the postmodernism of later years, that the  
modern [observer] is exposed to a concourse of signals so bewildering in their variety 
and number that, unless he is especially gifted or especially favoured, he can hardly 
begin to discriminate. Here we have the plight of culture in general. The landmarks 
have shifted, multiplied and crowded upon one another, the distinctions and the 
dividing lines have blurred away, the boundaries are gone, and the arts and 
literatures of different countries and periods have flowed together so 
that...[referencing T. S. Eliot] ‘it becomes exceedingly difficult for anyone to know 
whether he knows what he is talking about or not’.46  
Leavis, it should be clear, was referring to the emergence of a new monoculture in Britain 
characterised by mass consumption and mass production, and by a new media system that 
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had distorted the relationship between the high culture of art and literature and the popular 
culture of the industrial working classes. Eliot, his contemporary, would express similar 
misgivings in The Idea of a Christian Society (1938), a book that drew a parallel between the 
‘increasing organisation of the advertisement and propaganda’ and the ‘influencing of masses 
of men by any means except through their intelligence’.47 Both Leavis and Eliot approached 
the subject of advertising from the perspective of modernist thought, and though they are 
seldom credited with originating the study of advertising their contribution laid the conceptual 
groundwork for later scholars. Since both were conscious of the similarities (or purported 
similarities) between advertising and propaganda, it is worth noting that they were among the 
first commentators to draw a parallel between the promotion of products and services and the 
promotion of the armed forces and war. 
In 1944, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, German-Jewish émigrés to the United States 
but founding members of the Frankfurt School, published a scathing denunciation of 
advertising and the mass media that embraced the dichotomies between culture and 
entertainment and art and mass media that had defined the work of Leavis and Eliot. ‘The 
Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception’ was written as an indictment of the 
failure of capitalist societies to nurture true freedom and individuality and represent the real 
conditions of existence.48 Advertising, which performed a crucial mediatory role between 
capitalist industry and the mass society on which it depended, performed a vital function in 
both the culture industries and the wider capitalist economy. The culture industries (a 
deliberately contradictory term used to describe the production of mass culture) stretched 
from the media itself to the advertising that sustained it.  Advertising represented both the 
‘elixir of life’ of the culture industries and a ‘negative principle’ that ‘block[ed] everything that 
does not bear its stamp’ such as (high) art. The encroachment of advertising in capitalist 
society collapsed the distinctions between promotion and media content or ‘information’, with 
the latter emulating the former and vice versa, and the ‘mechanical repetition of the same 
culture product’ by advertisers and corporations was equivalent to ‘the propaganda slogan’ 
seen in totalitarian societies. The real ‘triumph of advertising’, however, is that ‘consumers 
feel compelled to buy and use...products even though they see through them’.49 
The notion that advertising was instrumental in the regulation of demand, and that it provided 
a bridge that connected the producers of goods with their consumers, became key themes in 
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post-war literature. Adorno and Horkheimer, following in the footsteps of early theorists on 
propaganda, credited both the culture industries and the advertising profession with an ability 
to change human behaviour, and the same idea would soon be found in John Kenneth 
Galbraith’s classic book The Affluent Society (1958). Galbraith, an economist by trade who 
had worked for the US Strategic Bombing Survey during the Second World War, was no 
adherent to critical theory. Yet he nevertheless believed that advertising played a malign role 
in American society by separating in the popular conscious ‘privately produced and marketed 
goods’ from ‘publicly rendered services’.50 ‘The engines of mass communication, in their 
highest state of development, assail the eyes and ears of the community on behalf of more 
beer but not more schools’, thus encouraging Americans to view private consumption as an 
enriching experience and state spending as a burden. In their endorsement of consumerism, 
advertisers steered public opinion from matters of government to matters of private industry. 
‘Every corner of the public psyche is canvassed by some of the nation’s most talented 
citizens to see if the desire for such merchantable product[s] can be cultivated’, and ‘we 
would be measurably shocked to see [advertising] applied to public services’ in the same 
way. Advertising, indeed, was responsible for encouraging a lack of social balance:  
The scientist or engineer or advertising man who devotes himself to developing a new 
carburettor cleanser, or depilatory for which the public recognises no need and will 
feel none until an advertising campaign arouses it, is one of the valued members of 
our society. A politician or a public servant who dreams up a new public service is a 
wastrel.51 
Galbraith’s critique of advertising was directed at what Edmund McGarry called the 
‘propaganda function’ of marketing,52 and drew on a general outlook or philosophy on 
advertising that sought to tie high levels of consumption to the saturation of American society 
with consumer imagery and messages. Since consumption and advertising went hand in 
hand, it seemed plausible to many observers that there was a correlation between the 
‘affluent society’ of the postwar era and the attempt by advertisers to create the ‘all-round 
ambience’ towards consumption53 required to sustain that society. This was certainly the 
conclusion drawn by the journalist Vance Packard, whose The Hidden Persuaders (1957) 
pre-empted Galbraith’s research on the affluent society and resurrected both the spectre of 
media effects that had haunted early writing on propaganda and the nomenclature used to 
describe and measure those effects. Describing what he called the ‘depth approach to 
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influencing our behaviour’, Packard claimed ‘large-scale efforts [were] being made, often with 
impressive success, to channel our unthinking habits, our purchasing decisions, and our 
thought processes by the use of insights gleaned from psychiatry and the social sciences’.54 
Speaking to a generation of Americans who had lived with the Cold War, and writing at 
around the same time as Cold War hysteria erupted in the McCarthy trials, Packard’s thesis 
suggested the ‘skill’ of advertisers and ‘public-relations experts at ‘“engineering” our consent’ 
had steadily increased with the passage of time, and that attempts to ‘probe our everyday 
habits for hidden meanings’ had furnished both corporations and governments with the 
means to persuade people without their knowledge or consent.55 According to Mark Crispin 
Miller, it was precisely this conviction that advertising worked on a subliminal level, that is, 
that even the most astute or fastidious observer was powerless to its charms, that made 
Packard’s intervention so timely.  
The Hidden Persuaders shook up that complacent view, by baring the dark side of 
advertising...[and] by demonstrating that the advertising industry had lately started up, 
and now was seeking to perfect, a whole new science of allurement – one based not 
on crowd psychology, with its crude model of collective stimulus/response, but on 
much subtler notions of the mind, derived primarily from psychoanalysis, with insights 
also gleaned from sociology and cultural anthropology.56    
Though the United States had produced some of the earliest and most well-known critiques of 
advertising, the totalising power of the advertising industry also seeped into postwar British 
literature. In 1972, the cultural studies academic Fred Inglis published The Imagery of Power, 
a book that repeated the charges against commercial and political promotion aired previously 
by Leavis, Eliot, Adorno, Horkheimer, Galbraith and Packard, but eschewed the kind of 
effects-based analysis those authors hinted at or advocated. Suggesting that the existence of 
the advertising industry was a symptom of a ‘damnable failure’ to construct a communications 
system in ‘public hands’, Inglis’ work highlighted a shift in the language of advertisements 
from ‘information’ to ‘image-orientated’ communication: advertising, according to this 
interpretation, had moved away from mass culture representations to a new doctrine of 
individualism and a ‘social and moral ideology which judges fulfilment in terms of private 
fulfilment and ostentatious display’.57 
Inglis’ work, though it shared certain thematic similarities with the critical literature that 
preceded it, approached the study of the mass media from a different theoretical vantage 
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point. Whereas earlier literature had placed a primacy on messages and on the (typically 
linear) process of communication from producer, to message to consumer, literature within 
media and cultural studies couched in the semiotics tradition suggested a move away from 
message, and from processual models of communication, to studies of texts. Texts, here, 
were taken to mean inherently contested or entities whose polysemic nature undermined the 
notion of media ‘effects’. In the literature on advertising, the French philosopher Roland 
Barthes offered perhaps the first semiotic analysis of an advertisement in ‘Rhetorique de 
l’image’ (1962), an article that used a single Panzani advertisement to make a general point 
about the complex chain of signification that surrounded texts and complicated their 
meanings.58 Judith Williamson continued this approach in Decoding Advertisements (1978),59 
and in ‘Encoding, Decoding’ (1977) Stuart Hall put forward a four-stage theory of 
communications that radically departed from notions of effects and suggested instead an 
emphasis on production, circulation, use (consumption) and reproduction.60  
The notion that advertisements represent ‘texts’ whose meanings are constantly shifting and 
whose audiences or ‘readers’ are actively involved in their use and ‘reproduction’, helped to 
inspire a new range of critical engagements with advertising that including studies of 
advertising audiences and various branches of detailed semiotic analyses of texts. Works 
produced within this vein included the ‘close reading’ or ‘explication’ favoured by New Critical 
theorists such as Barbara Stern and the reader-response theory of Linda Scott.61 However, 
not all research on advertising published in the 1960s and 1970s drew its inspiration from 
semiotics. Stuart Ewen’s Captains of Consciousness (1976), an account of the emergence of 
consumer culture in America and its relationship to the advertising industry, offered one of the 
first dedicated historical monographs on advertising, focusing on the early 20th century and 
the interwar period in particular. Suggesting advertising helped to establish consumerism as 
an ‘idiom of daily life with a matter-of-fact status within American culture’,62 Ewen’s argument 
was based on a review of a range of primary sources such as industry trade journals and 
accounts of advertising left by its practitioners. Its conclusion, that advertising had been 
involved in a covert agenda to promote consumerism and ‘civilise’ the working classes, 
echoed many of the criticisms aired decades earlier by Leavis et al. In its 
attempt to massify men’s [sic] consumption in step with the requirements of the 
productive machinery, advertising increasingly offered mass-produced solutions to 
‘instinctive’ strivings as well as to the ills of mass society itself. If it was industrial 
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capitalism around which crowded cities were being built and which had spawned 
much of the danger to health, the frustration, the loneliness and the insecurity of 
modern industrial life, the advertising of the period denied complicity. Rather, the logic 
of contemporaneous advertising read, one can free oneself from the ills of modern life 
by embroiling oneself in the maintenance of that life.63    
Ewen’s attack on advertising attracted a number of critics, and by the 1980s a debate erupted 
within social history and cultural studies over the precise role of advertising in American and 
more broadly western society. Its protagonists shared some common ground; the idea of a 
‘consumer society’ or a ‘commercial culture’, for instance, had by now firmly established itself 
within the academic milieu. Yet disagreement centred on the old battleground of media 
effects, and in particular on the extent to which advertising could be said to cause or merely 
reflect the kinds of values and beliefs identified by historians. Michael Schudson, a sociologist 
and historian of commercial culture, published Advertising, the Uneasy Persuasion (1984) as 
a counterargument to Ewen’s earlier work, articulating the general point that ‘consumer 
changes are rarely wrought by advertising’ and that advertising follows rather than leads the 
audiences to whom it is directed.64 Nevertheless, much of the attention since the middle of 
the 1980s has moved beyond questions of media effects.65 Anthropologists and sociologists 
have carried out ethnographic studies of the consumers of advertising and of the advertising 
industry itself, using methods such as interviews, focus groups and participant observation. 
Some studies have paid attention to wider aspects of advertising, including in particular 
brands and public relations, and as with the medium history of propaganda, a number of 
books and articles have been released that seek to problematise and deconstruct 
advertisements in certain media, including in particular print and television.66 
Analysing Institutions: Studying Advertising Through Discourse Theory 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s a new kind of advertising scholarship began to establish 
itself within media and cultural studies. Eschewing analyses of media texts for studies of 
‘cultural production’,67 this approach drew from notions of discourse pioneered in the work of 
the French philosopher Michel Foucault. Foucault’s work is notoriously opaque, and there is 
not space to deal with it here save to say that it has proven particularly useful for examining 
institutions and the processes by which they are socially constructed.68 Sean Nixon, Liz 
McFall and Anne Cronin all work within this tradition of intellectual enquiry, and though there 
are differences between the approaches these authors adopt they share a common concern 
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with how advertising institutions can be analysed and assessed through the records they 
leave behind. In Advertising Cultures (2003), Nixon put forward an argument that centred on 
the personal ‘identities and subjective choices made by [advertising] practitioners’, a subject 
which, he claimed, remained the ‘most neglected aspect’ of current advertising research.69 
Yet the work of Liz McFall and Anne Cronin has proven most useful to this thesis – focusing, 
as it does, on the process of institutionalisation and providing a model for analysing primary 
sources that will be described in detail in the next chapter.  
In Advertising: A Cultural Economy (2004), McFall levelled a series of important criticisms at 
existing historical accounts of the advertising industry, suggesting that the place of the 
advertising industry within British society has been consistently misunderstood by historians, 
whose analysis of advertising tends be conducted through the prism of the textual analysis of 
advertisements rather than empirical analyses of societies or institutional analyses of 
advertising agencies.70 Whereas the literature on propaganda made repeated attempts to 
illustrate the authority propagandists apparently had over their audiences, historians of 
commercial culture have tended to dismiss earlier forms of advertising as trivial and 
unsophisticated attempts to exhort and cajole the public which compare unfavourably with 
more contemporaneous appeals. This argument, which McFall calls the ‘teleological’ 
approach to the history of advertising, suggests that the business of advertising has gotten 
progressively more complex as time has passed by; a belief apparently confirmed by 
comparing older, technologically less ‘advanced’ advertisements with their newer 
counterparts. Yet it is not a position that stands up to historical scrutiny. McFall, who finds 
ample evidence to suggest the advertising of the past was complex and sophisticated, 
suggests historians of promotion need firstly to engage with any historical moment in its own 
terms, and also to move beyond a ‘preoccupation with texts’ to studies of the ‘local, 
organisational level’ of production.71 
Studying advertising institutions in their historical context counteracts an over-reliance on 
texts, and reveals aspects of the advertising industry that are promotional but are not 
nevertheless conveyed in advertisements. The pages of Advertising: A Cultural Economy are 
filled with examples of how advertisers communicate with clients and consumers during the 
19th and 20th centuries, suggesting, as McFall contends, that advertising has been a 
‘remarkably adaptable institution that has, over time, made ingenious use of a diverse and 
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eclectic range of technologies to ensure its message is seen and heard’. Adapted to suit 
‘busy urban environments’, advertisers developed appeals that were designed to catch the 
eye, including an ‘elaborate promotional machine’ involving advertisers, the press and the 
book trade which led to a system of ‘editorial puffing’; horse drawn advertising ‘machines’; 
and a range of print-based mediated promotions such as placard-bearers.72 Many of the 
devices used by advertisers to sell products and services were, as we shall see, also used by 
military advertisers who borrowed from (in Nicholas Hiley’s terms) the ‘language of the mass 
market’ in order to construct appeals directed at ordinary civilians.73 
Crucial to McFall’s work, and a belief shared by Cronin, is the notion of advertising as 
something that can only be meaningfully studied in relation to the particular historical moment 
that give rise to it. Historians can no more make blanket judgements on the nature of the 
advertising industry by looking at advertisements than they can compare advertisements of 
the past with those of the present to make a point about ever-increasing promotional 
saturation. To even begin to address questions of media power and influence, accounts of 
advertising need to consider the place of the advertising industry within the societies that 
created them. Envisioning advertising as a site of discursive contestation that implicates both 
consumers and producers, clients and agencies, audiences and publics, and promotion and 
‘information’, allows historians to unpack the myriad ways in which advertisers understand 
and produce (as well as semiotically construct) advertisements, and thus, in a different way, 
contribute to the social production and circulation of meanings.74 Cronin, whose work on 
advertising is contemporary rather than historical, has suggested that the industry of 
advertising extends beyond the confines of the agency to the various discourses that ‘make 
up’ advertising at any moment in time. Advertising, she claims, represents a ‘special form of 
mediation’ that brings together disparate individuals and institutions which cannot be properly 
grasped by examining individual advertisements.   
Whilst practitioners certainly cannot be said to determine viewers’ reception of their 
texts, completely excluding practitioners from the analysis skews understandings of 
the significance of advertising practice and its textual products. This inattention to the 
process of production and the influence of practitioners’ social position and beliefs on 
this process thus detracts from a full analysis of advertising as an industry. As an 
industry, it has its own culture and values into which new practitioners are duly 
initiated.75   
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Advocating a ‘full analysis’ of the advertising industry based on a series of contemporary or 
historical ‘snapshots’ can provide an empirically richer understanding of the advertising 
industry. Yet no work has yet sought to apply comparable methods to the history of 
recruitment advertising. Military advertising, for its part, has received only passing references 
in the literature on war propaganda, and virtually no mention at all in the literature on 
promotional culture. Neither McFall or Cronin examines military recruitment, although their 
understandings of how promotion works (or worked, in the case of McFall) can aid this thesis’ 
analysis of military advertising. 
Conclusion: Reviewing the Literature on Advertising, Promotion or Propaganda 
By now it should be clear that both advertising and propaganda have been implicated in some 
of the key debates on the nature of British society. The rise of a mass media culture in the 
early years of the 20th century spurred those debates in the interwar years, and it was during 
the latter period that the study of advertising and the study of propaganda took on a distinctly 
modernist undertone. In the postwar era academic disciplines emerged associated with both 
subjects, including the ‘new propaganda history’76 of the 1970s and the study of advertising 
institutions (as opposed to advertising texts) of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Concepts and 
theories can be borrowed from these literatures. The study of propaganda institutions, for 
instance, provides a useful model against which this thesis can compare its own institutional 
histories of recruitment advertising, while production-centred accounts of the advertising 
industry can help to move beyond the narrow paradigm of media ‘effects’ to matters of 
discursive production. At the same time, there are elements to these approaches that are not 
particularly useful. The emphasis on media effects in the literature on propaganda is not 
shared by this thesis, and nor is the tendency in the literature on promotional culture to study 
advertising through the prism of advertisements. In moving beyond the notion of media 
effects, and behind advertisements, this thesis seeks to provide a different kind of account of 
promotion to that often found in either literature. The ways in which this account was 
developed, how archival sources were used and selected, and how this thesis drew on the 
discourse theory of McFall, Cronin and other authors, will be the subject of the following 
chapter. 
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Chapter Three 
Researching, Designing and Writing the Thesis: 
A Methodological Survey  
In previous chapters, a broad outline of the approach taken to military advertising was given. 
This approach, which draws from the work of the sociologists Liz McFall and Anne Cronin, 
suggests that recruitment advertising should be studied in relation to the specific historical 
circumstances that give rise to it, and that advertising should be treated as a form of 
discourse. In its Foucauldian inflection, discourse represents a means of organising and 
producing meaning within a social context; a way of seeing the world, describing things and a 
thing that can itself be described, it can be studied through systematic analyses of the 
documents institutions and individuals produce.1 These documents are created by the 
structures and practices of the advertising profession – the committees, institutions, agencies, 
clients, departments and individuals involved in the making of advertisements – and by the 
language of advertisements themselves, which perpetuates what is sometimes called an 
‘advertising discourse’.2 According to McFall, by studying advertising as a practice governed 
by social meaning and conventions, historians can move beyond text-centred accounts of the 
profession to analyses rooted in media production. Eschewing a developmental historical 
narrative in favour of a ‘snapshot of how advertising operated as a way of generating different 
ways of thinking about its contemporary and historical formations’, she calls for a ‘patiently 
documentary’ approach to advertising history based on a close reading of production: 
[T]o tell the history of advertising solely from the text is to tell a story which is 
unusually dependent at every stage on the type of hermeneutic, interpretative method 
that...can be so problematic. The...benefits of a more modest description of 
advertising practice are a liberation from some of the constraints of dualistic theory, 
and a more informed understanding of the contingent conditions in which various 
advertising practices and forms – for the two are inextricably linked – emerged.3  
McFall’s emphasis on a ‘description’ of advertising practice is shared by Cronin, who 
combines detailed ethnographic studies of advertising institutions with an analysis of the 
discourses that constitute them and situate them within fields of media production. The 
business of advertising, according to Cronin, provides multiple ‘regimes of mediation’ (leaning 
on Michel Foucault’s concept of ‘regimes of truth’) that link advertisers with agencies, 
advertisements with the commodities and services (or careers) they represent, and 
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promotional vehicles with the mass and interpersonal media that carry them. Echoing 
McFall’s critique of the widespread ‘inattention to the process of production and the influence 
of practitioners’ social position and beliefs’ within the literature on commercial advertising, 
Cronin advocates what she calls a ‘full analysis of advertising as an industry’ that reveals the 
‘culture and values into which new practitioners are duly initiated’.4 This industry, Cronin 
claims, ‘produces more than advertisements or commodity signs: its practices generate a 
wide range of discourses that circulate in complex ways between multiple participants’.5 
The recognition that the business of advertising involves more than the production and 
circulation of advertisements is fundamental to this thesis, and provides a good point of 
departure for thinking about the kind of methodological questions a discursive history of 
military advertising raises. If the practices of advertising and the communicative forms it 
trades in are constructed by and maintained through discourses, how might historians study 
recruitment advertising in relation to the literature discussed in previous chapters? To what 
extent, furthermore, are discourses discernible through archives, and can the ‘systematic’ 
study of archival materials provide an insight into the discourses and ‘regimes of mediation’ 
that prevailed in British society at particular moments in the past? The literature on discourse 
analysis, promotional culture and institutional theory provides some tentative answers to 
these questions, but it is worth noting that the application of discourse to historical writing 
presents its own problems. Writing in 1989, the historian Arthur Marwick claimed its emphasis 
on dominance and its ‘indissoluble’ connection to the Marxist notion of ideology prevented 
discourse theory from ‘ever making major contributions to historical knowledge’.6 Ludmilla 
Jordanova, writing some years later, was a little more charitable in her assessment, but 
nevertheless wrote of the ‘limitations’ discourse and ideology have as concepts for historians: 
The notion of discourse and work that deploys it rely heavily on the study of 
language. Although it is sometimes claimed that anything can be treated as a 
text...the whole approach has been shaped by a conviction of the power of the written 
word and of the intellectual effectiveness of theories of language to open up its 
capacity to structure all human experience... discourse implies that there is more or 
less a coherent world view behind the texts, and that the ideas they express have 
palpable effects.7  
Though historians also place great stock on written communications, the determining quality 
of discourses stands at odds with some traditions of historical scholarship, not least because 
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discourse theory regards all documents as embodiments of one or more discourse, and 
considers the search for such discourses (rather than the search for, and analysis of, 
sources) as the principal task of historians.8 However, while the idea of discourse may have 
disadvantages as a general methodological framework for historical writing, it contains a 
practical use when applied to studies of media organisations and the media forms they 
produce and circulate. Since the 1990s, a number of authors working across several 
disciplines have turned to discourse to explore various aspects of media communication.9 
Merging Foucault’s notion of discourse as a social construction of reality with studies of how 
language is used, these authors have sought to explore how media ‘texts position readers to 
view social and political events in a particular way’.10 A means of examining advertisements, 
‘critical discourse analysis’ (the name given to this latter form of enquiry) can complement the 
Foucauldian analysis of advertising put forward by McFall and Cronin. 
This chapter demonstrates why this approach was adopted and how it was subsequently 
applied to the various sources examined during the course of researching this thesis. 
Beginning with a chronological overview of the process of designing and writing the thesis, it 
shows that the significance of discourse as a general methodological tool only became 
apparent after a period of archival research and a review of available literature. The approach 
to studying advertising discursively, in other words, only began to shape the research 
presented here until after a period of critical reflection. The second section returns to the 
subject of discourse, and to the work of McFall, Cronin and others, to demonstrate why 
discourse theory was chosen as a methodological framework for analysing military 
advertising, and how this ‘framework’ was subsequently applied to the various sources used. 
Reiterating the key tenets of the thesis’ argument, it sketches out two broad uses of discourse 
theory and illustrates how these uses can be applied to the history of military advertising.  
The Genesis of the Project: Designing, Researching and Writing the Thesis 
Research for this thesis began in the autumn of 2009. The key research questions that 
defined the early engagement with the subject matter included the following:  
o How did the military use advertising and public relations to promote itself? 
o What institutions and organisations were involved in recruitment promotion? 
o Did recruitment promotion change over the course of the 20th century? 
o In what ways did the military borrow from or appropriate techniques of persuasion 
developed outside the state (id est, in the world of commerce)? 
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A preliminary review of the literature was carried out, and it became apparent fairly early on 
that a significant proportion of the thesis’ research would need to be archival in nature. Few 
published works examined the subject of recruitment advertising, although a wealth of 
material existed on commercial advertising and war propaganda. The latter disciplines, as the 
previous chapter demonstrated, approached the subject of promotion from different 
perspectives and with contrasting intentions. Historians of advertising tended to focus on the 
commercial origins and applications of promotion, and on its relationship to the capitalist 
economy. Historians of propaganda, on the other hand, tended to restrict their analyses to the 
development of promotion as a political tool, focusing on its role within government.  
Since the connection between the state and private industry was identified as a key research 
question, both forms of promotion were deemed important for the thesis at this early stage. 
However, in the absence of any major study of recruitment advertising – at this point, Peter 
Simkins’ work had not yet been reviewed, and nor had the numerous articles of Nicholas 
Hiley (see below) – a review of existing archival materials was carried out. In all, nine weeks 
were spent reviewing records in 2010 and again 2012. The Imperial War Museum (IWM), the 
Public Records Office (PRO), and the British Library (BL) were all consulted, and around the 
same period of time was spent surveying the digitised records of the proceedings of Houses 
of Parliament (or Hansard), the Times Digital Archive, the Guardian and Observer Historical 
Archive and the Daily Mirror Archive. The materials acquired from these resources would 
provide the basis for each of this thesis’ six case studies, but the particular ways in which they 
could be studied through the prism of discourse analysis did become apparent until after the 
first visit to the archives. We will return to the subject of discourse below. In the writing that 
follows, a basic outline of the progression of the archival research will be given. 
The First Visit to the Archives, 2010 
Since it contained various records associated with the prosecution of war, and had recently 
organised a Posters and Conflict exhibition that exhibited many recruitment advertisements,11 
the IWM was the first archive visited. In the initial stages of a review of its records, a number 
of books and articles on recruitment advertising were examined, including Advertising Goes 
to War (1942), an account of the role of the American advertising industry in aiding Second 
World War troop mobilisation, Keep Mum! (1975), a British equivalent which focused on the 
advertising work of the Second World War Ministry of Information (MOI), and Cate Haste’s 
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Keep the Home Fires Burning (1977), a fairly comprehensive overview of First World War 
propaganda and recruitment advertising.12 It was Haste’s book, and in particular the chapter 
on ‘Getting the Troops’, that introduced the author to some of the institutions involved in 
recruitment advertising during the 1914-18 period. These institutions included the 
Parliamentary Recruiting Committee and the Caxtons Publishing House, which would provide 
the basis for the first case study (see below), as well as a host of voluntary organisations 
unrelated to the official recruiting drive. At this point in the research, no distinction had been 
made between official and unofficial recruiting efforts, so a decision was made to search for 
any additional archival materials that illustrated which organisations had been involved in 
military recruitment, and whether their work changed or adapted over the course of time. 
During the course of this investigation, some evidence was unearthed on ‘propaganda 
postcards’ which depicted the death of the Nurse Edith Cavell; recruiting ephemera – 
including pamphlets, posters and even hymn books – produced by the Maidstone Borough 
Council; and a recruitment advertisement for the Women’s Land Army (see figure six).13 
However, it became apparent that the holdings of the IWM did not contain large quantities of 
files on First World War recruiting, although they did contain some material on the planning of 
the Second World War MOI.14 This material stressed the crucial role that had been played by 
the Post Office in developing the approach taken by the MOI towards official promotion.15 It 
also introduced the author to the significance of interdepartmental exchanges of information 
and expertise, a process that would prove crucial for various case studies (see below).  
However, since the IWM did not contain a wealth of material on military advertising, the 
decision was made to consult the PRO. Whereas the IWM contained a small number of 
documents useful or potentially useful to the thesis, the PRO contained a great profusion of 
archival sources spread out over a number of collections.16 The sheer quantity of files stored 
in the PRO presented a problem: if so much recruitment work had apparently been carried 
out, what particular steps could be taken to narrow down the subject and develop a single, 
coherent thesis? The answer to this question did not come immediately (see below), and in 
the first two weeks of visiting the PRO an exploratory review of its holdings was carried out. 
This review indicated that both military advertising and military advertisements (see chapter 
one) could be found not only in the records of the Service departments, but in the holdings of 
the ‘information services’,17 the Cabinet Office and other non-military departments like the 
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Home Office and the Treasury. During the course of the review it became quickly apparent 
that the business of promoting the military extended beyond the military itself, and that many 
of the major propaganda agencies (including the First and Second World War MOIs) were not 
involved to a significant degree in recruitment promotion. This would have important 
repercussions for the development of this thesis’ main argument and methodology. Since 
military advertising extended across government, it could feasibly be studied as a product of 
broader processes and trends within government, and even (as would become clear in the 
case of certain campaigns) as a product of certain outside influences and constraints.  
 
The significance of these observations would only become clear later, however, and before 
returning to them it is worth reflecting on some of the material unearthed in the PRO during 
the period of exploratory review conducted in 2010. Among the first files examined in the 
PRO were copies of original advertisements created by the government’s information 
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services. These advertisements included a number of full-size colour posters, leaflets and 
pamphlets and even plates of newspaper and magazine advertisements. Some of these texts 
had been stored in ‘precedent books’, large bound volumes comprised of cuttings of original 
advertisements and responses to recruitment campaigns in the press. These ‘books’ were 
used to plan future campaigns, and demonstrated the importance within military advertising of 
reviewing past practices and procedures when organising campaigns. The War Office (WO) 
in particular had created and stored a number of these ‘books’, and appears to have used 
them to develop recruiting policy and improve certain aspects of its administration.18  
Other files consulted during the exploratory review included detailed accounts of the 
organisation and planning of the Second World War MOI, the production of a series of 
recruitment films in the early to mid 1960s, and miscellaneous materials on Second World 
War intelligence gathering.19 Some but not all of these sources would prove useful in the 
development of the case studies, and after a period of roughly three weeks in the archives a 
number of more targeted searches of the PRO’s catalogues were initiated. Whereas the 
period of exploratory research involved sifting through large quantities of files and ‘flagging 
up’ any information apparently useful, the more targeted research undertaken later involved 
following particular organisations and individuals whose names appeared frequently in the 
files or whose work appeared significant or otherwise interesting at the time.  In this way a 
more detailed picture of organisations and institutions involved in recruitment promotion 
began to take shape. In terms of chronology, it became apparent that certain periods in the 
20th century seemed to have led to more references to military advertising and military 
recruitment than others.20 These periods include the two world wars, the latter stages of the 
interwar years, the late 1940s, and the late 1950s and early 1960s. In terms of the content of 
sources, it became clear that there were broadly two different kinds of records held in the 
PRO: the first, hard-copies of original advertisements and the ‘precedent books’ associated 
with them; the second, memoranda, production logs, correspondence, minutes of meetings 
and reports on the organisation and planning of campaigns. The records that fell into the first 
category provided some useful evidence for individual recruiting appeals, but they tended to 
provide very little information on how these advertisements were produced. Indeed, in the 
vast majority of cases advertisements appeared simply as stand-alone texts without any 
additional contextual information, possibly because, as images, they were stored separately 
to ‘written’ material.21 The records that made up the second category, however, contained an 
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array of detailed information on how campaigns were planned and organised, which 
individuals and institutions were involved with them, and what ‘results’ they apparently had. 
Several important observations were drawn from this survey of archival records. First, since 
recruitment activity tended to be concentrated around certain key dates, it seemed likely that 
these dates were the site of heightened activity amongst recruiters. Second, given the timing 
of these dates it seemed likely that recruitment campaigns were implicated in some of the key 
events in British social and political history, such as the two world wars, the planning for the 
Second World War, the immediate aftermath of the postwar period, and the transitional period 
between 1957 and 1963 when National Service was gradually phased out. These periods 
would eventually form the basis of this thesis’ six case studies. Third, and perhaps most 
important of all, though a broad range of advertisements could be accessed in the PRO it was 
often difficult to determine which of the various institutions involved in the promotion of 
military recruitment was responsible for their production. That advertisements tended to be 
recorded separately from the material associated with advertising reinforced the distinction 
(retained throughout this thesis) between the promotional vehicles of recruitment advertisers 
and the organisational and administrative machinery that lies behind them. In light of McFall’s 
work, which had been consulted before research for this thesis began, the records of the 
PRO seemed to lend themselves to the kind of institutional history McFall advocated.  
Reflecting on the Findings: Sources, Literature and Potential Approaches   
After the 2010 visit, a period of critical reflection was embarked upon. The information 
gleaned from the archives provided a good starting point for conducting an analysis of military 
advertising. Yet before that analysis could be carried out it was necessary to return to 
historical and theoretical literature. Initially, the literature on war propaganda was considered 
the most likely source of information on military advertising, but it soon became apparent that 
other literatures were also germane to the topic, such as the study of promotional culture22 
and the general social, political and economic history of Britain. Keyword searches within 
these literatures using the names of individuals and organisations that had appeared most 
frequently in archival records were carried out, and a rough indication of current knowledge 
on military advertising was sketched out. It became apparent that some authors, including 
Nicholas Hiley, Peter Simkins, William Crofts, John Tulloch and Mariel Grant, had examined 
various aspects of recruitment advertising,23 but that no author had examined the subject over 
[54] 
 
a broad swath of 20th century history. Moreover, though the subject of military advertising had 
come in for some attention, it had tended to be studied in different ways and for contrasting 
reasons. Grant’s work, for example, explored the growth of the information services in the 
interwar years; Simkins’ the raising of Kitchener’s Armies; Hiley’s the ‘origins’ of First World 
War propaganda; and Tulloch’s the machinery of news management. Though various aspects 
of their work would prove useful during the course of writing up, it became clear that:  
o Most authors who had studied recruitment campaigns had done so from the 
perspective of social, political or military history. This focus on campaigns as by-
products of manpower policy, or as social and cultural ‘events’ that could be 
recounted as part of the broader history of British society, has tended to divert 
attention from issues of promotion. 
o Within the small body of research that dealt explicitly with the subject of recruitment 
advertising, most of the attention had been directed towards the study of 
advertisements rather than the business of advertising. This was typified by the 
literature on the war poster. 
o The literature on commercial advertising, while providing a wealth of theoretical and 
methodological approaches for studying promotion, had largely avoided questions of 
military recruitment in favour of analyses of commercial communication. 
o The literature on war propaganda, on the other hand, had tended to focus not on 
recruitment campaigns but on other aspects of government communications, and had 
demonstrated an inclination to overlook or downplay the importance of recruitment 
advertising in favour of other forms of promotion related to the armed forces. 
o The First World War had received more attention directly relevant to the study of 
recruitment advertising than other periods during the 20th century, and the postwar 
and interwar periods had received virtually no serious attention whatsoever.   
From this review the basic methodological approach to studying military advertising began to 
take shape. Though a small number of studies concerned exclusively with military advertising 
had been carried out, these were in the minority when compared to those studies that either 
referenced recruitment campaigns as part of general historical accounts or studied 
recruitment advertisements rather than the topic of recruitment advertising. On the whole, 
there was an absence of commentary on the planning and organisation of campaigns, and on 
the kinds of activities and procedures that existed beneath or ‘behind’ advertisements. 
Coincidentally, this absence reflected the treatment of commercial advertising until the 
interventions of McFall, Cronin and Sean Nixon.24 The latter author had spoken of the 
‘magisterial centrality’ of the text in literature on commercial advertising, and a similar 
argument could be levelled at the historiography of military advertising.25 However, while the 
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literature on commercial advertising had engaged with issues of advertising there had yet to 
be a comparable turn in the literature on recruitment advertising.  
McFall’s work proved particularly important in this regard because, even though her analysis 
was restricted to commercial communication it offered an approach that could be readily 
applied to this thesis. Offering a ‘genealogical’ approach to historical writing, McFall 
suggested studying advertising through a series of unique ‘snapshots’ and the ‘diverse, 
haphazard and uneven array of institutions [and] practices...adapted to fit specific contextual 
circumstances at different historical moments’.26 Since they were by definition temporary 
events designed to precipitate an immediate increase in enlistment, the recruitment 
campaigns examined in this thesis provide ideal examples of ‘snapshots’. By studying a 
number of them over the course of a broad sample, furthermore, a discursive history of 
military advertising could be fashioned that focused not on commercial advertising, but its 
military counterpart. This history would not exclude the literature on commercial advertising or 
war propaganda, and would actively seek to place military advertising within the context of 
existing debates and controversies. How it did so for each chapter will be examined in detail 
below, but before then it is necessary to briefly detail how the rest of the research progressed. 
Drafting the Chapters and Returning to the Archives 
After a period of critical review, two years were spent drafting and redrafting individual 
chapters. Given the volume of primary sources and the apparent absence of literature on 
recruitment advertising, the outline of the thesis originally involved eight self-contained case 
studies which would each examine a different ‘snapshot’ of recruitment advertising. This plan 
was subsequently revised to the more manageable figure of six, preceded by a literature 
review and a methodology. The original objective of examining a different aspect of military 
advertising through a series of discrete ‘snapshots’ was still retained, although the 
commitment to making each case study ‘self-contained’ was diluted in order to emphasise 
some of the connections and differences that existed between each chapter. 
In the spring of 2012, the archives were revisited. During the course of the first visit, a large 
number of files had been examined, but various questions remained about certain aspects of 
the campaigns. Some of the records originally surveyed in 2010 required revision, while 
additional sources were also sought in an attempt to strengthen the empirical grounding of 
each case study. In this respect the BL proved a useful depository of archival materials. 
[56] 
 
Holding a mixture of official and unofficial records, it contained some examples of military 
advertisements and some books and memoirs written by advertisers – including Charles 
Higham’s Advertising: Its Use and Abuse (1925), Thomas Russell’s Advertising and Publicity 
(undated) and Stephen Tallents’ lecture on Post Office publicity (1932)27 – that provided 
evidence for how practitioners viewed advertising and public relations at certain points during 
the 20th century. After another four-and-a-half week period surveying records, the drafts of the 
six case studies were rewritten to incorporate this new material. In what follows how each 
case study used and applied sources will be discussed. 
Constructing the Case Studies: The First Drafts 
The First World War, as noted above, has attracted more interest amongst scholars than 
other periods considered in this thesis. Chapters four and five, which examined British and 
Irish recruiting advertising in the 1913-15 and 1914-19 periods, were thus positioned directly 
within scholarly fields that examined military advertising. This meant that the primary source 
material was ‘framed’ in relation to the debates and issues raised in these fields. The same 
approach, as we shall see, could not be applied to many of the later chapters. 
In the case of chapter four, historical commentary on the PRC and on the Caxtons Publishing 
House stretched back at least to the 1970s, with authors from Roy Douglas, to Haste, to Hiley 
to Simkins examining different aspects of the recruitment campaigns.28 The work of the PRC 
had also been briefly touched on in the general social and political accounts of the war, such 
as Arthur Marwick’s The Deluge (1965) and Nicoletta Gullace’s The Blood of Our Sons 
(2002).29 Two key themes in the literature were the role of advertisements and the 
significance of the wider social and political context within which recruitment occurred – 1914 
was the site of a ‘rush to the Colours’ that witnessed the highest enrolment figures in the 
history of the British armed forces. Historians have tended to regard recruitment 
advertisements as ineffective or unsophisticated, and have sought to explain the ‘rush to the 
Colours’ with recourse to the culture of ‘war enthusiasm’ that apparently prevailed in Britain at 
the outset of the war. Yet little work has been carried out into a range of activities that were 
designed to sustain this enthusiasm, including public meetings, speeches and recruiting 
rallies, as well as the role of the PRC in gathering information for the state. The files on the 
PRC held in the PRO can shed light on these activities, and chapter four tried to position this 
archival material in the context of existing debates about the response of the public to the war 
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and the attempt by the government to retain ‘war enthusiasm’. In particular, it aimed to show 
that focus on the PRC and Caxtons has tended, with few exceptions, to gloss over the actual 
organisation and prosecution of the campaign in favour of analyses of advertisements. 
Chapter five also drew from a wide range of secondary source material, and tried to position 
the analysis of recruitment advertising in the context of existing debates on Ireland’s role in 
(and response towards) the Great War. In recent years, a number of books and articles have 
been published on Irish history in 1914-18, and the subject of recruitment advertising has not 
gone unnoticed. Indeed, because of the broader role of the British government in Ireland 
during the war, recruitment campaigns have been widely discussed in the literature.30 Much of 
the attention has focused on the perceived success or failure of these campaigns, and of their 
relationship to events such as the early ‘epoch of voluntary action’,31 the 1916 Easter Rising 
and the 1918 conscription crisis. Files in the PRO suggested a major recruitment campaign 
was waged in the midst of the 1918 conscription crisis, while material recorded in Hansard 
indicated that other campaigns were waged at various points during the war.32 By using the 
existing commentary to give a general outline of recruitment campaigns, archival materials 
were used as a basis to explore some issues that had been neglected in the literature, 
including in particular the relationship Irish recruiting shared to its ‘British’ counterpart and 
how one recruitment body, the Irish Recruiting Council, was continued into the postwar era. 
This approach, whereby recruitment campaigns were placed directly within the context of 
existing debates about them, could not be emulated in all the case studies. Chapter six 
adopted a different methodology because, unlike its predecessors, its main subject area, the 
campaign for national service in 1938-39, had attracted very little attention. The lack of 
attention encouraged a little more creativity in the use and application of secondary sources, 
and a decision was made to tie recruitment for ‘national service’ to the notion of a ‘people’s 
war’, a concept usually associated with the wartime period.33 This decision was borne of a 
review of the content of the advertisements used to promote ‘national service’, of the records 
of the Central National Service Committee (CNSC) (held in the PRO), and of the work of the 
Public Relations Departments (PRDs) of various government ministries. The analysis of this 
archival material was framed in relation to Grant’s Propaganda and the Role of the State in 
Interwar Britain (1994), which gives a lucid explanation of how PRDs emerged in Britain in the 
interwar years, and in relation to Angus Calder’s The People’s War (1969), which highlighted 
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both the positive and the negative features of the war.34 However since neither Grant nor 
Calder acknowledged the campaign for national service, the case study sought to introduce a 
previously unexplored aspect of the planning for the Second World War: the attempt to 
convince British civilians that they would be fighting a people’s war if conflict returned. 
Chapter seven stands alone in this thesis as the only analysis of advertising research or 
‘publicity in reverse’,35 and as the only chapter that considers a broad chronological sample. 
While other chapters are limited to two- to six-year samples, the analysis of Social Survey 
carried out in chapter seven examined a twenty-year sample that covered both the wartime 
(1939-45) and postwar eras. The peculiar approach taken to its subject matter was borne of 
the irregular spread of archival sources on Social Survey, together with a general absence of 
historical commentary on the organisation or its impact on matters of government. To deal 
with these subjects in turn, a review of the records of the PRO unearthed an abundance of 
archival material detailing how Social Survey developed and refined its methodology during 
the war years, but only a very small quantity of primary sources on the work of the 
organisation in peacetime. In terms of historical commentary, some authors (such as Crofts) 
have briefly mentioned the methods used by the Survey, but on the whole the subject has 
been underexplored.36 In the work of a number of and philosophers, however, there have 
been various criticisms of the methods of public opinion polling.37 Chapter seven sought to 
integrate the latter literature (which was not expressly historical) into an analysis of how the 
Survey developed its methods during the war years and how those methods were 
subsequently applied to the business of military advertising in the postwar era. As such, it 
was split into two main sections, the first of which examined the wartime years and the 
second of which examined the postwar era. This approach differed from those applied in the 
other chapters, but it shared the same commitment to exploring how surveys were produced 
and designed, and what kind of work went on behind their production. 
Chapter eight, the first of two postwar chapters concerned with issues of recruiting reform, 
returned to the subject of advertising proper. Files in the PRO suggest recruiters were 
engaged in several high-profile campaigns from 1948 until 1951, and that the PRDs 
established in the interwar years and the Central Office of Information (COI) were involved in 
these campaigns. Furthermore, while these campaigns were being organised the 
organisational machinery of recruitment – and of government promotion generally – was 
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being reorganised under the auspices of the postwar Labour governments. Much of the 
historiography on this period has stressed the ambitious programme of social and economic 
reforms ushered in by these governments,38 and a small number of scholars have engaged 
with issues of promotion. Crofts’ Coercion or Persuasion? (1989) explores what he calls 
‘economic propaganda’, Tulloch’s (1993) article on the machinery of news management 
examines aspects of what he calls the ‘British machinery of news management’, and Grant’s 
article on the planning of the COI explores what she calls the ‘continuity and change’ at the 
heart of government information policy.39 By examining the 1948-51 recruitment campaigns in 
relation to this literature, and in relation to the reform of the information services, chapter eight 
sought to show how recruiters responded to the new climate presented by the postwar period, 
and how they adapted and continued techniques of promotion from earlier periods. 
Chapter nine, the final case study, examined another reform of recruitment advertising 
connected to the decision to terminate conscription in 1957.40 This decision led to a review of 
existing recruiting arrangements in 1960 led by Sir Frederic Hooper, but as with the earlier 
chapters little is currently known about the consequences of this review or the impact (if any) 
it had on recruiting policy. A range of studies have been published exploring how British 
military strategy shifted in the wake of the termination of conscription, furthermore, but no 
research has sought to explore how the armed forces responded to the change with 
advertising and promotion. A separate literature unconnected to the military has charted the 
emergence of an ‘affluent society’ in Britain in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and how this 
society changed the way established institutions (such as the armed forces) were perceived 
by individuals and groups.41 Taking elements from these literatures and using Hooper’s 
review (recorded in the files of the Ministry of Defence) as a case study, chapter nine sought 
to show how recruitment advertising was planned and executed at the turn of the 1960s. As 
with the earlier chapters, this was a significant period in British social and economic history, 
and the manner in which Hooper’s recommendations were rejected can help to reveal how 
the armed forces responded to the challenges presented by the emergence of an ‘affluent 
society’ in Britain, and how youth became a key demographic in official promotion. 
Discourse Analysis: Examining Primary Sources and Defining Discourses  
From this description of the case studies it should be clear that this thesis has drawn from a 
wide range of archival materials and academic literature, and that it has tried to combine 
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analyses of recruitment campaigns (and their associated practices) with discussions of 
historiography. Discourse theory provides a methodology for exploring and assessing archival 
sources, and its utility to the research presented here will form the basis of this section. 
As the discussion that opened this chapter demonstrated, there are several approaches 
towards studying discourse, and this thesis has drawn from more than one of them. In 
addition to the work of McFall and Cronin, it has consulted the literature on critical discourse 
analysis, a discipline that emerged in the 1990s out of the field of applied linguistics.42 Prior to 
the emergence of critical discourse analysis, there were two main approaches towards 
studying discourse. The first of these, associated with studies of language, viewed discourse 
as a form of social action and interaction. The second, which has already been mentioned, 
regarded discourse as a social construction of reality and a form of knowledge which is often 
expressed in language (both written and verbal) but not reducible to it; discourse, according 
to this interpretation, structures not only what it is possible to say at any given moment in 
time, but what is excluded from discussions and other forms of social interaction.43 Critical 
discourse analysts endeavour to integrate both understandings to explore language, social 
action and interaction, and the social construction of knowledge simultaneously. In the work 
of Roger Fowler, Guy Cook and Norman Fairclough, this methodology has been applied to 
various aspects of the mass media, including studies of commercial advertising.44 
However, while critical discourse analysis seeks to assimilate Foucauldian understandings of 
discourse with those found in studies of language, it has tended to apply this method to 
studies of media texts rather than the institutions that produce and distribute them. Fowler, 
Cook and Fairclough have each studied different aspects of media communication, but their 
research has remained overwhelmingly concerned with how texts ‘position readers to view 
social and political events in a particular way’45 – not how media institutions come into being 
or are themselves constituted by discourses. Despite the attempt to merge Foucauldian and 
linguistic understandings of discourse into a single explanatory framework, furthermore, there 
are fairly significant differences between the work of Fowler, Cook and Fairclough on the one 
hand and the research of McFall and Cronin on the other. Apart from devoting their time to 
studies of institutions rather than texts, McFall and Cronin also work within a more traditional 
Foucauldian perspective that eschews studies of language for analyses of the social 
construction of meaning and the processes by which advertising is institutionally sustained. 
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Reviewing this literature in the latter half of the research process, it became apparent that 
each approach contained its own advantages and shortcomings. The research of McFall and 
Cronin provided a good epistemological foundation on which to explore the development of 
military advertising, while the work of Fowler, Cook and Fairclough seemed useful for 
studying advertisements and other forms of promotional communication. Since this thesis 
examined both advertisements and advertising, a decision was made to draw on both 
approaches. In the writing that follows, how each approach was applied to military 
advertising, and how archival sources were used and selected, will be discussed.  
Discourse Analysis and Media Institutions   
All forms of discourse analysis rely on examinations of historical artefacts or texts. The kinds 
of texts studied will depend on the analysis in question, and on the particular approach taken 
to the subject matter. Among the texts considered in Advertising: A Cultural Economy (2004), 
for example, are newspapers, magazines and circulars, dictionaries and reference works, 
memoirs, biographies and autobiographies, company records and holdings, records of 
regulators and authorities, drawings, images and illustrations, as well as advertisements 
themselves (including posters, leaflets, pamphlets, billboards and various printed 
ephemera).46 In Cronin’s various publications (which examine the contemporary advertising 
industry and are therefore concerned with a different type of text) the trade press, the work of 
regulators like the Advertising Standards Authority, and interviews with practitioners and 
various individuals involved in the advertising industry provide the main source of texts.47 
By systematically analysing these texts McFall and Cronin partake in a form of discourse 
analysis, although the precise ways in which they go about their research differs according to 
the subject matter (or texts) at hand. McFall restricts her analysis to historical studies of the 
advertising industry, and thus relies to a considerable extent on archival sources. Cronin, on 
the other hand, engages with advertisers ‘directly’ through ethnographic studies and other 
forms of observation. Though there are differences in the kinds of text they examine, 
however, both authors are ultimately concerned with the process by which advertising is 
institutionalised. This process shapes how each author approaches the texts that make up 
their respective analyses, and can be applied to studies of recruitment advertising as well. It 
is through institutions, after all, that military promotion was produced and organised. 
[62] 
 
The approach of studying the texts advertisers produce and circulate within institutions has 
been applied in specific ways in this thesis. As noted earlier, the historian of military 
advertising is confronted not with a paucity of archival materials but a profusion, and it is 
useful to distinguish between two categories of text. The first of these, records of 
advertisements, will be discussed below. The second, records of the business of advertising, 
lends itself to the kind of discursive analysis of the advertising industry advocated by McFall 
and Cronin. The records of military advertising, as opposed to military advertisements, 
include memoranda, production logs, correspondence, minutes of meetings, reports, memoirs 
and auto-biographies. These kinds of text represent, in the Foucauldian sense of the term, 
‘systematically-organised sets of statements which give expression to the meanings and 
values of institutions’.48 Memoranda, for instance, often contain directives written by superiors 
to subordinates, proposals, descriptions of ideas and general notes. Production logs 
represent important sources of information regarding how campaigns progressed and how 
advertising was carried out. Correspondence between recruiters, on the other hand, provide 
an insight into the kinds of internal communication that exists behind advertisements, while 
minutes of meetings illustrate how campaigns were planned and organised, and how different 
aspects of the campaigns were viewed and commented on by recruiters.  
This thesis has examined large quantities of these texts, and has sought to reconstruct a 
history of recruitment advertising by examining them as products of institutions. According to 
the management theorists Phillips, Thomas Lawrence and Cynthia Hardy, it is through the 
production and circulation of ‘meaningful texts’ (their definition comprises ‘written documents, 
verbal reports, artwork, spoken words, pictures, symbols, buildings and other artefacts’) that 
institutions come into being.49 By applying this method to the archival sources found in the 
PRO, the BL and the IWM, this thesis has sought to explore how recruitment campaigns were 
institutionalised, and how advertisements were produced by these institutions. 
 
Discourse Analysis and Media Texts   
While the work of McFall and Cronin offers a good example of discursive analyses of media 
institutions, the work of Fairclough, Fowler and Cook in particular can inform the analysis of 
media texts.50 Cook, whose The Discourse of Advertising (1992) applies critical discourse 
analysis to the study of advertisements, has suggested that analyses of discourses (he does 
[63] 
 
not restrict himself to media texts, although his book is essentially a study of them) involves 
the study of textual content and an appreciation and awareness of textual context. This 
distinction is fundamental to all critical discourse analysis, and though it has mostly been 
applied to studies of media texts it can also be introduced to studies of the institutions and 
individuals that produce them. According to Cook, the ‘context’ of a text can be taken to mean 
the social, political and economic conditions within which it is produced, circulated and 
consumed, while its ‘content’ can be regarded as the particular manner in which it 
communicates a message or addresses a reader or viewer. By integrating both content and 
context into a single analysis, analysts engage in a form of critical discourse analysis.51 
This approach is useful for studying the wide range of individual advertisements – from 
posters, to leaflets to newspaper and magazine plates – that are associated with the business 
of military recruitment. However, as noted above these texts have mostly been divorced from 
the ‘contexts’ within which they occur. This creates a methodological problem, and for this 
reason the only advertisements that have been examined in this thesis are those which can 
be directly tied to particular recruitment campaigns which provide one part of the requisite 
‘context’ of advertisements. Advertisements, by extension, need to be studied as part of the 
campaigns of which they are a part, and not (as has sometimes been the case) as standalone 
images or texts that can be divorced from the particular uses to which they were put. 
There is a second, and highly significant, consequence of Cook’s distinction between context 
and content. In this thesis, a large part of the ‘context’ within which advertisements and 
advertising were produced and circulated has been provided by analyses of historical 
literature. In addition to the literature on commercial advertising and war propaganda (see 
chapter three), general social and political accounts of British history have been consulted. In 
some cases (see chapter seven) literature that is not explicitly historical has also been 
examined. This literature has helped to place the analysis of both recruitment advertising and 
recruitment advertisements within the context within which it occurred, and has enabled a 
more reflexive approach to discourse analysis that does not rely overwhelmingly on 
‘systematic’ analyses of archival sources or texts. In each of the six case studies examined in 
chapters four-nine, military promotion has been analysed both discursively and as part of 
broader debates within the literature not connected to the discourse analysis. This approach 
is designed to circumvent the problems associated with the study of discourse mentioned by 
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Marwick and Jordanova,52 and tries to integrate a discursive analysis of media institutions and 
the forms they produce with the more empirical historical literature.  
Conclusion: The Case for a Discursive History of Military Advertising 
This chapter has tried to show how this thesis was designed, researched and written. Starting 
from the premise that recruitment advertising should be studied in relation to the specific 
historical circumstances that give rise to it, and that the business of advertising can be treated 
as a form of discourse, it explored the various ways in which the concept of discourse has 
been understood by philosophers, historians and linguists and the particular ways in which it 
has been used and applied in this thesis. Though some historians have taken issue with the 
notion of discourse, this chapter has sought to show how discourse analysis can be 
integrated into a historical analysis of advertisements and the advertising industry that 
produces them. In the work of McFall and Cronin, a precedent exists for applying discourse to 
the study of commercial institutions, and the same methodological procedures can be applied 
to the study of the institutions which make up military advertising at any given historical 
moment. In the critical discourse analysis of authors like Cook, on the other hand, a model for 
deconstructing advertisements and for placing promotional communication within its social, 
political and economic context can be applied to both advertisements and advertising.  
Key to this approach has been an interdisciplinary understanding of military advertising that 
recognises the value of different academic fields and the utility of bringing certain elements 
from them together as part of the same research project. Discursive studies of media 
institutions and media texts can provide a theoretically richer account of military advertising to 
that typically found, for example, in the literature on war propaganda. Yet the literature on war 
propaganda can aid a discourse analysis of recruitment advertising because it can help to 
establish the broader context within which recruiters worked, and can demonstrate how ideas 
about promotion in one field of production (or in one form of advertisement or) influenced and 
shaped another. Each case study has thus sought to strike a balance between the discursive 
analysis of military advertising based on a review of existing archival resources, and an 
appraisal of available literature. Though they have not attracted a great deal of attention in the 
historiography of war propaganda or promotional culture, recruitment campaigns have, in this 
sense, been explored and assessed in relation to these literatures. The results of this 
particular methodological approach will be examined in the writing that follows.      
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Chapter Four 
The ‘Rush to the Colours’: The Great War and 
the Emergence of Modern Military Advertising, 
1913-15    
There is something infinitely greater and more enduring which is emerging already 
out of this great conflict – a new patriotism, richer, nobler, and more exalted than the 
old.1             
             David Lloyd George, 1914 
When we say to our men ‘Your Country Needs You’, we do not mean that Parliament, 
or the Government, or Lord Kitchener, or the King or Mr Asquith needs them. It is 
Britain – British cottage homes, British women and children, peaceful fields and 
villages – that need them.2       
                  Parliamentary Recruiting Committee pamphlet, 1915 
Day by day the advertisements went out. Day by day the recruits came in.3 
                     Hedley Le Bas, 1916 
When Britain declared war on Germany on August 4th 1914, a ‘rising tide of patriotism’ swept 
through the country.4 Crowds that had gathered outside the Foreign Office to await the 
announcement responded with ‘loud cheering’ and ‘patriotic demonstrations’ which, according 
to the Times, ‘continued until an early hour [in the] morning’.5 The outburst of public 
enthusiasm extended well beyond the capital to the northern and western reaches of the 
British Isles, and has been accounted for by one historian as a product of ‘a widespread 
fascination with war’ which extended across Europe and had been ‘brewing for a long time’.6 
This fascination manifested itself in a variety of ways. Within weeks of the declaration of war, 
books and articles began to appear that sought to explain British intervention as a product of 
a ‘chivalric struggle against the forces of evil’.7 Anti-German hostility quickly spiralled out of 
control, leading to rioting in London’s East End in April 1915 after the sinking of the 
Lusitania,8 and to the renaming of the Royal Family’s House name from Saxe-Coburg-Gotha 
to Windsor in the spring of 1917. Most conspicuous of all, however, was the flood of 
volunteers to recruiting stations. Between August and September 1914, just shy of half a 
million men enlisted in the British armed forces. So great was the ‘rush to the Colours’, the 
phrase now used to describe the extraordinary intake of recruits during this period, that the 
War Office (WO) was at one point enrolling more men in a day than it would normally expect 
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to receive in a year.9 This was no ordinary war, as its advocates were keen to point out; it was 
also, as we shall see, a war that laid the groundwork for modern military advertising. 
In three recruitment campaigns waged in Britain between January 1914 and December 1915, 
military advertising began to take shape as a coherent discipline and profession.10 The first of 
these campaigns, organised by the Caxtons Publishing House (hereafter Caxtons), an 
instalment publisher and mail-order advertiser, was launched over the winter of 1913-1914. 
The second and third, a great deal larger than the first and subjects of more academic 
attention, coincided with the establishment of the New Armies in Britain on August 11th 1914 
and with the ensuing expansion of the British Expeditionary Force.11 Given the initial 
response to the call to arms, which was so emphatic steps were actually taken to decrease 
volunteering by raising the entrance criteria for new recruits,12 it is perhaps unsurprising that 
some contemporaries believed advertising was responsible for luring men to the recruiting 
depots. Hedley Le Bas, Caxtons’ owner, was just shy of claiming sole credit for the ‘rush to 
the Colours’ in 1916, suggesting that it was ‘by the help of newspaper advertising’ that the 
British Empire had rallied ‘great armies to the flag’.13 Eric Field, a colleague of Le Bas’ at 
Caxtons, repeated the view in Advertising: The Forgotten Years (1959), a book published 
forty years after the war that claimed Caxtons were responsible for the ‘first real government 
advertising’, and that this advertising had made ‘men risk their lives’.14 The belief in the power 
of advertising to ‘risk lives’ was expressed by a number of commentators in the interwar 
years, who blamed recruitment advertising and war propaganda for convincing an otherwise 
peaceful nation to take up arms,15 but it has not gone unchallenged. 
Since the 1960s, social historians have tended to account for the ‘rush to the Colours’ not by 
stressing the importance of ‘propaganda’ but by acknowledging the culture of ‘war 
enthusiasm’ that prevailed in Britain in the run up to 1914. Arthur Marwick, whose The Deluge 
(1965) appeared in the same year as A. J. P. Taylor’s English History, claimed there was 
actually ‘no need for complete control of popular opinion’ because there was a ‘general wish 
for war’ in the United Kingdom long before it had actually transpired.16 Cate Haste, in Keep 
the Home Fires Burning (1977), followed Marwick’s lead by suggesting there was ‘[no] need 
to establish organised propaganda since the [British] population supported [the government’s] 
policies’, while Peter Buitenhuis (1989) and Lloyd Clark (1996) have since put forward 
variants of this argument.17 However, while underlying social and political factors have served 
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to dilute any claim that the mass media were potent recruiting agents, interest in such media 
and the recruitment campaigns that utilised them has not waned with the passing of time. 
Indeed, compared to other recruitment drives considered in this thesis, the work of Le Bas, 
Field and the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee (PRC), the government’s preeminent 
recruiting body and the institution responsible for the third recruitment campaign considered 
in this chapter, has attracted a wealth of scholarly attention. Roy Douglas, Nicholas Hiley, 
Phillip Dutton and James Aulich have all studied different aspects of the PRC and Caxtons-
WO recruitment campaigns.18 Yet there are still a number of gaps in the literature. Much of 
the research on the PRC, for example, has focused on its poster campaign, which in turn has 
diverted attention from other forms of promotion. Advertisements in their conventional ‘paid-
for’ sense have been extensively assessed but other forms of promotion, including public 
meetings and public spectacles, have not received comparable attention. Furthermore, while 
research on First World War recruitment has tended to be polarised across two extremes, 
with Dutton and Hiley stressing the commercial origins of recruitment advertising and Douglas 
focusing almost entirely on its political manifestations, little is currently known about how the 
official and commercial components of the campaigns interacted or interrelated. 
By exploring the planning and organisation of all three recruitment campaigns, this chapter 
seeks to fill in some of those gaps. Arguing that the First World War acted as a catalyst for 
the emergence of modern military advertising, it suggests the world of commercial advertising 
helped furnish the government with a language or ‘grammar’ of opinion control19 that would 
subsequently be used to promote enlistment. In three articles on First World War recruitment 
Hiley has stressed the centrality of commercial publicists like Le Bas to the development of 
this language, and has argued that it stood at odds with the traditional values and philosophy 
of government.20 The research presented here emphasises how the state borrowed from, and 
appropriated, techniques of ‘commercial’ communication, making use of the administrative 
and organisational machinery of political parties and central government to promote 
enlistment. Beginning with an analysis of the first two recruitment campaigns, both of which 
were organised by Caxtons, it continues with an examination of the third and final campaign 
organised by the PRC. Taken together, these campaigns changed the way in which the 
military authorities viewed advertising and other forms of promotion, produced and circulated 
a wide range of promotional devices, and impacted on how the government as a whole 
approached the matter of communication. After the recruitment drives of 1914 and 1915, 
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indeed, other government departments began to take an interest in advertising, suggesting 
military recruitment carried repercussions far beyond the realm of manpower policy.  
Selling War Before the War: Clients, Agencies and the Advertising Industry  
Recruitment campaigns were often conceived in the corridors of power, and this seems to 
have been the source of the PRC (see below). Yet the first campaign considered in this 
thesis, and perhaps the first ‘real’ example of government advertising,21 was conceived not in 
Parliament or in Whitehall, but in the picturesque surrounds of a Surrey golf club. According 
to Le Bas, Field and, latterly, Hiley, the ‘origins’ of First World War recruitment advertising can 
be traced to Walton Heath Golf Course, and to a chance meeting between Le Bas and 
Colonel John Seely in 1913. Recounting this meeting in The Lord Kitchener Memorial Book 
(1916), Le Bas claimed Seely, then Secretary of State for War, had approached him to ask 
how to ‘find 35,000 men’ for the Army. Le Bas’ response, based on his belief that ‘publicity will 
find or create anything’, was fairly predictable: ‘I should advertise for them’; and led to the first 
military recruitment campaign of 1914.22 
In 1913 advertising for the Army was, by all accounts, a novel proposition. The state had 
made use of newspaper classifieds to publicise recruitment to the civil services and to put 
government contracts out to tender, but it had yet to engage in a large-scale advertising 
campaign of the kind frequently witnessed in the commercial world. There was no Ministry of 
Information, and the Public Relations Departments of individual ministries (see chapter six) 
had yet to be established. From the late 19th century onwards the Post Office appears to have 
engaged in some billposting and leafleting work,23 although this seems to have grown out its 
commercial activities rather than its political status, and while it is likely that the Army did 
advertise for recruits during the Boer War there have been no historical studies demonstrating 
a major recruitment drive in that period. The most conspicuous form of promotion associated 
with the military before 1913, in fact, appeared in the form of commercial advertising. Britain’s 
military image, and the image of the Empire itself, became a defining motif of late 19 th and 
early 20th century advertising, which identified brands with famous military figures like General 
Robert Baden-Powell (see figure seven).24 However, while this kind of promotion clearly 
advertised the military, it did not, at least directly, advertise recruitment. 
Given the apparent reluctance on the part of the Army to partake in advertising,25 it would not 
be surprising if Seely rejected Le Bas’ overture. Yet the discipline of advertising had grown  
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significantly in the wake of the emergence of the British consumer society, and by the start of 
1914 official reluctance to make use of advertising to boost military enlistment appeared to 
have softened. On January 15th, a series of newspaper advertisements appeared in the 
London dailies, and within four days a two-hour recruiting film entitled The British Army Film 
(1914) had premiered at the Palace Theatre in the West End.26 Caxtons, responsible for the 
first of these ventures, had been awarded a contract from Seely to advertise on behalf of the 
Army, and set to work by consulting two well-known newspaper advertisers: Wareham Smith, 
advertising manager of the Daily Mail, and Thomas Russell, former advertising manager of 
the Times.27 The fruits of their collaboration were evident in the advertisement that launched 
the Caxtons campaign, a front-page spread in the Daily Mail which professed to reveal what 
the Army ‘offer[ed]’ to new recruits. Loaded with copy and designed to appear like an ordinary 
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front-page, the advertisement reeled off a list of ‘opportunities’ of a career in the infantry. The 
Army paid well, or well enough to compare favourably with civilian employment; it offered its 
recruits a greater chance of promotion than had hitherto been the case; it provided ample 
opportunities for leave and for recreational activities; and it afforded the possibility of ‘seeing 
the world’ from the sanctuary of ‘comfortable quarters’ (see figure eight).28  
 
These features of Army life, which became key motifs of military advertising, chimed with the 
‘factual, down-to-life appeals’ favoured by Caxtons in its normal business operations. Indeed, 
as Field suggested when recalling the January-February campaign some years after helping 
to coordinate it, both the ‘recruiting season’ and the season for selling books overlapped 
since it was during winter that men were least likely to be found ‘on street corners’ and most 
likely to be seen searching for employment.29 Utilising the same marketing techniques it had 
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used to sell books, though making use of the expertise of Thomas Russell for drafting the 
copy,30 Field approached the issue of military recruitment in the manner in which he had 
treated the sale of encyclopaedias and instalments. He even borrowed the favoured Caxtons 
convention of attaching a coupon to advertisements that offered readers a ‘book’ on the Army 
which would be sent to their address free of charge. (This ‘book’ was followed promptly by a 
call from a recruiting sergeant, who visited the interested reader at his home and continued 
the endorsement of the military in person.)31 
The accumulation of personal details would later be used in the drive to impose conscription, 
albeit in a totally different context (see below). Yet the most significant aspect of the pre-war 
recruitment campaign was the system of client-agency procurement it heralded. Caxtons, 
commissioned by the WO to promote the Army on its behalf, performed a similar function to 
Keith, Prowse & Co., the firm hired to produce The British Army Film.32 This arrangement, 
whereby the state outsourced certain aspects of its communications infrastructure to outside 
agents in exchange for a commission or a rolling fee, represented one of the principal means 
through which the military was brought to the British public as a career choice during the first 
half of the 20th century. However, as Hiley has made clear, though recruitment was the 
principal aim of the campaign it was also intended as an exercise in public relations. The WO 
envisaged advertising as a means of initiating a ‘broader educational campaign’ that 
presented an image of the Army as an institution shaped by civilian values, an approach to 
promotion that would be revived in the late 1950s (see chapter nine). Seely himself ‘hoped to 
change the whole structure of military recruiting...by carefully manipulating its public image’.33 
Reflecting on the campaign in Parliament in March 1914, he claimed there was a ‘need to 
make a complete change in the attitude of the great mass of the people towards the Army’,34 
but since this kind of work represented a departure from earlier practices the campaign was 
treated as a strictly ‘controlled experiment on which future planning would be based’.35  
‘Your King and Country Need You’: The First Wartime Recruitment Campaign 
After the WO had judged the January-February campaign a success, planning for a second, 
much larger campaign began in the summer of 1914. The first venture had been financed by 
a £6,000 grant, but that figure was more than trebled for the second campaign to £20,000, 
with Caxtons authorised to carry out an intensive four-month recruitment drive beginning on 
the eve of the recruiting ‘season’ in September.36 Britain’s entrance into the war brought 
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forward any existing plans, however, and within less than a day of the declaration of war a 
recruiting appeal had appeared in all major newspapers bearing the famous slogan ‘Your 
King and Country need You’ (see figure nine). This slogan is sometimes attributed to 
Kitchener, although Field has claimed credit for coining it and has also claimed responsibility 
for writing the advertisement’s copy, which warned of grave ‘possibilities’ befalling the Empire 
and the world being catapulted into the ‘greatest war in...history’.37 On August 11th, another 
advertisement appeared in the national dailies which substituted the earlier sign-off ‘Join the 
Army To-day’ with ‘God save the King’ and made direct mention of to Kitchener’s now widely-
publicised appeal for 100,000 men (see figure ten).38  
 
There was a marked difference in both tone and content between the first and second 
recruiting campaigns, a difference that can be explained at least in part by the change in 
international circumstances between January and August 1914. In the months leading up to 
the war, though some patriotic organisations had taken to prophesising an impending 
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European conflict,39 it was generally believed that the next war would be fought not on the 
continental mainland but in the towns and cities of Ireland (see chapter five). After Germany 
invaded Belgium and King Albert requested British aid, attention turned to the Central Powers 
and the more serious threat to British interests and supremacy they represented. 
Advertisements, like the columns of the popular press, were laden with theatrical 
denunciations of ‘Prussian’ barbarity,40 and though the recruitment drive was only one voice 
among many that represented what David Lloyd George called a ‘new patriotism, richer, 
nobler, and more exalted than the old’,41 it was fundamental to establishing a new military 
ideal in Britain that shaped the representation of soldiers in the mass media. Thus whereas 
the January-February campaign made references to material inducements such as pay and 
travel, the wartime campaign turned to principles of duty, honour and sacrifice. In “The Blood 
of Our Sons” (2002), Nicoletta Gullace has referred to the second category of appeals as a 
form of ‘propaganda in action’ that altered the ‘language of citizenship’ in Britain during the 
war and revolutionised the popular image of the soldier.42 The ‘cynical, working-class soldier 
whose bravery and patriotism offset his vulgarity’ was, Gullace claims, ‘domesticated and 
refined’ in the First World War.43 
However, while the second and third recruitment campaigns were at least partly responsible 
for the dissemination of a new military ideal, it is worth noting that large-scale publicity efforts 
did not begin immediately after the war was declared. In fact, because so many men joined 
up so quickly, it was only after the ‘rush to the Colours’ had taken place that the WO 
sanctioned a major advertising campaign. Caxtons, much to Le Bas’ chagrin, had been 
restricted to what Hiley has called ‘restrained announcements’ in the press and on the 
hoardings until late October, when the WO permitted both Caxtons and the PRC, which 
operated independently of WO oversight, to redouble their efforts. As it happens, a 
combination of official heel-dragging and the alleged poor quality of official advertising 
actually led to the establishment of at least two unofficial recruitment advertising committees, 
one overseen by Le Bas (and containing staff from the first WO campaign), and the other 
presided over by H. E. Morgan, director of W. H. Smith’s publicity department.44 By 1915, in 
one more twist in the second recruitment campaign, Le Bas found himself on a boat to Ireland 
to oversee, or rather to reorganise, Irish recruitment advertising (see chapter five). 
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Given that major recruiting efforts only began after the initial ‘rush to the Colours’ had 
subsided, it is hard to accept the view that recruitment advertising triggered the flood of 
volunteers to the New Armies. In fact, as Peter Simkins has shown, it was only after 
enlistment had dropped to levels considered unacceptable by the WO that attempts were 
made to apply advertising on a large scale.45 The organisation tasked with reversing that 
decline, the PRC, will be examined next.  
 
The Parliamentary Recruiting Committee: The Second Wartime Recruitment Campaign  
There can be little doubt that commercial advertisers had a foundational role in the genesis of 
military advertising. Yet while publicists like Le Bas and advertisers like Field had a hand in 
drafting advertisements, the state’s administrative machinery and financial resources 
provided something individual advertisers lacked. The defining feature of the wartime 
campaigns – their scale – was achieved not because of the skill of commercial advertisers in 
drafting compelling appeals, but because of the willingness on the part of politicians, civil 
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servants and members of the public to lend a hand to the recruitment drive. The desire to 
boost enlistment was expressed in various ways: the staffs of political parties were offered 
freely to the PRC, as were government offices and buildings. As we shall see, even though it 
has received less attention in the literature than recruiting advertisements, the mobilisation of 
the resources of the state is vital for understanding how the PRC’s campaign came into 
being, and how the state itself responded to the demand for recruits. 
Conflicting accounts have been given for the emergence of the PRC. According to Haste, the 
committee grew out of the activities of the National Liberal Federation, a party campaign 
group that responded to the outbreak of the war by circularising its constituency bodies with a 
call to arms.46 Dutton has traced the source of the committee to ‘behind-the-scenes activities 
of Parliament’, and specifically to a trip made by L. S. Amery, a Unionist politician appointed 
Director of Civilian Recruiting for the Army’s Southern Command on the outbreak of the war,47 
who subsequently recommended a ‘systematic scheme for enlisting public opinion and 
civilian drive behind recruiting over the whole country’.48 Douglas, who appears to have 
written the first academic article on the PRC, has claimed it was ‘taken for granted [within 
Parliament] that the people best able to campaign for recruitment were the political parties’, 
and has suggested the PRC grew partly on the initiative of Cabinet ministers (including 
Asquith) and partly because of the ‘vigorous and effective organisations’ for conducting 
political campaign work already extant in the Liberal and Unionist parties.49 Before the war, 
the latter organisations had been preparing for a general election; with balloting temporarily 
suspended, they were mobilised to aid recruitment at the WO’s discretion.  
Despite its official origins, however, the PRC has in recent years been treated as more than 
the sum of its parts. In particular, it has been regarded, to quote Dutton, as a ‘semi-official’ 
organisation that drew heavily from the world of commercial advertising to construct appeals 
and exhortations intended for British citizenry.50 With the exception of Douglas’ early 
research, much of the historiography on the PRC has struck a similar tone, stressing what 
Aulich has called (in relation to the war poster) the ‘[intimate] relationship between 
propaganda, public information and advertising’ that grew in Western societies during the 
early 20th century, and giving private advertisers and printers a prominent role in the overall 
development of the recruitment campaign.51 Dutton, Hiley, Joseph Darracott and Belinda 
Loftus are among those to emphasise the role played by private individuals such as the 
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printer Arthur Gunn, who claimed to have been responsible for the notorious Savile Lumley 
image ‘Daddy, what did YOU do in the Great War?’ (see chapter one), and Le Bas himself, 
who declared with more than a little pomposity to have been the ‘nominal head’ of 
government advertising from the outbreak of the war until the introduction of conscription.52  
While there can be little doubt that posters in particular were produced using outside 
practitioners, the organisational network that lay beneath these images was set up using the 
machinery of the state. Though it did not house the PRC (whose offices appear to have been 
spread out across a number of locations, including 11 Downing Street and St. Stephen’s 
Chambers in Westminster), the WO provided it with a small grant to conduct its work. 
Voluntary contributions, requested in Parliament by the Prime Minister on November 19th 
1914,53 were also received from certain unnamed individuals. The grant and the contributions 
helped to pay for the production of advertisements, including the (often lucrative) contracts 
awarded to printers,54 but they did not pay for the staff. The PRC’s personnel, on the contrary, 
were drawn from the ranks of the National Unionist Association, the National Liberal 
Federation and the Labour Party, from the benches of the House of Commons and the House 
of Lords, and from the Cabinet itself. A number of military personnel were also connected to 
it, including Major-General Lorn Campbell and Major (later Colonel) A. B. Gossett.55 The 
coming-together of so many disparate figures led R. H. Davies, a recruiter involved in the 
PRC, to claim that the outbreak of war had precipitated an end to 
political controversy...in Great Britain. The “cannon’s opening roar” found political 
parties and political organisations quickened by a common impulse and a common 
desire to be of service to the country...[and] a channel for a full expression of that 
harmony of action speedily opened out’.56  
As joint-chairman of the Publications Sub-Department of the PRC, Davies had helped to open 
up this ‘channel’, and was not alone in believing that the war had brought a new sense of 
unity and togetherness to the state. Writing a couple of years later in Raising and Training the 
New Armies, the author Basil Williams claimed that the machinery of the major political 
parties had been co-opted into the recruitment drive to allow the government to reach every 
single ‘voter’.57 Williams’ interpretation, which has been corroborated by Douglas’ detailed 
case study analysis of the PRC, is not without foundation.58 The PRC appears to have been 
established at the request of the Prime Minister sometime in August 1914; staffed by the 
Whips of the three major political parties and by the agents employed by those parties; and 
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overseen by Asquith, the leader of the opposition Bonar Law, and the leader of the Labour 
Party (following Ramsey Macdonald’s resignation in protest at the war) Arthur Henderson. It 
was, as Haste has remarked, an ‘all-party group’ designed to mobilise the various institutions 
of the state to boost enlistment in the Army and, to an extent, the Navy.59 
In a letter to the British Museum some years after the war, Davis described the PRC as 
evidence of a ‘remarkable and spontaneous display of British patriotism at a time of extreme 
peril to the nation’.60 However, if politicians, civil servants and officers had contributed to the 
recruitment effort, their ‘display’ of patriotism had come at a financial cost. All those who had 
volunteered for the PRC continued to receive their normal salaries as elected officials or 
employees of party campaign groups, and some of those politicians who had joined the WO 
as recruiters received an additional salary on top of their existing salary.61 Nor would it be 
accurate to characterise the work of the PRC as in any way ‘spontaneous’. As Davies himself 
acknowledged in a report on the PRC written sometime between 1915 and 1916, shortly after 
the committee had held its first ‘formal’ meeting in the Reception Room at 12 Downing Street, 
the decision was made to send  
[c]ommunications...to Peers and Members of Parliament inviting their co-operation, 
and letters were dispatched by the Chief Whips [of the Liberal and Conservative 
parties]62 to the Party Agents urging them to unite and form a Joint Committee in each 
Constituency for the purpose of obtaining Recruiting by the holding of meetings and 
other forms of propaganda, and by working with existing recruiting agencies.63 
These ‘joint committees’, which have been referred to variously as Parliamentary Recruiting 
Committees, Parliamentary and Joint Labour Recruiting Committees or simply Recruiting 
Committees, were established in every constituency in England and Wales.64 Staffed by Lord-
Lieutenants, Lord Mayors, Mayors, local counsellors, party agents (who often served as 
Honorary Secretaries) and sometimes the parliamentary representative – or MP – of the 
constituency, they were charged with ‘watching the interests of the Service’.65 Utilising the 
administrative machinery of local government and the political parties that ran it, they 
represented the eyes and ears of the central PRC. Yet despite their seeming significance, 
and even though the First World War recruitment drive required a contingent of local 
recruiters to properly function, Joint Committees have received little attention in the 
literature.66 Haste, who provides a brief account of their work in a chapter on ‘getting the 
troops’, has described how these ‘constituency organisations’ distributed the PRC’s 
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pamphlets and leaflets, carried out a house-to-house recruitment canvass and 
compiled a Householders Return to estimate the number of potential recruits. Nightly 
meetings and patriotic rallies were addressed by speakers provided by the [central] 
Committee, often accompanied by music hall artists, the singing of patriotic songs, 
and much flag waving. In constituencies it was a source of local pride to match 
recruiting figures with the national average.67  
This summation downplays their importance and the variety of promotional techniques they 
deployed. Indeed, while the central PRC produced advertisements that have provided the 
basis for so many case-study analyses of First World War recruiting, local committees 
distributed and exhibited these texts, arranged public meetings, marches and events, 
produced their own local promotions (see figure eleven), and coordinated meetings.   
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Furthermore, while Hiley, Dutton and Aulich have each examined the posters produced by the 
PRC, other kinds of work carried out by the central PRC have so far largely been overlooked. 
The body responsible for producing the posters, the Publications Sub-Department was in fact 
only one of four Sub-Departments set up by the PRC in 1914, the other being Publicity 
(defined by one official as a body designed to ‘keep the press informed of the activities of the 
Parliamentary Recruiting Committee’), Householders Return and Information (concerned with 
information gathering), and Meetings (tasked with organising public marches and meetings).68 
Since it was responsible for producing posters, leaflets and a range of printed ephemera, 
historians have tended to focus on the work of Publications rather than the other Sub-
Departments. This has diverted attention from the role played by Publicity, Householders 
Return and Information, and Meetings in the overall recruitment campaign, and has prevented 
an analysis of other forms of promotion not produced by the Publications Sub-Department. In 
fact, in the files of the former Sub-Departments, and even in records of the Publications Sub-
Department itself, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that the PRC was not driven by the 
whims of a handful of ‘advertising men’, as Le Bas and Field claimed, but by the politicians, 
party agents and civil servants who staffed and maintained it.  
Householders’ Returns, Canvassing and the Information Gathering Apparatus  
The idea of a Householders’ Return appears to have been put forward by Sir Jesse Herbert, a 
Liberal campaign organiser and one of three honorary secretaries to the central PRC. 
Envisaged as a means of establishing how many men were available for the New Armies, 
forms were sent to every householder in the country requesting details – age, marital status, 
occupation and so on – of men willing to enlist. Described by one politician in early 1915 as a 
type of ‘informal census’,69 it may have represented the first attempt by a British government 
to gauge the opinions of a significant cross-section of the population. By determining how 
many men would be willing to join the armed forces, recruiters could not only estimate the 
total pool of available recruits, but establish where such men lived, whether they were 
concentrated in certain areas, and whether there was a particular region within the United 
Kingdom that proved especially amenable to enlistment.70 
The first step in the drive towards greater scrutiny of the home populace, the Householders’ 
Return represented a watershed moment in the history of military advertising. Without 
accurate information on where those interested in military service lived, recruiters could waste 
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valuable resources campaigning in areas that had already been drained of young men. The 
original Caxtons campaign had included a coupon for precisely this reason. Furthermore, 
though the national Census and the Electoral Register, both products of the pre-war era,71 
had given the state a rough idea of how many men were currently residing in Britain, they 
were not effective barometers for determining how many of these men would be willing to 
enlist in the armed forces. Recruiters required not only the whereabouts of men of military 
age, but their opinions with regard to military service as well. Thus, when the returns were 
first drafted they requested details not only of those willing to serve but of all men of military 
age. Such an ‘inquisitorial’ stance led Arthur Steel-Maitland, chairman of the Unionist Party, to 
press for a revision of the returns so that they requested information only of those willing to 
enlist.72 By mid-1915, the revised forms had been sent out to all householders in England, 
Wales and Scotland,73 together with a covering letter (or advertisement) that implored men to 
‘attest’ their willingness to serve on grounds of moral conscience. It would not be the last time 
the postal service would be involved in delivering promotion, and nor would it be the last time, 
as chapter seven will show, when attempts were made to monitor public opinion. 
The agency that organised the returns, the Householders Return and Information Sub-
Department, was also responsible for a second and more significant attempt to monitor public 
opinion. In July 1915, after the Householders’ Return had been completed but before Lord 
Derby (a noted conscriptionist) had been appointed Director-General of Recruitment,74 the 
Coalition government passed the National Registration Act, a bill authorising the state to 
gather information on all men residing in the country. The householders return had not been 
legally binding, but the National Registration Act was, and though it was not enforced by the 
PRC it became the foundation of much of its campaign work in the months to come. By mid-
1915, voluntary enlistment had petered out, and Derby was appointed to reignite the 
campaign in a last-ditch attempt to ‘save’ the voluntary system. As appointments go, Derby’s 
was unusual. Before the war, his voice had been among those who had called loudest for 
compulsory military service, and when he was appointed Director-General in October 1915 he 
was approached by an influential group of MPs (Winston Churchill among them) to refuse the 
post to accelerate the introduction of conscription.75 Derby declined their request, and set to 
work by instituting the so-called ‘group system’ of voluntary enlistment whereby men were 
asked to ‘pledge allegiance’ to their country (that is, to the Army) and were subsequently 
divided into twenty groups according to their age and marital status. Utilising both the 
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National Register and the administrative machinery of the Joint Committees, this ‘system’ 
favoured door-to-door canvassing over postal communication as a means of reaching men, 
and targeted the unenlisted not just in their homes but in their workplaces as well. 
Canvassers were given a series of detailed instructions on how to interact with members of 
the public, and the following advice was given to them in the form of a leaflet: 
Put before him plainly and politely the need of the Country. Do not bully or threaten. If 
he agrees, give him all the necessary information as to where and how he may enlist. 
If he hesitates or refuses, try to find out what are his reasons. Note these carefully. 
Ascertain whether his difficulties or objections can be removed by furnishing him with 
information on any specific point...or by some possible action with his employer or 
relations.76  
These instructions, which were directed to the staff of Joint Committees and to the various 
volunteers (often party agents) that carried out the canvass, highlighted the promotional 
function of the group system, which was not intended simply as a means of finding out how 
many men were willing to ‘pledge allegiance’ to the Army, but to actively encourage such men 
to do so.  
Canvassers must endeavour to get all the men they possibly can for the infantry. It is 
the Infantry that is required to man the Armies in the Field, and the issue of the War 
largely depends on this Arm. They [the potential recruits] should be told that their 
services are equally useful whether they join the Regular, New, Special Reserve or 
Territorial Force.77   
When it was concluded in December 191578 more than 2¼ million men had ‘enlisted’ under 
the Derby Scheme, but since the majority of these men had done so knowing that they would 
not be called upon (these men had been ‘starred’, which is to say exempted from enlistment 
owing to their connection to vital war work), it was not considered a resounding success. 
Within little more than a month, conscription had been enforced throughout the United 
Kingdom, although crucially not in Ireland, and the PRC and its various affiliates sank into 
obscurity. While the attempt to enlist men using a canvassing system failed, however, it 
provided a model for other governments to follow, as they did in the run up to the Second 
World War when a National Register was completed.79 
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Recruiting Meetings, Recruiting Rallies and the Organisation of Public Spectacle 
Before steps were taken to introduce a Householders’ Return, and before any advertisements 
had been produced by the PRC or its affiliates, the Meetings Sub-Department was formed to 
‘undertake the arrangements for meetings and speakers to stimulate recruitment throughout 
the country’.80 While the work of the Householders Return and Information Sub-Department 
was concerned predominantly with information gathering or ‘market research’, the Meetings 
Sub-Department was concerned with what would today be considered a form of public 
relations. The term ‘PR’, apparently coined in the 1920s by the American practitioner Edward 
Bernays,81 does not appear in the official records of the PRC, although that should not be 
taken as evidence that the PRC itself carried out no public relations. Understood as a means 
of creating goodwill or interacting with the public,82 public relations defined much of the work 
of the PRC, and was particularly important in the planning and organisation of public 
meetings, marches and recruiting rallies.    
While it was tasked with organising meetings to drum up enthusiasm in the war, over 12,000 
of which were held in England, Scotland and Wales between 1914 and 1916, its work 
snowballed into something much larger as the war rumbled on. The proprietors of cinemas, 
theatres and music-halls were lobbied to allow recruiters to speak during intervals and before 
and after shows; lantern lectures, complete with scripts prepared by staff83 at the central 
PRC, were delivered continuously through the winter of 1914/1915; military processions and 
rallies passed through towns and other residential areas; a campaign of ‘aggressive open-air 
propaganda’ was waged in London in the spring of 1915, complemented by a range of 
advertisements and editorial publicity (see below); ‘brilliantly decorated and illuminated 
tramcars’, accompanied by bands and speakers who used the trams as platforms for 
promoting the Services, were despatched to Huddersfield, Halifax, Leeds and Bradford; 
permanent outdoor stages were erected in market squares and open spaces as podiums for 
speakers and bands; and the entire Sub-Department, in common with the rest of the PRC, 
was involved in canvassing for Derby’s ‘group system’ in October-December 1915.84 
Describing the results of the campaign in Britain’s capital city, Sub-Department staff claimed: 
London was ringing with appeals, [and] meetings were held morning, noon and 
night... In the parks and open spaces, in workshops and factories, in theatres, music 
halls and cinemas, wherever the united experience of the three party organisations 
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showed that crowds large or small could be gathered together, there meetings were 
held.85   
It is clear that by ‘meetings’ officials had in mind something quite different to the dry 
congregations of village notables and recruiting officers implied by the term. They meant – 
and helped to carry out – a form of public spectacle that sought to seize control of public 
space, imposing a ‘central, collective definition of patriotism’86 and exploiting it for the 
purposes of the New Armies. As the labour historian Brock Millman has argued, control of 
public space was crucial in the struggle to combat dissent in Britain between 1914 and 1919, 
and yet surprisingly little is known about its role in manufacturing consent or of the place of 
‘meetings’, in their various forms, in the broader context of the recruitment campaign.87 
Existing accounts on the PRC do not do justice to the scale of its meetings work. Douglas, 
who dedicates a section in his paper to meetings, devotes much of the ensuing space to 
discussing enrolment rates, and though he does acknowledge that meetings were ‘evidently 
considered...to be of substantial importance as a means of recruitment’ his discussion is 
restricted mostly to piecemeal references drawn from the Times and Hansard.88 Dutton, 
though recognising the PRC’s ‘comprehensive provision of meetings, speeches and rallies’, 
follows the general trend within the literature of focusing on advertisements rather than the 
wider business of producing a range advertising, while Hiley makes only passing references 
to meetings in his article on the government’s poster campaign.89 Haste, finally, mentions 
meetings only once in her discussion on recruitment, in the paragraph cited above, and also 
devotes more space to the subject of posters and pamphlets than to the public spectacles 
that took place alongside them. 
By searching beyond conventional advertisements to the structures and practices that 
produce them historians are presented with a more comprehensive picture of how advertisers 
actually operated. The ‘great national effort to secure recruits’, as one official described the 
PRC’s work,90 was carried out on multiple fronts and using multiple media. Similar, though 
perhaps not quite so grand campaigns were probably waged by political parties in the run up 
to elections, and there is also reliable evidence that commercial enterprises partook in various 
forms of public spectacle, dubbed by McFall an ‘exhibitions culture’, from at least the 19th 
century onwards.91 
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Conclusion: Military Advertising as a Synergy of Public and Private Communications  
The first campaign for new recruits waged in January-February 1914 was a relatively small-
scale affair; the second and third were not. Though contrasting estimates have been put 
forward by historians, the PRC’s own records claim the committee produced 54,260,500 
copies of posters, leaflets, pamphlets, taxi-strips (designed to be affixed to government 
vehicles, public buses and train carriages, and taxis) and cards (designed to be displayed in 
recruiting offices, in public buildings and in offices); organised 12,705 meetings, incorporating 
21,400 speeches across 422 constituencies; and arranged miscellaneous other promotions 
including marching bands, special exhibitions and a range of press work whose full extent 
may never be known.92 In the face of such figures it is not hard to see why Jay Winter has 
described the PRC as the source of the ‘most spectacular’ recruitment campaign ever 
waged,93 although there remains an enduring belief amongst other historians that the PRC’s 
output was not particularly significant, either in terms of its scale or in terms of its subsequent 
impact on other forms of government promotion. Marwick and Taylor, for instance, claimed 
that the PRC’s posters were of a ‘rather low quality’, and that their ‘method’ was distinctly 
‘clumsy’.94 Haste has echoed these sentiments by suggesting the government betrayed an 
‘imperfect grasp of the significance of manipulating public opinion’ at the outset of the war, 
only to discover its feet in 1917, while Clark, in a confident statement of falsehood, even 
suggested (in 1995) that the ‘government decided it was not worth spending time and energy 
on domestic propaganda, as the nation’s mind was already made up in favour of the war’.95 
Part of the reluctance to treat recruitment advertising seriously can be explained by the stress 
laid on the study of advertisements rather than the business of advertising. While the 
Publications Sub-Department of the PRC has provided the basis of many analyses of its 
poster and leaflet work, and while the advertisements that appeared in the press in the early 
months of the war have been cited in many social and political studies of the war, historians 
have in general appeared reluctant to move beyond these sources to other forms of archival 
material. Advertisements, as this chapter has tried to show, were only part of the business of 
recruitment, which extended to a series of public ‘events’ around which recruitment could be 
organised, to more surreptitious forms of promotion found in newspapers, to lantern lectures, 
to elaborate publicity marches involving enlisted men and displays of military weaponry and 
vehicles. These kinds of promotion would represent the stock-in-trade of military advertisers 
in the years to come. What Le Bas called ‘editorial matter’,96 for example, would become 
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known in recruiting circles as ‘editorial publicity’, a subject that was considered so important 
that the government set up dedicated offices to deal with it (see chapter six). Furthermore, 
while certain historians of propaganda have emphasised the importance of the major 
propaganda agencies – the ‘literary propaganda’ created under Charles Masterman at 
Wellington House has been subjected to many critiques97 – the great recruiting campaigns of 
1914 and 1915 influenced how other departments interacted with the public, a fact that can 
be demonstrated by the wartime career of Le Bas, which involved stints at the WO, at its 
counterpart in Ireland (see chapter five) and at the Treasury, where he organised a campaign 
for War Bonds that eventually earned him a knighthood.98 Recruiters even influenced how the 
wartime propagandists went about their work, with organisations like the National War Aims 
Committee modelled on the PRC and bodies like Wellington House (set up shortly after the 
PRC had held its first meeting) producing (in at least one case) a recruiting pamphlet 
authored by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle.99 
If the work of the PRC, Caxtons and the WO laid a path for other departments to follow, 
however, it is worth noting that they only managed to operate on such a grand scale because 
of the unique conditions they faced in England, Scotland and Wales in the early years of the 
First World War. There can be little doubt that large sections of the British population 
supported the war, and lent their hand to recruiting efforts by aiding official organisations and 
establishing their own voluntary organisations. The Pals battalions, raised independently of 
WO oversight and outside of the machinery of the PRC and Caxtons, are evidence of that.100 
Such ‘war enthusiasm’ did not, however, pervade all aspects of British life, and in the next 
chapter we will turn to a part of the United Kingdom that responded to the war in a quite 
different way to England, Scotland and Wales. 
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Chapter Five 
‘The Irish Problem’: Recruiting, Rebellion and 
Conscription in a Divided Country, 1914-19 
[W]e are dealing with a very difficult problem. We are discussing in this House, 
certainly not for the first time, or the hundredth or the thousandth time, the most 
baffling problem that ever comes up for consideration by Government or 
Parliament...the Irish problem.1       
                           David Lloyd George, 1918  
We...joined voluntarily for the purpose of taking human life, in order that the principles 
for which this country stood should be upheld and preserved. These principles, we 
were told, were Self-Determination and Freedom for Small Nations… We came back 
from France to see that Self-Determination had been given to some Nations we had 
never heard of, but that it had been denied to Ireland.2    
                      Reggie Dunne, 1919  
On the eve of the Great War the island of Ireland was on the verge of its own civil war.3 Since 
the passage of the third Home Rule Bill in 1912, tensions between nationalist and unionist 
communities had been strained. Ulster Unionists, who counted among their allies several 
high-ranking military officials and the Unionist (or Conservative) Party,4 opposed any attempt 
to enforce self-government in Ireland, believing that, as a Protestant minority in a 
predominantly Catholic country, they would be subjected to religious persecution. 
Nationalists, on the other hand, argued that Home Rule would wrestle back the independence 
Ireland had lacked since the destruction of its Parliament in 1876, and were represented in 
Westminster by the Irish Parliamentary Party and, to an extent, the ruling Liberal Party.5 In 
1913, unionists under the auspices of Sir Edward Carson founded a private army, the Ulster 
Volunteer Force (UVF), to resist any attempt to impose Home Rule in Ulster; nationalists, 
supported by the leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party John Redmond, formed the Irish 
Volunteers (IV) as a counterpoise. With the two sides squaring up for an armed conflict, it is 
perhaps surprising that the British government included Ireland in its plans to mobilise men 
for the New Armies in the summer of 1914. Yet in spite of its instability and the complexity of 
its internal politics, Ireland was the site of a host of recruitment campaigns waged both during 
the Great War and after the Armistice had been signed. More surprising still, the private 
armies that had been raised in the run up to 1914-18 soon became ‘feeders’ to the New 
Armies, with republicans and unionists joining forces to aid the Empire.6 
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As in England, Scotland and Wales, the campaigns waged to attract men to the army were 
organised by a series of specialist recruiting bodies which made use of the machinery of 
political parties and the resources and expertise of private enterprise. On the outbreak of the 
war, a Central Council for the Organisation of Recruitment in Ireland (CCOR) was established 
in Dublin.7 In files stored in the National Archives references have also been made to a Dublin 
and County Recruiting Committee and to a separate Naval Recruiting Committee, although 
little is known about when these organisations were established or how they operated.8 In 
1915, under the direction of the publicist Hedley Le Bas (see chapter four), the Department of 
Recruiting (DOR) superseded the CCOR. Tasked with ‘making public in all quarters the need 
for recruits’, the DOR used methods comparable to those seen in the rest of the United 
Kingdom, producing posters such as ‘Will you go or must I?’ (see figure twelve) which played 
on male anxieties about gender identity.9 In 1918, one final body, the Irish Recruiting Council 
(IRC), was established in an attempt raise 50,000 men.  
Many of these organisations have attracted the attention of historians, not least because of 
what they seem to say about Ireland’s response to the war. Remarking on the ‘escalating 
demand for manpower to feed Kitchener’s mass armies’, Charles Townshend, for instance, 
has suggested that the Irish Parliamentary Party found itself ‘[c]aught up in the high-pressure 
British war effort, [where] recruiting came to be the overriding priority in...party policy’, and 
where ‘recruitment became a kind of test of the Redmondite credibility’.10 Other authors have 
commented on the mobilisation of political parties, with James McConnel suggesting that the 
portrayal of nationalist MPs as ‘recruiting sergeants’ for the New Armies requires systematic 
revision,11 and the subject of recruitment has also entered general social and political 
accounts of the war, such as Keith Jefferys’ Ireland and the Great War (2000) and Richard 
Grayson’s Belfast Boys (2010).12 Nevertheless, in keeping with the literature on the British 
experience of the First World War, most of the attention has been directed towards questions 
of mobilisation rather than persuasion. No study, furthermore, has sought to examine the 
connections during the war years between British (English, Welsh and Scottish) and Irish 
recruitment work, or the continuation of the IRC into the postwar era. 
This chapter, which explores the many attempts to boost enlistment in the New Armies, the 
Royal Air Force and the Navy in Ireland, describes both the differences and similarities 
between recruitment campaigns waged on either side of the Irish Sea. While both Britain and 
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Ireland utilised existing political structures and drew from outside expertise to construct 
appeals for the civilian public, the organisation of recruitment in Ireland changed in the wake 
of a series of ground shaking social and political events. In 1914, recruitment proceeded on 
the assumption that what (allegedly) worked in England, Scotland and Wales would also work 
in Ireland. In 1915, appeals to ‘King and Country’ and to the Union Jack were modified to suit 
the values and principles of the nationalist community. In 1916, after republican 
revolutionaries attempted to overthrow British rule to trigger the birth of a new ‘Irish 
republic’,13 efforts to boost recruitment stagnated until, in 1918, the IRC was formed in a last-
ditch attempt to raise men before Britain (that is, Westminster) imposed conscription in 
Ireland for the first time. Taken together, these campaigns represented important 
interventions into civil society, not least because they occurred alongside, and in response to, 
a series of great events in Irish history. Indeed, while recruitment in Britain occurred against a 
backdrop of patriotic sentiment, in Ireland after the initial surge of war enthusiasm it became a 
highly controversial subject amongst both nationalists and unionists. The ways in which 
Ireland responded to the call to arms can thus reveal how official institutions tried to attract 
recruits in a society not necessarily predisposed towards supporting the British armed forces. 
Recruiting Politics and the Politics of Recruitment  
Even though Ireland seemed to be perched on the brink of a civil war in August 1914, the 
Irish public appear to have responded to the Great War in a manner befitting a loyal member 
of the Union. Adrian Gregory and Senia Paseta have described the early stages of the war as 
an ‘epoch of volunteer action’ that led to the creation of a ‘plethora of small bodies keen to do 
their bit [for the war]’. The war itself created an ‘unprecedented unity, both within the island of 
Ireland and between Ireland and Great Britain’, and suggested ‘Ireland [had] behaved in ways 
that were recognisable in the rest of the United Kingdom’.14 As with Britain, political parties 
and politicians also swung their weight behind the war. The same men who had advocated a 
military struggle against the forces of the Crown or against the forces of their opponents were 
seen extolling the virtues of enlistment in the New Armies. Bonar Law, leader of the Unionists, 
joined the nationalist MP Joseph Devlin in endorsing recruitment to Kitchener’s Armies, with 
each man believing the enlistment of Irish men could aid the causes of their respective ideals. 
Devlin suggested enlistment would ‘not only...maintain our national rights, but...[ensure] a full 
and an increasing share in the work and the glory of the Empire’,15 while Carson believed it 
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would help further the unionist cause and set to work advocating the mass-enlistment of 
Protestant loyalists to try to prevent Home Rule.16  
 
The UVF and the IV, which had close ties to a number of politicians in Westminster, were 
soon actively involved in recruiting for the New Armies.17 Carson, who was eager to establish 
an Ulster Division in Ireland, received War Office (WO) approval to do so using the ranks of 
the volunteer force he had helped to create; Redmond, though he was not responsible for the 
formation of the IV, was nevertheless ‘able to use his influence to take control of it’ in an 
attempt to press for a separate Irish Brigade.18 The organisation of military advertising in 
Ireland during the early stages of the war has often been told through the eyes and deeds of 
these men, partly because they have been regarded as authority figures within the main 
communities of Irish society and partly because Irish MPs have in general been accused of 
acting as ‘recruiting sergeants for John Bull’.19 Yet recent historical scholarship has tended to 
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stress the role of ‘factors other than the agency of MPs in accounting for the enlistment of 
approximately 144,000 Irishmen (in addition to the 58,000 Irish military personnel and 
reservists who were mobilised)’.20 MPs might have urged young Irishmen to enlist through 
their political speeches – and they appeared to do so in numbers equivalent to those 
witnessed in Britain during 1914 and 1915 – but they were only part of a broader promotional 
culture that was orchestrated and developed by a series of recruiting organisations.  
Many of these organisations had direct or indirect connections to the authorities in Whitehall 
and to the War Office (WO) in particular. The CCOR, for example, has been described by one 
historian as a body with a ‘superficial civilian profile [designed] to camouflage the military’s 
control over recruiting matters’.21 Its perceived inadequacy at drumming up enthusiasm for 
enlistment has been put forward as a principle reason for Le Bas’ involvement in military 
advertising in Ireland in 1915. According to Nicholas Hiley, it was only after the WO had been 
‘impressed’ by his work in England that the decision was made to send Le Bas to Ireland to 
embark on what Hiley has called a more ‘sensitive mission’. The Parliamentary Recruiting 
Committee (PRC), which published a number of posters that subsequently appeared in 
Ireland, had deemed it unwise to set up a permanent presence in the country, and so Le Bas 
was sent as a ‘special representative’ of the WO to inspire recruiting and create what Hiley 
has called a ‘firm base for future British propaganda in Ireland’.22 Arriving in Dublin sometime 
in February 1915, and tasked with ‘mak[ing] public in all quarters the need for recruits’,23 he 
discovered that the kinds of recruiting appeals deemed effective in Britain did not appear to 
have the same effect in Ireland. In Dublin, the stronghold of Irish republicanism, posters had 
apparently appeared references speeches from prominent British politicians, including the 
Unionist leader Law, and the phrase ‘God Save the King’ was also to be found. Overhauling 
the CCOR’s existing arrangements and setting up a new organisation,24 Le Bas then set to 
work on an ‘intensive poster and leafleting campaign that substituted messages like ‘God 
save the King’ with ‘God save Ireland’ and introduced new appeals that adapted the earlier 
work of the PRC.25 
Nicoletta Gullace, whose The Blood of our Sons (2002) examines the impact of the First 
World War on notions of British citizenship, has suggested that Le Bas’ work in Ireland in the 
first half of 1915 circumvented the difficult issue of appealing to Irishmen hostile to the British 
armed forces by constructing appeals designed to ‘[encourage] men to defend their women 
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and their own sense of honour’.26 Some contemporaries of Le Bas, nevertheless, felt that 
early attempts to mobilise Ireland’s population, particularly its nationalist population, had been 
deliberately scuppered by figures in the WO. In the House of Commons in 1916, one Irish 
Parliamentary Party MP spoke of an ‘Unseen Hand’ and a ‘Curragh Camp’27 within the latter 
department that did ‘[e]verything...in a Machiavellian spirit, not to encourage but to discourage 
recruiting’. Referring to Le Bas’ earlier visit, the same politician claimed Le Bas had found 
little evidence of any serious recruiting work in Ireland, that ‘all over the country [the WO] 
employed the very last type of men [required] to make a successful recruiting appeal’, and 
that most recruiting jobs were given to unionist politicians who had a vested interest to enlist 
as few nationalists as possible in Kitchener’s armies.28 This view was later echoed by Sir 
Henry Robinson, former executive of the Irish Local Government Board, who claimed 
recruiting in Ireland had been ‘handled rather badly’,29 and was echoed by A. J. P. Taylor in 
English History (1965) in relation to the appointment of Lord Kitchener as Secretary of State 
for War. According to Taylor, it was ‘[t]hanks to Kitchener [that] the surge in Irish loyalty’ 
witnessed at the outset of the war was replaced with an attitude of ‘sullen indifference’.  
Both [the UVF and the IV] were anxious to be embodied in the British army. 
Kitchener, who had been born and partly brought up in Ireland though not an 
Irishman, shared the outlook of the Protestant garrison. He accepted the Ulster 
organisation; he rejected the Home Rulers. The Red Hand of Ulster was 
acknowledged [as a divisional symbol]; the Irish Harp was not. Recruits from Ulster 
had their own officers; those from the south of Ireland were placed under 
Protestants.30 
Taylor’s intervention, as the title of his book suggests, approached the subject of recruitment 
largely from the perspective of English (or British) history. More recent research by D. G. 
Boyce, however, has sought to explain the low numbers of Catholic officers in the New 
Armies as the upshot of an absence of officer training schools in Ireland, and the refusal to 
sanction an Irish insignia for the predominantly Catholic 16th Division as a reflection of the 
values of that division’s commanding officer rather than an indication of any institutionalised 
prejudice at the WO.31 Nevertheless, even if nationalists were not on the whole treated 
differently to unionists it is important to recognise the suspicion held at the time by certain 
individuals and republican groups that men with nationalist sympathies were being unfairly 
persecuted.32 It is also important to acknowledge, both in the early part of the war and 
towards its conclusion, that a number of republican groups had set up their own ‘anti-
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recruiting’ campaigns designed to offset any publicity created by the authorities, and that 
these campaigns often made use of the same promotional imagery and rhetoric. According to 
Patrick Pearse, the leader of the Easter Rising (see below), both the IV and the New Armies 
made use of the image of the Irish flag in their recruiting marches.33 
Thus while Kitchener may have allowed ‘every conceivable obstacle to be placed in the path 
of the formation of a specifically Irish Nationalist division like the one he had sanctioned for 
Ulster’,34 the Irish themselves, or more precisely certain elements of radical republicanism, 
also sought to discourage enlistment. In leaflets, speeches, newspapers and public meetings 
recruitment to the New Armies was derided and disparaged, with the British Army portrayed 
as a threat to Irish sovereignty. Such ‘anti-recruitment propaganda’, as Peter Simkins has 
called it,35 competed with the pro-recruitment materials developed by the official recruiting 
agencies. When enlistment began to tail off in 1915 (a trend apparent throughout the United 
Kingdom) the ire of certain politicians was directed towards the ‘seditious meetings and 
utterances’ of those opposed to recruitment. One member of the unelected Upper House 
suggested Sinn Fein propaganda had affected the ‘minds of many young [Irish] men 
[otherwise] anxious to serve’, and calls were made for a military crackdown.36 The military 
crackdown would come in 1916, and would have such a devastating impact on voluntary 
enlistment that it was not until 1918 that a serious attempt to mobilise the public was made. 
Before dealing with this attempt, however, it is necessary to consider some of the events that 
preceded, including in particular the Easter Rising and the 1918 conscription crisis.  
The Easter Rising, the Spectre of Conscription and a ‘New Nationalism’ in Ireland 
On the morning of April 24th 1916, a small force of armed men comprised of soldiers from the 
IV, the Irish Citizen Army and the Irish Republican Brotherhood seized control of key public 
buildings in Dublin’s city centre. Proclaiming the birth of a new ‘Irish Republic’ on the steps of 
the General Post Office, the force was surrounded and subsequently overwhelmed by 
members of the 18th Royal Irish Guards.37 In the midst of the rebellion, the government of 
Ireland, which had been controlled by the country’s Chief Secretary Sir Augustine Birrell,38 
was effectively handed over to the military authorities. Major-General Sir John Maxwell, a 
Colonial governor and veteran of several of Britain’s imperial wars, was appointed ‘military 
governor’ with ‘plenary’ powers to put down the rebellion.39 Maxwell’s response, and the 
response of the British government per se, would have a profound effect on recruiting in 
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Ireland, both in the immediate aftermath of the rebellion and for a period in 1918 when Ireland 
was threatened with conscription if it failed to muster enough volunteers. 
The fear that Westminster would impose conscription had played an important part in the 
events of the Easter Week of 1916. In England, Scotland and Wales, conscription had come 
into force in January after it had become clear that the WO’s insatiable demand for new 
recruits would not be satisfied by existing voluntary arrangements. Redmond had managed to 
secure the exemption of Ireland from the draft, but as British military losses on the Western 
Front grew so too did Irish anxiety that compulsory military service would be applied to the 
four counties.40 After the interment and subsequent execution of the leaders of the rebellion, 
public opinion swung behind the rebels, having previously broadly rejected their insurrection. 
The treatment of Irish prisoners, over 1,800 of whom had been sent to England in the 
aftermath of the rebellion, many under the false apprehension that it was Sinn Fein that had 
planned and organised the rebellion, did not help the situation, and nor did the continuation of 
martial law, which remained in force throughout the summer despite the appointment of a 
new Chief Secretary in the form of H. E. Duke.41 Most damning of all, however, was the 
failure of the British government to execute a workable plan of Home Rule, which had been 
brought forward in the wake of the Rising in an attempt to placate the nationalist community, 
only to be exposed as a piece of gamesmanship by David Lloyd George.42 
The cumulative effect of these events was a change in feeling and sentiment that drastically 
altered Ireland’s experience of the war and popular attitudes towards the British armed forces. 
Remarking on the impact of the Easter Rising on Irish society, the historian W. E. Vaughan 
has claimed a ‘new nationalism’ began to take shape in the wake of the Easter Rising that 
was both vehemently anti-British and fundamentally opposed to any form of voluntary or 
compulsory military service. This nationalism expressed itself in a ‘groundswell of discontent 
and frustration’, and in the widespread belief that the execution of the rebels was little more 
than cold blooded murder. ‘During that dismal summer of 1916’, Vaughan claims, ‘stroke after 
stroke seemed to emphasise that Ireland’s fate was a matter almost of indifference to her 
rulers’. A ‘mood of savage resentment’ set in, and ‘expressed itself most dramatically in a 
rapidly developing cult of the dead leaders, a cult that found expression in the frequent 
commemorative masses then being held in Dublin churches, and that easily passed into the 
singing of patriotic songs and the formation of vast processions, highly charged with 
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emotion’.43 Ireland, in short, had changed beyond recognition and experienced a 
‘transformation’.44   
Ireland’s ‘new nationalism’ presented a significant obstacle for military recruiters, not least 
because it positioned them in direct opposition to the very people they were supposed to 
persuade. In a climate of deep-seated public hostility, in which the armed forces were viewed 
as agents of British rule and as executors of martial law, military recruiters could not draw on 
the culture of ‘war enthusiasm’ or the ‘epoch of volunteer action’ that had characterised much 
of Britain in 1914.45 How they responded to the challenges presented by this dilemma, and 
what techniques and methods of persuasion they sought to apply, will be the subject of the 
remainder of this chapter.  
The ‘Conscription Crisis’ and the Irish Recruiting Council  
In October 1917, Russia’s imperial government was overthrown by Bolshevik revolutionaries. 
By March the following year, Russia had signed a peace treaty with the Central Powers that 
freed up a sizeable proportion of the latter’s military resources for an assault on the Western 
Front.46 On March 21st, the Germans staged the first of five major offensives using 
reinforcements assembled from the east, with the bulk of the attack falling on the British 5th 
Army at the Somme. Nearly 40,000 British soldiers were killed or captured on this day alone, 
and for the first time since 1916 it seemed likely that Britain might lose the war.47 As Gregory 
has noted, ‘[u]nless the British army could be provided with manpower to rebuild the 
shattered divisions, the B[ritish] E[xpeditionary] F[orce] would cease to exist’.48 To find this 
manpower the War Cabinet was presented with two options. The first, to extend the age limit 
of conscription in England, Scotland and Wales from 42 to 49 and to make use of the many 
thousands of 18-year-old recruits trained but disbarred from fighting, might provoke the wrath 
of the British public. The second, to extend conscription to Ireland, would probably inflame an 
already volatile situation and lead to a full-scale armed rebellion which, to be effectively put 
down, would require the transferring of troops from the Western Front to Ireland.  
Both options were fraught with difficulties, and even Carson, an avowed unionist, suggested 
conscription was ‘not worth contemplating [in Ireland]’.49 In the event, Lloyd George’s 
government decided to implement both – or rather, resolved to authorise a new Military 
Service Bill that gave the Irish authorities the power to conscript men for the Army and their 
counterparts in England, Scotland and Wales the power to extend it. By conscripting the Irish 
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Lloyd George ‘guaranteed the failure of any attempt to settle the Irish question on the basis of 
Home Rule... wrecked the credibility of the Irish Parliamentary Party and permanently 
alienated a wide swathe of Irish opinion’.50 Yet conscription, as Alan Ward, Gregory and a 
number of other historians have shown, was never actually enforced in Ireland despite being 
on the statute books, and despite the passage of the Act leading to a General Strike in Ireland 
on April 23rd.51 In that respect, conscription was rather like Home Rule: both policies had been 
promised to the Irish people only never to materialise, and both had triggered heated debate 
and public discussion during the war.  
The decision to extend conscription to Ireland but not to actually enforce it was part of a 
shrewd diversion devised by Lloyd George to give the impression that the government was 
extending the call-up to Ireland. This impression would appease public opposition to the 
mobilisation of ‘English grandfathers’,52 but it did not resolve the problem of recruiting 
shortages. The government still required an influx of new soldiers to replace those killed, 
wounded or captured on the Western Front, and in the summer of 1918 a new voluntary 
recruiting organisation came into being.53  
The IRC, formed nearly three months after the attack on the Somme and nearly four months 
before the end of the war,54 was given a single task – to raise 50,000 men. Presented as an 
intrinsically ‘Irish’ body, it was actually set up by the Ministry of National Service (MONS), a 
department that had been established in 1917 to assume control of mobilisation from the WO. 
According to Lieutenant-Colonel G. J. S. Scovell, a recruiting official at the latter department, 
there was a ‘necessity for disguising, as far as possible, the identity of the Ministry of National 
Service [in the recruitment campaign], and the consequent necessity for avoiding [adverse] 
publicity’.55 On June 24th 1918, some tentative steps were taken in this direction. In an article 
published in the Irish Times, a newspaper that had campaigned in the early stages of the war 
for voluntary and subsequently compulsory enlistment in the New Armies,56 an appeal was 
made to Irish men. It read 
Fellow Countrymen – At the request of His Excellency, we four Irishmen have 
undertaken to organise a campaign of voluntary enlistment, to be carried on by our 
own people, by their own methods and in their own way. We are quite conscious of 
the difficulties that beset our path; nevertheless, we believe that we shall receive the 
willing support of all, even those who are suffering under mismanagement and 
disappointed hope, for all must realise that the first necessity for the peaceful 
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settlement of our country’s troubles must be the defeat of the traducer of honour and 
of our common Christianity [sic].57 
Ireland’s ‘troubles’ were well-known to the authors of the appeal, and indeed to anyone who 
had paid attention to the shifting dynamics between the state, the armed forces and the public 
in Irish society in the wake of 1916. Yet what distinguished this appeal from those circulated 
earlier by the DOR (see above) was the explicit emphasis placed on military recruitment as a 
solution to Ireland’s social, political and religious problems. Referring to the ‘mismanagement 
and disappointed hope’ of those disillusioned by the war, a plea was made to the ‘common 
Christianity’ that united Irishmen and Irishwomen and apparently distinguished them from the 
‘un-Christian’ Germans. Tales of German barbarity can be traced to the pre-war era,58 and 
took on a particularly malicious tone during the war years when a stories surfaced alleging a 
British soldier had been ‘crucified’ by German cavalrymen.59 These tales were designed to 
position the Central Powers as outside the realm of normal human activity, and beyond the 
pale of normative Christian values. In the case of Ireland, however, an additional problem 
existed: the religious divisions that existed between Catholics and Protestants, and the need 
to resolve these to receive the ‘willing support of all’.60  
The main figures behind the IRC seem to have been aware of this problem, and put forward 
various schemes designed to encourage Ireland’s catholic majority to accept the religious 
grounds for supporting the war. One plan necessitated constructing ‘War Honour Shrines’ as 
a ‘salutary effect in bringing the Catholic religion into touch with the war’. Another involved 
paying the clergy, apparently ‘not above giving useful advice to their parishioners for a good 
addition to the “Poor-box”’. It is hard to determine the impact of such schemes, although their 
intention was clearly stated in official files: recruiters sought to ‘exercise a very “wholesome” 
influence in certain neighbourhoods of ill repute’, and would do so using the promotional 
techniques and methods witnessed in Britain and Ireland earlier as well as any new appeals 
they could develop. As with the PRC, the IRC was expected to ‘run the [recruiting] campaign 
just as if it were an election campaign’.61 Despite its best efforts, the IRC would not, however, 
succeed in doing so.  
The Origins of the Council: The War Cabinet and the Ministry of National Service 
The appeal reported in the Irish Times on June 24th was authored by four men, three of whom 
were prominent figures in Irish society.62 Stephen Gwynn, an MP for the Irish Parliamentary 
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Party, was a serving officer in the 16th Division. Maurice Dockrell, a Dublin-based 
businessman, had received a Knighthood for his business work and would win one of three 
unionist seats outside Ulster in Ireland’s postwar general election. Alexander Martin Sullivan, 
finally, was a well-known lawyer who had defended Sir Roger Casement, the British counsel 
implicated in the Easter Rising, before his execution in London in 1916. Presenting 
themselves as ‘Irishmen’ who sought to ‘organise a campaign of voluntary recruit enlistment, 
to be carried out by our own people, by their own methods, and in their own way’,63 they 
sought to present the IRC as a quintessentially Irish body.  
There is reliable evidence, all the same, suggesting that the origins of the IRC can be traced 
to the deliberations of the War Cabinet. On May 30th, almost two months prior to the IRC’s 
first appeal, a meeting was held to review the possibility of implementing conscription in 
Ireland. Ireland’s available manpower was at that point unknown – unlike the rest of the 
United Kingdom, no National Register had been compiled and no Derby Scheme had ever 
been carried out – so an arbitrary figure of 50,000 men was set. Agreeing to sponsor a 
voluntary recruitment campaign before conscription was introduced, the Cabinet gave a 
deadline of August 1st to avert conscription, a deadline that would subsequently be pushed 
forward to October 1st, November 1st and December 1st. On June 3nd, the government took 
steps to publicise its intentions via a press release, targeting young Irish men aged 19-27 who 
lived in towns and not rural areas, and making clear that conscription would not be needed if 
50,000 men promptly came forward to the Colours.64  
In the meantime, a review of existing recruiting procedures was undertaken on behalf of the 
MONS to determine where improvements could be made and to outline a possible plan of 
action for the new recruitment drive. This review, which made a series of implicit criticisms of 
existing arrangements, confirmed the belief that recruiting in Ireland had been rather ‘handled 
rather badly’ (see above) and made eight recommendations to the government. New recruits 
should be given a bonus of between £2 and £5, and ‘a better class of recruiters’ would be 
required. A ‘great propaganda [campaign]’ should be commenced; ‘[n]ot a recruiting 
propaganda [campaign], as such, but [one] on War Aims’, which would help to nullify anti-
recruiting sentiment. Soldiers should be given ‘preferential treatment’ in the distribution of 
land after the war,65 and those from poor backgrounds should be advanced a bulk sum from 
their Separation Allowance. Boys between the ages of 17 and 18 should be allowed to join 
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up, and should be given the right to a preference of choosing which Unit they would join. 
Finally, ‘the bringing over of Colonial soldiers as propagandists and recruiters, and the giving 
of long leave to soldiers in Irish Regiments who have won decorations or otherwise 
distinguished themselves in [some way]’, should be considered.66  
Apart from the ‘great propaganda campaign’ and the use of ‘colonial’ (that is, American) 
soldiers, many of these appeals were material inducements on par with those advertised by 
the Caxtons Publishing House in January-February 1914 (see chapter four). Attracting 
civilians using financial inducements might have seemed a sensible approach to military 
advertising. In 1914, as Arthur Marwick has argued, there were fundamental differences 
between Great Britain (‘comprising England, Wales and Scotland’) and Ireland (‘lacking the 
mineral bounty with which Britain was blessed...poverty-stricken and, save for the Belfast 
area, almost entirely agrarian’).67 Yet the war had actually brought a level of relative 
prosperity to Ireland. Wages increased and the need for work, both agricultural and industrial, 
likewise grew. Irish firms were also involved in the production of goods for the British armed 
forces,68 and since Irish men could not be conscripted they also found employment across the 
Irish Sea in England, Scotland and Wales. Increasing affluence might be put forward as a 
factor to explain the relatively poor performance of the 1918-19 recruitment campaign (see 
below), but it was not the only challenge the recruiters would face. 
The MONS review of existing recruiting procedures concluded that it was paramount to 
conceal Whitehall involvement in the project. ‘As far as possible, from the top to the bottom of 
the organisation, it should be Irish’.69 Nevertheless, the question remained as to how it would 
appear ‘Irish’ and what particular shape the organisation would take. In this regard, the 
MONS appears to have consulted recruiting bodies then operational in Ireland, including the 
aforementioned Dublin and County Recruiting Committee and the Naval Committee, but it 
dismissed both for different reasons. According to report’s author, the Dublin Committee was 
discounted because of its ‘Unionist Reputation’: of 29 members, it contained only four 
nationalists. The Naval Committee, on the other hand, was dismissed for being too small for 
the task, and for being presided over by a man, P. J. Andrew, seemingly ‘anxious to have any 
big paid appointment that may be going’.70  
Having dismissed these organisations (the DOR does not appear to have operated beyond 
1915), the decision was made to establish an entirely new body that came into being in June 
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1918. Given the rather sizeable task of enlisting 50,000 men from a population already 
drained of manpower, it would also conflict with the various nationalist paramilitary groups 
operational in Ireland at the time. In July, Lloyd George’s government engineered a scandal 
that implicated Sinn Fein in a ‘German plot’. Serving many purposes, the plot provided a 
pretext for rounding up known rebels and interning them in England, and for appointing 
General Sir John French as Viceroy of Ireland, essentially resurrecting the ‘military governor’ 
post formerly held by General Maxwell.71 Ward has suggested that the 1918 German 
conspiracy ‘marked a new wave of oppression in Ireland which was really directed at anti-
conscription agitation’, but it can also be interpreted as a step in the direction of voluntary 
recruiting and the ‘great propaganda’ campaign on which it would be based. The MONS 
report on recruiting in Ireland had warned of ‘statements detrimental to recruiting’ and 
‘literature of a similar kind’, and spoke prophetically (if inaccurately) of the absence of a single 
‘prosecution’ against the perpetrators of seditious utterances. ‘Our Recruiting Officers’, its 
author wrote, ‘complained bitterly of this, and asserted that it was one of the greatest 
hindrances to recruiting they had to contend with’. French himself believed the removal of the 
leaders of the rebels would help boost enlistment and promote acceptance of British military 
rule.72 In the event, the interments only served to radicalise the population. The IRC would 
have its work cut out.  
Setting up the Recruitment Machinery: Producing and Disseminating Promotion     
As we have already seen (see chapters one-three) the work that goes on behind the 
production of advertisements is often more useful for analysing a campaign than are 
advertisements themselves. This was the case for the recruitment campaigns waged in 
England, Scotland and Wales in 1914-15, and it is also the case for the work of the IRC, 
which mirrored the constitution of the PRC by operating on both a local and a national level. 
In addition to a central headquarters located in Ireland’s capital city, ten regional offices were 
set up throughout the country.73 A building on St. Stephen’s Green, one of the locations held 
by the rebels during the Easter Rising, provided the location of the head office, but as the 
work of the organisation expanded the office was moved to the Maples Hotel on Kildare 
Street. The latter hotel was requisitioned under the Defence of the Realm Act, and would 
become a topic of some controversy after the war (see below), but for the three months of 
intensive wartime recruitment work it became the main centre of official publicity in Ireland. In 
England, on the other hand, a ‘London Council’ comprised of representatives from the IRC, 
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the MONS, the Irish government and the Army Council was set up, superseding the IRC and 
tasked with forming a ‘constitutional link’ between the IRC and the ‘Imperial Government’.74 
On paper, this system gave the IRC little autonomy because its ‘general policy’ was dictated 
by the London Council.75 Yet a review of the council’s work undertaken after the war suggests 
it did enjoy some measure of independence. While it took some time to become operational – 
a meeting on the subject of a new recruitment drive was held in London in late July,76 but 
work does not appear to have begun in earnest until August – the IRC was soon recycling the 
full repertoire of promotions undertaken and perhaps pioneered by the PRC and the Caxtons 
Publishing House. Press releases and ‘specially written articles’ were drafted. Press and 
poster advertisements, using a local advertising agency called Kenny’s, were also made, with 
nearly £15,000 spent, a colossal figure when compared to the PRC.77 Leaflets were 
distributed and a weekly magazine called Irish Soldier, edited by Gwynn’s son and apparently 
suggested by a Ministry of Information official, was published.78 A special film was 
commissioned by the IRC in conjunction with the Army Photographic Unit, and was shown in 
cinemas and from cinemotor vans travelling through the country. In addition, a series of 
exhibitions were held around the country containing ‘war trophies’.79 
The records of these promotions, including the hard copies of advertisements, appear to have 
perished. Some of the files may have been held in the Irish Public Records Office, but this 
was destroyed in a battle between the Irish Republican Army and the Provisional Government 
of Arthur Griffith in 1922, while a number of important records of the IRC also perished in the 
Kildare Street fire in 1920.80 While some advertisements from the early part of the war have 
found their way into scholarship of Hiley and Gullace,81 those released in 1918 are more 
difficult to trace. Nevertheless, according to invoices sent to the Treasury detailing the 
expenses of the IRC, a total of 114 newspapers ‘received payment for service[s] rendered’, 
while 34 posters were designed and issued by the IRC and produced in ‘very large’ batches 
because they were frequently destroyed by anti-recruiting agitators. An unknown quantity of 
leaflets, some produced under Stationary Office oversight, was distributed ‘by every 
conceivable means, including a daily distribution over all Ireland from aeroplanes of the Royal 
Air Force’.82 As many as 35,000 copies of Irish Soldier were distributed each week, ‘reaching 
individually Clergy of all creeds, National School Teachers, Doctors, and every official listed in 
any number of books of reference, as well as all book stalls, railway stations, etc.’; and a 
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further ‘large supply of photographs, war trophies, and aeroplane parts [were] secured and 
arranged into ten travelling exhibits’ designed to ‘leave a mental picture of the war upon the 
minds of hundreds in Ireland who do not see printed matter’.83 
The emphasis on scale, and the corollary belief in its effects, suggests the IRC approached 
the subject of recruitment from a similar standpoint to its predecessor, the PRC. Yet any 
similarities in organisation should not distract from the fundamental differences between 
recruiting in Ireland in 1918-19 and recruiting in the rest of the United Kingdom in 1914-15. 
The work of the IRC coincided with a crucial period in Irish nationalist history, a time when the 
country was once again placed under martial law and once again governed by a British 
General with known unionist sympathies.84 The internment of all but a few of Ireland’s de 
facto leaders in mid-May had precipitated a deep-seated ‘hatred of L.G. and the government’, 
according to one of the imprisoned,85 and by early July all organisations that could be 
identified with Sinn Fein, including the Irish Volunteers and the Gaelic League, were 
summarily banned. The effect the banning had on Irish opposition, as had been the case with 
the reprisals associated with the Rising, was not so much to end agitation but to accelerate it. 
Sinn Fein and other groups were pushed underground, a precursor to their transition from a 
passive to an active resistance movement that paved the way for the War of Independence. 
Popular membership of, and support for, revolutionary nationalism grew,86 and a ‘systematic 
campaign’ against recruitment to the British armed forces was waged in the popular press.87  
Ireland, in short, had no groundswell of patriotism from which to draw new recruits, it is 
difficult to see how recruiters could seek to win over a population largely sceptical towards 
service in the British army. In the event, fewer than 10,000 volunteers enrolled at recruiting 
stations, a figure described by Ward as a ‘dismal failure’ and lampooned by a Treasury official 
after the war in a cost analysis of the campaign.88 The IRC, the official claimed, ‘was, it may 
now be permitted to say so, one of the most ridiculous instances of waste that have been 
incurred [during the war]... It was obvious from the first to everyone in Ireland that it would fail 
to obtain recruits, it was conducted on the most lavish and expensive lines – and the persons 
employed (such as Col. Lynch)89 have blamed “Treasury parsimony” for the failure’.90 These 
sentiments were echoed during the war by another Treasury official who, confronted with 
spiralling costs of the campaign and the request to extend the IRC’s budget, claimed the IRC 
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was ‘typical of the new Departments’ created during the war, ‘whose argument seems to be: I 
spend money lavishly, therefore I must succeed’.91 
Given the absence of broad public support for recruitment, it is perhaps unsurprising that the 
IRC cost more than the recruitment work of the PRC relative to the ‘results’ of either 
campaign. As one recruiter said to the Treasury when trying to justify the IRC’s expenses, 
politicians in Westminster ‘only have a distant view of the extraordinary conditions arising 
locally’. Repeated attempts to scupper enlistment took place, and ranged from ‘open 
obstruction, passive resistance...[to] general indifference’. It was ‘impossible to lay down any 
local plan of action’, and even when meetings were held speakers were howled off stage.92  
The IRC in Peacetime: From Recruiting to ‘Steadying Nerves’ 
The IRC had been given a provisional date of December 1st to raise 50,000 men to avert 
conscription. On the morning of November 11th 1918, the armistice between the Entente and 
the Central Powers was agreed, thus bringing to a conclusion the First World War. Yet the 
IRC was not wound up. Indeed, and despite a communiqué from the Secretary of the MONS 
to the IRC requesting that all exhibits be closed down and shipped to London, all cinemotor 
vans be recalled, all posters and ‘poster boards’ be collected and destroyed and all local 
recruiting staff be dismissed,93 the IRC did not cease recruiting. On the contrary, its own files 
and correspondence between London and Dublin suggest that it continued to endorse British 
enlistment long after the war had ended. What is more, some areas of its work, such as the 
publication of Irish Soldier and the use of cinemotors, were actually augmented when 
compared to the war years.94 
In light of its apparently poor results and the large sums spent on the campaign, it is worth 
briefly considering why the IRC was continued after the war had ended. One possible 
explanation is that the council, having cost a great deal to set up, was asked to continue its 
work in order to lure any men willing to serve now that peace had arrived. Though the war 
had ended, the requirement for new recruits did not wane because large numbers of New 
Army soldiers had enlisted ‘for the duration’, and were now entitled to (though were not all 
granted) demobilisation.95 Yet that does not appear to have formed the basis of the decision. 
On the day before the armistice, Ireland’s new Chief Secretary Edward Shortt reportedly 
approached the IRC to ask them to ‘tender to him any advice, not on recruiting, but on the 
general Government of Ireland’.96 This was a remarkable request, not only because it 
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represented an admission on Shortt’s part of an acute lack of awareness of how the country 
should be run, but also because it suggested the IRC was considered by the government to 
be something of an authority on Irish public opinion. The IRC’s response to Shortt, however, 
was almost as remarkable: all but one of its members suggested imposing conscription as a 
means of dealing with the ‘present situation of the country’.97  
Whether conscription would have been imposed is of course impossible to tell, because 
within less than 24 hours of the meeting the war had ended. Yet what can be determined from 
official files and correspondence between IRC recruiters and the Treasury is that the IRC 
soon took on a new task: combating dissent. By the end of November, with a hotly-anticipated 
General Election approaching,98 the IRC was given a brief to produce and disseminate a 
variety of ‘instructional’ materials, including handbills, pamphlets and small posters that dealt 
with ‘general questions affecting Ireland’, a large collection of photographs of ‘world interest’, 
films that depicted a ‘wide selection of world events’, and the Irish Soldier.99 Earlier in October 
Shortt had apparently signalled his reluctance to disband the IRC, claiming that it would not 
‘help’ public opinion and would lead to the deterioration of public order. Citing an 
‘improvement’ in public mood that has not since been confirmed by historians, he claimed the 
IRC was ‘in large measure’ responsible for it.100 The IRC itself, according to another official, 
provided a ‘very satisfactory and efficient machine for conducting publicity or propaganda’, 
the results of which were described as follows:  
Throughout the whole of Ireland it is publicly recognised that that the educational 
affect of the propaganda campaign conducted by the [Irish Recruiting Council] has 
been most marked and to this publicity has been attributed much of the stability of 
public opinion during the four months past... [No] part of the country has refused to 
absorb this publicity...[and a] further publicity campaign [should be carried out].101 
In a memorandum written by on December 2nd, an additional attempt was made to stress the 
palliative effects of the IRC’s new functions. ‘The result of our work during the past five 
months’, a recruiter claimed, has amounted to ‘good educative results in the broad principles 
of citizenship’. The ‘particular phase that we had in view was the national obligation to support 
the war by recruiting, but entirely apart from [the] direct result in the end sought for, 
propaganda of that kind has [had] a general steadying effect on the nerves of a country’.102 
The IRC, these remarks suggest, had become an arm of the British state designed to 
counteract revolution.   
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Conclusion: Recruitment, Rebellion and the Significance of Public Opinion 
The various attempts to recruit in Ireland, and the opposition these attempts met, can serve 
as a useful example of the importance of public opinion in shaping the organisation, 
dissemination and reception of military advertising. As Simkins has noted in reference to the 
mass armies raised in Britain in the first part of the war, the mobilisation of 1914-16 was 
‘essentially a national effort’.  
In the sense that it was raised for the most part by civilian committees and ad hoc 
voluntary organisations in all corners of the country, Kitchener’s army was the closest 
thing to a true citizen army that Britain has ever produced. Without the support and 
enthusiasm of the majority of the population, no administration could have secured 
nearly 2,500,000 men purely by voluntary methods in less than seventeen months 
from the outbreak of the war.103 
Ireland may have possessed some of that enthusiasm in the early stages of the war; indeed, 
as two historians have argued, it experienced its own ‘epoch of volunteer action’.104 Yet it was 
also beset by deep-seated social, political and religious grievances that predated the war and 
would resurface yet again in the years that followed it. That major recruitment campaigns 
were waged in the midst of era-defining events like the Easter Rising, and even as martial law 
was enforced using the same armed forces Irish men were encouraged to join, might be 
interpreted as evidence of the general ignorance of the authorities in London towards events 
in Ireland. Alternatively, it might be regarded as evidence of the belief within government, on 
both sides of the Irish sea, that advertising was, in the words of Le Bas, a ‘force which might 
develop an idea, a school of thought, a political personality, or a national policy, as easily as it 
expanded the commercial interests of private enterprises like my own’.105 This idea was 
conveyed by other contemporaries. Charles Higham, an advertiser who had (unsuccessfully) 
lobbied the government before the war to make greater use of the techniques of commercial 
advertising, suggested in a book published in 1925 that advertising  
is one of the mightiest and consequently one of the most dangerous forces in the 
modern world. If we dispute its danger we deny its might, since all powerful forces are 
dangerous if they are improperly used. This is a point that critics of advertising 
generally forget, and it is certainly one that all users of advertising should 
remember.106  
A belief in the power of the mass media is fundamental to all campaigns examined in this 
thesis, but in Ireland the particular ways in which this idea was applied to the unique 
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conditions witnessed in the country warrants special attention. As one IRC recruiter claimed 
in October 1918, the IRC’s ‘propaganda...has without doubt been of the greatest value, and 
considerable progress has been made by way of educating Irish opinion which since 1916 
has in the main been apathetic or sullen in its outlook on the War’. Suggesting the campaign 
should not be judged on the merits of its recruiting returns but on its impact on mass feeling, 
he claimed the true ‘value of the propaganda work will be most clearly recognised in the 
future’.107 Given that Ireland slipped into a War of Independence shortly after these words 
were written, historians might be disinclined to share the belief in the efficacy or ‘value’ of the 
IRC’s work. Yet it is important, all the same, to recognise the significance of the thinking or 
philosophy towards promotion that lay behind it. In Ireland, military advertising was viewed 
not just as a means of promoting service in the New Armies but as a solution to underlying 
social problems. That a major recruiting body was continued into the postwar era, seemingly 
to ‘educate’ the public rather than to recruit, suggests that the practice of military advertising 
could be adapted to suit new circumstances, and that the techniques and methods of 
persuasion developed to promote enlistment could be applied to other topics or policies.  
In the next chapter, how military advertising responded to, and adapted in line with, the 
demands created by the impending Second World War will be discussed, not in relation to the 
conventional armed forces but in relation to the eleven branches of civil defence set up in the 
1920s and 1930s. 
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Chapter Six 
‘To encourage, inspire and guide’: National 
Service, the ‘People’s War’ and the Promotion 
of Civil Defence in Interwar Britain, 1938-39 
It is our war because the working people have flung their energies into the work of 
equipping the fighting forces, [and] have surrendered for the time being vital 
safeguards of normal industrial life, in order that the war trades shall be kept in 
continuous production and to ensure swift and ample supplies of every essential 
weapon.1            
           John Marchbank, ‘This is the People’s War’, 1941 
In the dying days of 1938 Ernest Brown rose in the House of Commons to deliver a speech. 
Known for his thunderous voice and for the affectionate ridicule it sometimes earned him,2 the 
Minister of Labour carefully unpacked a project that would become central to the way his 
department communicated with the British public. National service, a term usually identified 
with the postwar conscript Army (see chapter eight), would be a campaign for Britain’s civil 
defences and auxiliary and reserve forces. Comparable in scale to the great recruiting drives 
of the First World War, it would surpass the latter if only because of the variety of positions on 
offer. Land tillers, tree surgeons and tractor drivers were required for the Women’s Land 
Army; current and ex-policemen were needed in the Police War Reserve, the Special 
Constabulary and the First Police Reserve; and the institution of Air Raid Precautions (ARP), 
a body that could be traced to the mid-1920s and the work of a sub-committee of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence, sought everything from ambulance drivers to 
decontamination squads, to demolition parties.3 Announcing the campaign to its readers the 
following year, the Daily Mirror called it ‘Britain’s greatest defence drive…a citizen “army”’.4 
Brown, for his part, was more prescriptive. The ‘scheme’ for national service, he claimed,  
has two aims. The first is to encourage, inspire and guide a free people to enrol 
themselves to undergo training in peace time for the services they could best render 
on the outbreak of war. The second is to ensure that volunteers for service should not 
be enrolled if they would not be available to be called on for such service in war time 
owing to the essential nature of their occupation.5 
That Parliament was once again discussing war illustrated the precariousness of the peace 
on which the interwar years were founded. Less than three months prior to Brown’s 
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announcement, the Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain had returned from Germany 
brandishing a ‘pact’ that was supposed to end Anglo-German hostilities. The Munich 
Agreement, which has since been treated as a case study in failed diplomacy (and in 
historical revisionism generally)6 did not, however, preclude contingency plans for another 
war, and nor did it prevent Britain embarking on a massive and costly rearmament 
programme designed to put it on a level footing with Nazi Germany and imperial Japan.7 
Remarking on the paradox of these seemingly conflicting aims, the historian A. J. P. Taylor 
claimed the 1930s told two stories both ‘true in their own terms and yet seemingly 
contradictory’: one of ‘steadily accelerating preparations for an inevitable war’, the other of 
‘groping attempts to prevent war – attempts which failed regretfully and by mistake’.8 National 
service, a network of ‘passive’ defences designed to complement the ‘active’ forces of the 
Army, Navy and Air Force, embodied this paradox: both a means of preparing Britain for an 
‘inevitable war’ and of discouraging such a war from taking place, it was presented by 
Chamberlain’s government as a manifestation of Britain’s voluntary spirit and a harbinger of a 
new era in its democratic history.9  
The press and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) seemed all too willing to 
accommodate this view, describing national service as a ‘campaign for the defence of civil 
life’, for example, or a ‘plan for mobilising democracy’.10 Given the large numbers of civilians 
involved – the military historian Peter Doyle has suggested that ARP alone attracted as many 
as 400,000 full-time and 150,000 part-time volunteers11 – it is not surprising that the 
contributions of national servicemen and national servicewomen to the defence of Britain 
have attracted historical attention. While the fighting forces repelled the Luftwaffe and 
embarked on the Normandy landings that paved the way for the Allied victory, the men and 
women who served on the home front during the war ensured the Army, Navy and Air Force 
had sufficient supplies to prosecute the war, and that Britain’s resources were effectively 
marshalled and protected. These ‘heroes within the domestic context’, as the social historian 
Asa Briggs has called them,12 have formed the basis of countless histories of wartime Britain, 
and their contribution to the war effort has often been evoked to illustrate what one historian 
has called, in reference to the popular memory of the conflict, the ‘British spirit of 
unquestioning unity and dogged resistance’.13 Suffice it to say historians have treated the 
‘story’ of the Second World War with more caution, but the overwhelming focus on the 
wartime period has served to distract attention from the years that preceded it. Little is known 
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about how the government sought to attract men and women to the various branches of civil 
defence, what advertising and public relations techniques were used, and how the 
institutions, structures and discursive practices of military advertising were utilised for the 
campaign.14 The literature on interwar propaganda, the first place one might expect to find an 
account of these developments, has remained distinctly silent on the subject, while even 
Mariel Grant’s Propaganda and the Role of the State in Interwar Britain (1994), a detailed 
survey of the ‘considerable expansion’ of official ‘publicity’ during the interwar years, makes 
no reference to the drive for national service.15 
By examining how the campaign was organised and executed, this chapter seeks to fill in 
some of the gaps that have appeared in the literature. Focusing on the institutions and 
individuals most intimately connected to the campaign, it argues that the drive for national 
service was not simply intended to attract new recruits, but to cement the idea in Britain that 
any future conflict would represent a ‘people’s war’ in which all citizens contributed an equal 
share towards victory. The idea of collective sacrifice and national unity represents an 
enduring theme in popular recollections of the conflict, and though the concept of the 
‘people’s war’ has been questioned it continues to cast a long shadow over the historiography 
of British society in the 1930s and 1940s.16 However, as with the commentary on national 
service historians’ attention has been devoted almost exclusively to the wartime period and to 
the consequences the ‘people’s war’ had (or did not have) for postwar social change.17 No 
work has sought to uncover the emergence of the idea as a distinct way of viewing the war or 
of describing Britain’s response to it. Through an analysis of the organisation and execution of 
the campaign for national service, this chapter suggests that the key tenets of the ‘people’s 
war’ were communicated forcefully and vigorously before that war had actually taken place. 
Utilising newspapers, magazines, posters, leaflets, pamphlets, guides, BBC broadcasts, 
speeches and public meetings, the government tried to instil the notion that service in 
Britain’s ‘citizen army’ would enhance its democracy and pave the way for victory should war 
be declared. Making use of a host of Public Relations Departments (PRDs), bodies 
established within government ministries during the interwar years, this campaign involved 
several departments, a powerful coordinating committee (see below), and what one observer 
called a “red-hot” recruitment campaign’ that was designed to bring ‘national service’ into 
every household in the country.18 
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Promoting the State in a ‘Morbid Age’: The Rise of the Public Relations Department 
Crucial to this chapter is an awareness of the culture of promotion that grew in Whitehall 
between the wars. During the First World War, as we have already seen, recruitment 
campaigns were organised for the most part by committee, and although the campaign for 
national service also utilised committees (see below) it made extensive use of PRDs, 
organisations established within individual ministries during the interwar years that employed 
a host of public relations officials, press officers and advertisers. How these positions came 
into being will be the subject of this section, which argues that the interwar years heralded a 
new system of producing military advertising that differed in some respects from the work of 
the 1913-19 period but also continued many of the techniques, practices and conventions 
pioneered during that latter years. 
If the First World War had been a catastrophe and a crisis, the interwar years were similarly 
tumultuous. After a brief economic boom in the immediate aftermath of the war, the British 
economy slid into a deep recession followed by a long period of stagnation that culminated, 
after another downturn and another boom, in the Great Slump of 1929-32. This was an age, 
as Richard Overy has argued, characterised by ‘morbid’ ideas about the future of the British 
Isles and its peoples,19 a time of hunger marches, National and Coalition governments, 
Blackshirts and industrial unrest. Though it has also been credited with establishing a ‘new 
consumerism’ in Britain that brought with it ‘important shifts in the levels and distribution 
patterns of consumer expenditure’,20 the period between the wars is not usually regarded as a 
time of prosperity and peaceful accord. Some historians have taken to describing the interwar 
years as a mere cessation in hostilities between the European powers – a long pause in a 
European ‘civil war’ that began in 1914 but did not reach a conclusion until the summer of 
1945 – and there is an abundance of evidence suggesting conflicts within nations between 
different classes and social groupings.21 
As one of its principal architects, this ‘civil war’ had a pronounced affect on Britain’s global 
economic standing. Before 1914-18, the United Kingdom had been the largest trading 
economy and the third largest manufacturing economy in the world. Within two decades, its 
major industries were in sharp decline, long-term unemployment had blighted its northern and 
eastern regions, and the state had reverted from the favoured laissez-faire approach to 
international trade to protectionism.22 Fears of national decline manifested themselves in a 
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variety of ways. Eugenicists, for instance, took to popularising theories that Britain’s ‘island 
race’ was deteriorating, and used a method of statistical modelling that would contribute, 
albeit in an indirect way, to the emergence of Social Survey (see chapter seven). There was 
also, according to the political historian Keith Jefferys, a ‘pronounced growth of new forms of 
social enquiry’ dedicated to resolving the problems of mass unemployment and poverty.23 
Mass Observation, an organisation that prided itself on providing a ‘science of ourselves’, was 
just one of several bodies established in the 1930s that tried to understand and predict public 
opinion: a subject that had grown in importance in the wake of industrial unrest and the partial 
enfranchisement of women, and which interested governments as much as it did 
corporations, industrialists and commercial advertisers and public relations experts.24 
For its part, the state was involved in development and expansion of new forms of 
promotional practices in two key respects. Firstly, as Jacquie L’Etang has argued, local 
government the first steps towards ‘professionalising’ government public relations in 1922.25 
Secondly, and more importantly for the present analysis, PRDs, themselves a relic of the first 
world war, were set up by central government within the major ministries and departments of 
state. According to Grant, whose analysis of interwar propaganda remains the only 
comprehensive study of the subject, despite pressure to reduce expenditure six Whitehall 
departments employed staff ‘specifically for publicity purposes’ in November 1923, and by 
1937 that figure had almost tripled, to seventeen.26 These ‘branches’, like the public relations 
officials retained in local government, were given two main tasks: liaising with the public, and 
cultivating a relationship with the press and (from 1923 onwards) the BBC. Their work varied 
from department to department, and from campaign to campaign. In 1919, for example, after 
Britain’s veterans had been hastily demobilised,27 the War Office recommenced voluntary 
recruiting using a medium – the poster – that had been used extensively during the opening 
stages of the war.28 By 1937, with appeasement and rearmament operating in unison,29 their 
work transcended the routine activities of recruitment to taking press cuttings of important 
articles and circulating them in memoranda to relevant officials, responding to ‘misstatements’ 
in the press and on the BBC, dealing with press and BBC enquiries, providing information to 
the press and the BBC that might make for an interesting ‘story’, liaising with the regional 
Commands to find material that would interest journalists, carrying out so-called ‘editorial 
publicity’30 on behalf of the War Office, and hiring film and newsreel companies to produce or 
distribute films designed to boost enlistment or ‘inform’ potential recruits of life in the Army.31  
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Compared to the volumes of published materials concerning wartime propaganda, the work of 
PRDs has received short shrift. Summarising the neglect of the subject area, Grant writes:  
To date, peacetime publicity in the domestic sphere has been virtually ignored by 
historians. Although the use of propaganda in and by Britain in the twentieth century 
has been the subject of extensive research in recent years, most modern scholarship 
has focused on the concept of propaganda, the emergence of its pejorative 
connotations in the aftermath of the First World War, and its role as a weapon of 
war... Such studies are not intended, nor do they attempt, to provide an overview of 
and explanation for the growth of government publicity at home...[and] even general 
publications overlook the subject of the normal activities of government as opposed to 
the aberrant or secretive.32 
PRDs were neither aberrant nor secretive. It was their function, indeed, to remain visible, and 
to liaise with the press and the public on matters pertaining to government policy. At the same 
time, it is important to recognise the promotional function these organisations served, and the 
fact that, as instruments of government ministries and the elected officials who ran them, they 
were implicated in activities that were by their nature politically contentious. How PRDs 
carried out their work varied from department to department. At the Ministry of Health, for 
example, promotion was geared towards correcting the parlous state of public health. The 
Great War had exposed chronic health problems amongst the poor,33 and educating the 
public on the importance of subjects like nutrition was, according to Grant, regarded as an 
‘essential means of promoting national health’. Yet the ministry’s promotion also reflected 
what Grant called the ‘growing emphasis...on prevention rather than cure in the treatment of 
disease’, and therefore the importance of public opinion per se. 
An educated public opinion came to be regarded as a necessary impetus to reform, 
and, once new services were in place, instruction the chief means of ensuring their 
use. More than an arm of policy, propaganda became an essential aspect of health 
administration, even to the extent of substituting for, or replacing, services when 
further expansion was deemed impossible.34      
‘Information’ and ‘instruction’ would become integral to the reform of government promotion in 
the postwar era (see chapter eight), and would also play a part in the campaign for national 
service which provides a useful illustration of how multiple PRDs worked together on the 
same campaign. This campaign, planning for which began in 1938, involved the PRDs of the 
Ministry of Labour (MOL), the Home Office (HO), the Lord Privy Seal’s Department, Office of 
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Works and the three Service departments. The resourced allocated to it far outweighed those 
given to individual departments for their own publicity purposes, and the campaign itself 
demanded promotion that was by definition exceptional because of the exigencies of the 
post-Munich climate.35 In what follows, how the campaign was planned and organised will be 
discussed, before exploring how national service was promoted in the mass media and how it 
came to be expressed in a series of public events. As with the analyses of recruitment carried 
out in earlier chapters, the topics examined here are not intended to provide an exhaustive 
survey of the campaign, but to give the reader an snapshot of how promotion was practiced 
at a particular moment. The scale of the campaign combined with the variety of promotional 
techniques used suggests the British government was not a ‘reluctant’ propagandist, but an 
enthusiastic participant. 
Planning for the Apocalypse: The Origins of the Campaign for National Service 
We all hope that an emergency will not arrive, but we know that it may, and in those 
circumstances it would be madness to run the risk of delaying until the event had 
occurred… We must refuse to either be bombed or cajoled into slavery.36 
         Herbert Morrison, January 25th 1939 
On January 24th 1939, a recruiting rally was held in the vast auditorium that is the Royal 
Albert Hall. Attended by the Lord Privy Seal, Sir John Anderson, the Lord Mayor of London, 
the Leader of the London County Council and the Minister of Labour, it signalled the start of a 
campaign described by the Manchester Guardian as the harbinger of ‘a new chapter in our 
history as an island people’.37 Patriotic chest beating was par for the course in a recruitment 
rally, and set the tone for the evening’s speeches and ceremonies. Anderson, who had been 
involved in the subject of air raid defences since the 1920s, said to the crowd gathered in the 
hall that any future war would be a ‘test of the courage and steadiness of the ordinary 
citizens’.38 In a simultaneous address to the British people broadcast on the BBC on the same 
day, Chamberlain spoke of a ‘scheme to make us ready for war…to defend ourselves and 
resist attack’.39 Both of these speeches, and one by Herbert Morrison cited above, gave 
national service its first dose of publicity, with the national press reporting a ‘London rally’, the 
‘Premier’s Call’ and the ‘New Duty’ the following day.40  
Before the doors of the Royal Albert Hall had opened to welcome London’s political elite 
however, and before Brown had broached the subject of national service in Parliament, secret 
discussions on a new recruiting campaign were held in the MOL. In November 1938, serious 
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consideration was even given to using the King’s annual Christmas broadcast to promote 
national service. That plan was eventually shelved for fear that it would ‘sting him [Hitler] into 
action’,41 but work continued on the administrative machinery for attracting and processing 
new recruits and on the appointment of key staff to carry out this task. On December 6 th, a 
fortnight before Brown’s speech, Anderson introduced a scheme for national voluntary service 
in the House of Commons that involved National Service Committees established in every 
borough and county borough in England and Wales, and a National Service Guide that 
contained information on the various branches of service. The committees continued the 
model of promotion established by the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee and the short-
lived Ministry of National Service in 1917-18,42 while the explanatory pamphlets or ‘guides’ 
conveyed, according to Anderson, ‘a great deal of information...in language both simple and 
lucid’. Together, they were designed to  
stimulate interest in the whole problem of National Service, and to see that impartial 
advice is given to people who, after they have studied and digested this improved 
handbook,43 are still in doubt as to what they should do; to hold the balance fair 
between the different services; to remove misunderstandings and suspicions; and 
generally to bring public opinion to bear on the working of the National Service 
machine.44  
Envisioning national service as a ‘problem’ that required a ‘solution’ allowed the government 
to present its promotional work as an exercise in impartiality. Misunderstandings would be 
corrected, and by informing citizens of their duties both the handbook and the NSCs would 
ensure a suitable public response. Nine separate government departments and the various 
local authorities would be involved in recruitment, with the three Service ministries also 
setting up dedicated ‘in-house’ recruiting departments.45 The HO, which had traditionally 
overseen matters of domestic security, would organise ARP, a series of interconnected 
services that included first aid, evacuation, chemical decontamination, fire fighting and bomb 
disposal. It passed responsibility for these services to local authorities, and after a dispute 
over funding agreed to subsidise the majority of expenses incurred. The Ministry of Health 
would preside over the St. John’s Ambulance Brigade, St. Andrew’s Ambulance Corps and 
the British Red Cross Society, each of which was recognised as a separate branch of national 
service. The MOL, on the other hand, had control over matters related to the acquisition of 
wartime resources and materials, and set to work compiling a register of reserved 
occupations that would be circulated alongside the Guide in the spring of 1939. The same 
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department was also tasked with any ‘general publicity’ the campaign required, which in effect 
meant anything that promoted national service as a whole rather than with reference to a 
specific service or branch. The three Service departments, finally, would recruit for their 
respective reserve and auxiliary forces, including the Royal Naval Voluntary Reserve, the 
Army Supplementary Reserve and the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve.46 
Bringing together so many different institutions for a single recruiting campaign required a 
degree of administrative skill, most of which appears to have been proffered by Anderson47 
and Brown’s deputy secretary, Sir Humbert Wolfe. A poet and a playwright Wolfe was, by any 
measure, an unusual civil servant.48 Yet his penchant for the arts did not appear to dampen 
his enthusiasm for bureaucracy. By February 1939, less than three months after the 
campaign had first been mentioned in Parliament, a Central National Service Committee 
(CNSC) sat in the MOL above the local National Service Committees (NSCs) and alongside a 
National Service Department which had been given the task of implementing the 
recommendations of the central Committee.49 Together, these institutions acted like a giant 
production house churning out advertising and public relations and organising a series of 
elaborate ‘events’ designed to generate news coverage. The First World War had witnessed 
similarly expansive measures to stimulate recruitment, but the variety of the positions on offer 
and the fact that it called for both women and men, distinguished national service from the 
campaigns for Kitchener’s Armies. Celebrating this variety to its readers, a Times editorial 
made a ‘supreme recommendation’ for all Britons to join up, citing the interests of ‘peace-
loving and liberty-loving people’.50 However, not all observers were quite so enthusiastic.  
Launching a devastating attack on the composition of NSCs in the House of Commons, the 
MP Arthur Greenwood claimed the latter organisations reflected an ‘order of priority’: ‘the 
Service interests first, the local authorities [second], local employment committees [third] and 
then, as a sop to this side of the House, Labour’. Supposedly ‘representative’ of the local 
areas they operated in, NSCs would contain representatives of the relevant recruiting 
departments, local authorities, local employment committees and certain trades unions. But 
they would be led by Mayors, Lords-Lieutenants and Chairmen and Chairwomen of county 
councils. Suggesting this amounted to a democratic deficit which undermined the very 
principles of national service outlined by the government, Greenwood claimed a ‘movement 
directed from the top by a handful of people with honorific titles and wearing fancy uniforms’ 
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failed to embrace what he called the ‘democratic movements of this country’. The campaign 
for national service should rather be organised ‘overwhelmingly [by] those who can speak for 
the masses of the people’, a reference not to the masses themselves, but to the party 
Greenwood himself represented: Labour.51 
The struggle to define what national service meant and how it was organised was short-lived, 
however, as Chamberlain’s government continued with its plans to mobilise a citizen ‘army’ 
regardless of opposition or dissent. The NSCs, the CNSC and the National Service 
Department would cultivate a sense of national identity and belonging that would encourage 
citizens to do their part ‘for the country’. However, what that country stood for varied 
according to where one sat in the political arena, in the House of Commons and elsewhere. 
As Angus Calder has argued, the state might have presented a picture of national unity and 
togetherness during the war to bolster Britain’s chances of defeating Germany, but many of 
the old prejudices and inequalities within British society remained.52 Despite being offered 
jobs in the Land Army, munitions factories and in parts of the armed forces, women entered 
and exited the war on less pay and with fewer rights than their male counterparts.53 The 
working class, though they made up the bulk of the armed forces and industrial and 
agricultural labour, disturbed but did not disrupt the established class hierarchy.54  
In light of these material inequalities, it is not surprising that attempts were made to present 
national service as a collectivist endeavour that involved all quarters of British society. 
Recruiters themselves seemed to be aware of the importance of portraying the campaign as 
an embodiment of classless unity. The ‘good will of Labour’, Wolfe said in a meeting in his 
office a few days after Anderson’s speech, was an ‘obvious’ requirement, as was ‘special 
publicity for women’s services’.55 How mass and interpersonal media were utilised to create 
this publicity, and how different sections of the population were appealed to, will form the 
basis of the remainder of this chapter.  
National Service and the Mass Media: Films, Newspapers and Broadcast Media  
As the main engines of recruitment promotion, the CNSC and the National Service 
Department were responsible for much of the publicity considered in this chapter. The first of 
these bodies was comprised of representatives from various recruiting authorities, the 
Treasury, the Stationary Office and the Post Office,56 and was attended by ‘Special Officers’ 
elected to represent local NSCs. For logistical purposes, the United Kingdom had been 
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divided into 12 separate recruiting regions, each of which was presided over by a Special 
Officer who liaised with the NSCs located in those regions and subsequently presented their 
progress on recruitment to the Central National Service Committee.57 Separating Britain into 
regions allowed central control to be maintained without sacrificing a local presence on the 
ground, a prerequisite for a campaign that required recruits from all over the country for 
services that were also diversely situated. 
On February 21st 1939, a meeting was called in the MOL to discuss how the Guide and the 
NSCs could be complemented by an ‘intensive [recruitment] campaign’.58 The belief in the 
efficacy of ‘intensive’ promotion had been expressed before. In correspondence between 
Anderson and E. T. Crutchley, a public relations official who had a made a name for himself 
working under Sir Stephen Tallents at the Post Office,59 mention was made of a ‘quick “red-
hot” recruiting campaign’ to promote ARP.60 Crutchley’s request was subsequently granted by 
the Treasury,61 and although the resulting advertising was not authorised by the CNSC – it 
began before that body had held its first meeting – it represented one aspect of the overall 
campaign. Between February 15th and March 20th, a series of newspaper advertisements 
appeared in the national press for ARP.62 Some of these targeted men, others women, but all 
played on fears of air raids and the effect they could have on loved ones, women and 
children. ARP, as one advertisement (see figure thirteen) put it, 
is going forward splendidly. But there is a difficulty. It is some mysterious power 
referred to by people as “they”.  
“They” will see to it that there is no war. “They” will come round at once if the 
house is set on fire. “They” will bandage me if I’m hurt...  
There is no such thing as “they”. No longer, as in days gone by, can you 
leave the protecting of your home to soldiers and warships. In an emergency, your 
family doctor, your local Fire-Brigade, may have their hands too full to “come at once”.  
There is no “they” today. 
There is only “you”.63  
Portraying national service as the last line of defence in war, as the institution on which ‘rests 
the safety of yourself and your family’,64 became a key theme in the ARP newspaper 
advertisements which warned of the dangers of modern war and targeted different sections of 
the population accordingly. Women were asked to serve as nurses, cooks, ambulance drivers 
and guardians of children, while men were compelled to join up as firemen, stretcher-carriers 
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and as part of bomb disposal teams. Since ‘modern war’ did not ‘discriminate between civilian 
and solder; between men, women, [and] children’, all were asked to ‘work-in’ with others’.65 
 
With their colossal circulations the newspapers of the 1930s were the medium of choice for 
advertisers both corporate and governmental.66 Yet they were not the only medium 
appropriated for the purposes of recruitment. Posters were draped on commercial hoardings, 
on government buildings and in places of interest such as Trafalgar Square; placards and 
hanging cards were distributed to recruiting offices and to those shops that would display 
them; leaflets, pamphlets and the Guide were distributed by hand at recruitment meetings, in 
recruiting offices and at rallies; stickers were prepared for government vehicles such as Royal 
Mail post vans; films and newsreels were produced to be displayed at cinemas; and the BBC 
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was lobbied to include material in its programming. Each of medium was discussed 
separately by the CNSC, which sought to coordinate the different strands of publicity in 
accordance with the ideas it had about their respective merits, the requirements of the 
relevant recruiting departments and the cost and feasibility of production.67  
In the discussion on film, for example, a great deal of time was spent exploring the problems 
of distribution and exhibition peculiar to that medium. The Film Unit of the Empire Marketing 
Board and its successor at the Post Office had produced scores of official documentary films 
during the 1920s and 1930s, some of which had been critical and commercial successes.68 
But the market for films was driven by feature (that is, fiction) films, and short of forcing 
exhibitors to display ‘factual’ national service texts the CNSC could do little to get their films 
into cinemas. Government quotas introduced in the 1920s-1930s to curb the influx of foreign, 
mostly American films had been a disaster, and did not endear cinema owners – organised 
into regional chains or ‘circuits’ – to the government.69 The campaign’s flagship text, The 
Warning (1939), which contained a message by Anderson was nevertheless screened in 
cinemas up and down the country.70 
Problems associated with distribution were not isolated to film. On May 5th, NSCs in ‘most 
areas’ had expressed in ‘emphatic terms’ their disappointment at not receiving, or receiving 
late, many different kinds of poster. According to Special Officers, continuous shortages and 
complaints were noted ‘everywhere’ while some regions had yet to receive their ‘initial supply 
of posters’, to say nothing of the more recent productions.71 The Stationary Office, which 
produced various types of printed publicity on behalf of the government, claimed millions of 
posters had already been distributed but that mix-ups in correspondence between various 
parties had created problems.72 One such incident occurred when Shell-Mex, a major 
corporate advertiser in the interwar years,73 had offered to lend its hoardings to national 
service only for production to be delayed and the window for display lost.74 Another setback 
centred on misplaced supplies. Posters were delivered by post, train or van, but the possibility 
that some had been lost in transit led to concerns about over-production. Special Officers 
were adamant that ‘posters were still required for effective sites’, although one official queried 
whether posters were being ‘effectively used’.75  
Recruitment advertising was not a straightforward affair, and the CNSC and the National 
Service Department did not simply produce advertisements and send them to distributers or 
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exhibiters. Advertisements, rather, needed to suit the requirements of the media they 
appeared in, and any publicity conveyed in the BBC would also need to be adapted to suit the 
conventions of the broadcaster. At a CNSC meeting, Frere Reeves, the MOL’s Director of 
Public Relations, claimed the government would need to adapt its promotion to suit the news 
values of the Corporation. Listing examples of potential ‘stories’ involving national service that 
could be presented to audiences as ‘news’, he claimed ‘“black outs”…demolition of old 
houses involving demonstrations of ARP units…special mass meetings of employers to 
stimulate recruitment…[and] statistics of enrolment position in any town of exceptional 
interest’ would appeal to the programme makers.76  
At the same time, according to the government’s owns records the Corporation had ‘offered’ 
its services freely to the Lord Privy Seal and the Minister of Labour at the beginning of the 
campaign, an offer that Wolfe welcomed with open arms. The BBC’s capacity to reach so 
many people simultaneously was of ‘very great value’, Wolfe claimed, ‘and every endeavour 
should be made to take full advantage of the opportunity afforded’.77 By March 24th, and for a 
three-week period until April 14th, 3-4 minute slots in the 6 o’clock and 9 o’clock news 
bulletins conveyed national service as a news ‘story’.78 However, though it would be tempting 
to characterise this publicity as another instance of government intervention in the BBC,79 
there is evidence that the BBC did not simply accede to the state’s demands. Certain 
unnamed figures within the Corporation were apparently reluctant to display national service 
stories as ‘news’ items, and tensions between the government and the BBC’s regional 
production teams have been recorded in some official files.80 
Recruiting Rallies and a ‘Royal Review’ 
The rally at the Royal Albert Hall was one of many events organised by the government to 
promote national service in a form different to conventional (that is, ‘paid-for’) advertisements. 
Steps were taken to incorporate ARP into the demonstrations and exhibits of the annual 
Empire Air Day in May. The Football Association, the governing body of the sport in England, 
was lobbied to include announcements at matches during the Easter period and to exhibit 
‘[recruiting] posters prominently displayed at exits’. County Cricket Clubs were similarly 
petitioned to circulate appeals to spectators at their own matches. Large shopping stores 
were asked to establish ‘information bureaux’ that would allow recruiters to target female 
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consumers, an important demographic, and recruiting meetings organised by NSCs were 
held in local towns and villages as they had been in 1914-16.81 
The attempt to ‘reach’ a number of people simultaneously using different channels of 
communication confirms yet again the conviction within government of the value of 
promotional saturation. The organs of the mass media played an important part in the 
campaign, but so too did public spectacle which was regarded as equally valuable to 
recruiters. As Grant has shown, the PRDs of the major ministries attached some importance 
to ‘prestige publicity’ in the 1930s, a category of promotion that included public meetings, 
lectures, speeches and testimonies by eminent individuals.82 This publicity differed from the 
‘paid-for’ publicity conveyed in newspapers and on hoardings, and from the editorial publicity 
carried by the BBC. On July 2nd 1939, a ‘great National Service Parade and Demonstration’ 
was arranged in London’s Hyde Park, hosted by an individual the organisers felt was the 
most eminent of all: King George VI.83 
Judging by the coverage the event received in the national press, ‘prestige publicity’ was a 
clear success. The Times, using familiar terminology, described the rally as evidence of a 
‘Citizen Army of Defence’ comprised of men and women ‘whose love of country has moved 
them to devoting energy and leisure to making sure of its defences’. ‘Many Hyde Park 
Demonstrations have been held on Sunday afternoons’, the article continued, ‘but never has 
there been one more memorable than that of yesterday…where [others] were sectional, this 
one was eloquently expressive of complete national unity’.84 Describing national service as a 
‘Fourth Arm’ of the military, the Manchester Guardian claimed inquiries to recruiting booths 
set up in the park had been received ‘at about a rate of a hundred a minute’.85 The Daily 
Mirror, finally, devoted part of its front page, part of page 5 and a double page spread on 
pages 14-15 to the story. ‘It was a spectacle never before seen in British history’, a special 
correspondent said, ‘thousands of spectators went home knowing that the civilian army of to-
day is all right’.86 So impressed with the event was the Daily Mirror, indeed, that it concluded 
with a rallying cry of its own concerning Britain’s voluntary ‘spirit’: 
Britain and the peace-loving nations that are her friends are being assailed with 
threats…with insults…with outpourings of hate…by men who boast that they rely on 
deed, not words. And Britain answers in the spirit in which she has always answered 
such threats…the spirit of voluntary service.87 
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If the object of public relations is to generate favourable coverage in the news media, the 
government seemed quite adept at it. Putting aside the responses of the press, however, it is 
worth stressing the degree to which officials sought to shape the ways in which the rally was 
presented to the public. A detailed ‘order of march’ was worked out and subsequently sent to 
King George VI, who saluted each branch as they passed the ‘Royal Dais’ at the centre of the 
park. Badges and helmets were supplied for all ARP staff who, unlike the other branches of 
national service, marched in civilian dress. A Guard of Honour for the monarchs was 
stationed directly in front of the dais, while uniformed and plainclothes policemen were 
positioned throughout the area. Armed troops of the Territorial Army lined the route from 
Hyde Park Corner to Grosvenor Square, and the Army also sent mechanised infantry units on 
motorcycles, trucks and armoured personnel vehicles to take part in the procession. The Air 
Ministry launched six balloons into the skies above the park, and a ‘massed band’ from the 
Brigade of Guards provided music throughout the day that was broadcast on loudspeakers 
erected on a series of large scaffolding towers.88 
The event was, in a word, a meticulously planned extravaganza. Making use of military 
symbolism and iconography and the (believed) prestige of the royal family, it was designed 
according to one official to ‘stimulate’ recruitment by showing ‘[what] this country can achieve, 
and has achieved, upon a voluntary basis’.89 Both in the pre-rally publicity and in the 
speeches delivered on the day, the principles of voluntarism were continually stressed and 
contrasted with the approaches of Britain’s continental ‘neighbours’. Yet conscription had 
already been enforced in Britain by the time troops began to march down the East Carriage 
Drive, and would be extended to a large proportion of the population within a year of the rally 
taking place.90 Such paradoxes were lost in the speeches and the coverage of the event, 
however, which presented national service as a symbol of civic responsibility, national unity 
and collective sacrifice that came from the ground up. In this way it concealed how the 
campaign had been organised and orchestrated by a handful of civil servants and a retired 
Army general working in Whitehall.91   
Recruiting Meetings and the Women’s Voluntary Services 
Recruiting rallies of the kind pursued in Hyde Park on July 2nd 1939 represented major, albeit 
exceptional events. A more frequent occurrence during the months January-July was the 
recruiting meeting, a form of promotion that may have originated during the First World War 
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under the auspices of the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee. Unlike major rallies, meetings 
were not driven by lavish displays of public spectacle. Their appeal was based rather on the 
peculiar charm that came from holding a national political event in a town hall, a local pub or 
another place of interest.92 Using orators either known to the audience or of some local or 
national significance, they were designed to bring the subject of national service to places 
usually far removed from Westminster.  
NSCs again played a part in organising these events, and were offered a rota of speakers 
compiled by the Parliamentary Secretary of the MOL Alan Lennox-Boyd.93 Since they 
specialised in public oratory, politicians may have seemed a natural choice for the role of 
recruiting speaker, a role they had played before, with some notoriety, during the Great 
War.94 Yet they were not the only figures on Lennox-Boyd’s list. Chosen specifically because 
of their sex, women were appointed to give talks on the subject of ARP and other services 
that targeted female applicants. The body that provided these speakers, Women’s Voluntary 
Services, was established in 1938 after a request by the HO.95 However, while it prized itself 
on being ‘representative’ of women’s interests’,96 Women’s Voluntary Services was markedly 
undemocratic, as the historian James Hinton has shown, partly because of its hierarchical 
structure and partly because of the kinds of women (who included the Dowager Marchioness 
of Reading Stella Issacs) who sat on its Advisory Council.97  
Nevertheless, like other forms of recruitment for national service these features of the 
campaign were concealed, or at least obscured, by the promotion itself. In a document sent to 
all speakers issuing them ‘instructions’, women were told to ‘avoid politics’ and ‘not to be 
drawn into political discussions’98 to give the impression the campaign was apolitical. In 
additional instructions delivered to speakers in the form of a speech delivered in Montagu 
House, Whitehall, women were told that national service transcended ‘all questions of party 
policy and party tactics’. Using the same language that Brown and Anderson used in the 
House of Commons, and the same language that infiltrated the newspaper magazines that 
would appear in press advertisements, members of Women’s Voluntary Services were told 
that national service was a product of ‘centuries’ of history. 
You know the spirit of our people – you know the determination to preserve our 
heritage of liberty – handed down from past centuries; our nation has always 
commanded willing service. Remember the eager response, nearly twenty five years 
ago, to the call which then came – we have no doubt that freely given service will 
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once again speedily make our defences secure. But the essential condition is that 
people should be convinced that what is at stake is the preservation of their country, 
of their homes, of their families: and that can only be guaranteed by fully manned 
defence services trained now.99 
Recruiters were employed to make compelling appeals to the public, but they were also, as 
these instructions illustrate, appealed to themselves. Attempts to control the precise meaning 
and tone of promotion, to manipulate what national service meant and how it was presented 
in the news media, suggested senior officials were eager to impose their own values on the 
concept of civil defence. The MOI performed a similar function during the war, but what 
distinguished that body’s work from that of the campaign for national service was the 
apparent ease with which the official message was accepted and repeated by some 
journalists. Whereas the MOI became legendary for its cumbersome dealings with Fleet 
Street,100 the campaign for national service seems to have been so successful it passed 
without causing much controversy or scandal. This may serve to explain why so few 
historians have devoted attention to it, but it should not distract from the significance of the 
campaign itself or the many and varied attempts made to ‘encourage, inspire and guide’.  
Conclusion: National Service, Media Effects and a ‘People’s War’  
Mulling over the progress of the campaign for national service shortly after the July rally, 
Anderson suggested that there could be ‘no doubt that as a result of the effort which has 
been made during the last six months, the idea of National Service has been firmly 
established in the minds of people throughout the country’.101 Another official, writing shortly 
before the rally, claimed recruiters ‘shall have a very fine story to tell of the success of our 
voluntary effort’ by the ‘time the King takes the March past on 2nd July’.102 To both individuals, 
the campaign of 1938-39 was nothing short of a roaring success, and even though they could 
offer no proof that it was a success that could be attributed directly to their efforts they were 
more than willing to take credit for the mobilisation. In the House of Commons in mid-July, 
Anderson declared himself thoroughly satisfied with the campaign he had helped to organise: 
‘we are all proud’, he maintained, of the public response ‘to the call to National Service’.103 
Though it is difficult to find concrete figures – one historian has suggested that just shy of 1.7 
million individuals volunteered for ARP, the Women’s Voluntary Services, and Auxiliary Fire 
Service; another has proposed that ARP alone attracted a million recruits104 – it is clear that a 
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response did occur, and that the numbers involved were equivalent to, though not quite so 
large as, those witnessed in the opening stages of the Great War.  
Since recruiters publicised the subject of national service, directed individuals to recruiting 
depots, and gave them (via the National Service Guide) the requisite information to make a 
choice about which branch or service to join, it would be unkind not to recognise the part they 
played in the mobilisation. Yet it would be equally unkind, to the men and women who came 
forward in their hundreds and thousands, to regard their allegiance to the concept of civil 
defence as something that had been ‘established’ by recruiters over the course of a few 
months. There was in Britain in the 1930s a genuine fear of war that transcended the 
pronouncements of politicians and civil servants and predated the government’s campaign for 
national service by many years. This was, as Overy has argued, a ‘morbid’ age characterised 
by fears of racial or genetic deterioration, slow economic decline and public anxiety about the 
prospect of another world war.105 Pacifist movements sprung up in an attempt to stave off 
conflict between European nations, and there was even in the 1920s and 1930s a 
‘remarkably widespread enthusiasm’ for an international air police force that would ensure no 
nation could attack another ‘from above’.106 The attack on Guernica in 1937 shattered any 
illusions that European citizens would be safe from the widely-prophesised ‘knock-out blow’, 
and after Hitler continued his antagonistic posturing in the wake of the Munich Crisis it is likely 
that many Britons considered war a foregone conclusion. For those too old to serve in the 
conventional armed forces or disbarred for reasons of sex or health, enlisting in the eleven 
branches of civil defence set up to protect Britain from invasion, whether aerial or sea-borne, 
may have seemed a sensible response to the acceleration of hostilities on the continent. 
However, while a general recognition of the importance of defence or (to use a term favoured 
by recruiters) ‘preparation’ may explain why so many Britons answered the call to national 
service, it only tells half the story. Behind all the promotion lay an extremely well organised 
and well developed recruitment machinery that extended across the major departments of the 
state to the arms of local government. PRDs, staffed with their own promotional experts, 
liaised with NSCs set up in every borough and county borough in Britain, and with the CNSC 
housed in the MOL. Committees, as we have seen, can be traced to the First World War, but 
the development of PRDs represented a new development in the history of military 
advertising that warrants attention. In 1913-19, many of the departments involved in recruiting 
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did not possess the machinery to produce large-scale advertising campaigns themselves, and 
so turned to the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee and to the Caxtons Publishing House for 
expertise (see chapter four). At the tail-end of the 1930s, the same problem did not exist, as 
all the major departments of state employed public relations officials, press officers and 
advertisers skilled in various fields of media production. The contributions of these individuals, 
as Grant has shown, have tended to be written out of the historiography of propaganda, 
which has reserved space only for the pre-war planning of the Ministry of Information or the 
development of propaganda as a diplomatic tool to be used to gain strategic alliances in 
discussions of the interwar years.107 Yet the campaign for national service demonstrates that 
the government, despite lacking a single, centralised propaganda agency, did possess the 
means to ‘manufacture’ consent. Whether it succeeded in convincing British citizens that 
national service would strengthen the bonds between citizens and ensure an equality of 
sacrifice – that is, that national service would form the basis of a ‘people’s war’ – is impossible 
to say in the absence of evidence. What can be demonstrated, however, is that the 
government to steps to improve its information-gathering machinery shortly after the 
campaign for national service, and it is to that subject that we now turn. 
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 Chapter Seven 
Social Survey and the Rise of ‘Publicity in 
Reverse’: Military Advertising, Opinion Polls 
and the Construction of Public Opinion, 1940-60  
A tea-tester spends his life sampling; the analyst will condemn a water supply by 
testing a few drops; the doctor will pronounce on a patient’s blood after examining 
only 1/25th of a cubic meter. The taking of samples and the drawing of deductions 
concerning the whole is recognised as a valid process when applied to the inanimate 
world. Is it also valid when applied to human beings?1    
                 Political and Economic Planning, 1946 
When war finally did arrive, for Britain on September 3rd 1939 but for Poland (and Germany) 
on September 1st, there was no repeat of the farcical scenes of August 1914. In place of 
unbridled enthusiasm, as Michael Paris has argued, came a ‘sombre mood of grim 
determination overshadowed by the expectation of an immediate air attack by the Luftwaffe’.2 
The campaign for Air-Raid Precautions had continually warned of just such an attack, and of 
the eleven branches of civil defence recruited the largest number of civilians in order to repel 
it.3 Since most Britons were aware of the destructive power of modern aeroplanes – their use 
in Abyssinia in 1935 and Spain in 1937 had seen to that4 – it is perhaps unsurprising that 
gusto was replaced with a mixture of fear and anxiety. Mothers and children were evacuated 
from cities in what Juliet Gardener has called the ‘largest mass movement in British history’; 
theatres and cinemas were shut for fear that they would make attractive targets for German 
bombers; and even the fledgling BBC Television was taken off the air.5 Unlike 1914, the 
government had prepared ‘methodically for a long war from the start’, and contrary to the 
Great War it had seen fit to enforce conscription from the outset.6 It had also, however, taken 
steps to centralise all official communications under a single ministry: another ‘lesson’, Angus 
Calder suggests, drawn from the experience of the previous war7 and an indication of the 
awareness within government of the need to control and manage channels of communication.  
The Ministry of Information (MOI) oversaw no massive recruitment drives of the kind 
witnessed in 1914 and 1915, although it did play a significant role in recruiting for the various 
industries assigned to produce war materials.8 Among a string of new departments created 
especially for the war, the MOI was designed to coordinate government communications and 
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censorship in the manner of its First World War namesake.9 On a functional level, there was 
little to distinguish the 1918 and 1939-45 Ministries of Information: both had been formed to 
try to monitor and manipulate public opinion, and each was envisaged as a means of 
providing a greater degree of executive control over the various channels of communication 
established by the state from 1914 onwards.10 Yet there were some differences in the ways in 
which each institution went about its work. The Second World War MOI, for a start, circulated 
no stories of Germans grinding down corpses to make pig food, a type of ‘propaganda’ that 
had been widely discredited during the interwar years.11 While its ‘propaganda’ (or 
misinformation) was not necessarily more subtle – a series of early blunders exposed the 
department to widespread and lasting ridicule12 – it was generally less hostile towards 
German ‘kultur’. Furthermore, though the Political Intelligence Division of the First World War 
MOI had been concerned with the state of public opinion throughout the world,13 its Second 
World War counterpart, the Home Intelligence Unit, was formed expressly to examine 
fluctuations of public opinion at home, and to monitor the spread and diffusion of wartime 
resources requisitioned by the state. 
As the campaign for ‘National Service’ demonstrated (see chapter six), the examination of 
public opinion represented both a troubling and a perplexing subject to those charged with 
prosecuting the war. Wary of a repeat of the ‘seasons of discontent’ witnessed in 1917-18 
(see chapter five),14 steps were taken to ensure the government could respond to any change 
in national feeling by proactively seeking, and subsequently analysing, public opinions.15 In 
the latter stages of the Great War, this work centred on gauging public opinion via the press, 
and specifically via the press barons whose ownership of newspapers was deemed 
equivalent to a special grasp or comprehension of mass feeling and sentiment.16 During the 
Second World War, new techniques were developed and applied. In the spring of 1940, the 
survey organisation Mass Observation (MO) was appointed by the government to compile 
reports on home morale, and in the same year the Wartime Social Survey was formed to act 
as the government’s own pollster.17 These organisations adopted contrasting approaches 
towards the study of public opinion, and their epistemological differences may explain why 
MO, rather than Social Survey, has attracted an abundance of scholarly attention. Whereas 
the Survey treated public opinion as something that could be measured with statistical 
precision, MO adopted a more reflective and open-ended approach to researching British 
society that drew from the first-hand accounts of its voluntary ‘observers’.18 
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The accounts of these ‘observers’ have added colour and depth to social histories of the war, 
but the work of Social Survey can also aid historians interested in how public opinion was 
isolated, defined and measured by individuals connected to the state. Social Survey provides 
a wealth of information on official attitudes towards public opinion, and in those studies that 
specifically concern official publicity offers a revealing insight into how advertisers and public 
relations officials viewed and understood their work. From 1941 until 1945, a number of 
surveys were produced to explore various aspects of government communications.19 The 
MOI, for instance, commissioned a survey into the public reception of its films in 1941, while 
an investigation into the efficacy of an ‘information campaign’ for diphtheria immunisation was 
carried out on behalf of the Ministry of Health in 1942. Apart from a 1943 study into war 
workers’ transport difficulties carried out at the behest of the Ministry of Supply, the Service 
departments did not order any enquiries into their publicity during the war,20 but they did 
become regular users of surveys and opinion polls in the postwar era after Social Survey was 
transferred to the Central Office of Information (COI) in 1946 (see chapter eight). Between 
1947 and 1960, no less than six surveys were commissioned into different aspects of military 
advertising. As with the literature on the Wartime Social Survey, little is known about these 
surveys or the impact they had (or did not have) on the recruitment process.21 
This chapter explores how Social Survey came into being during the war years, and how its 
approach to monitoring public opinion was applied to matters of military recruitment in the 
postwar era. Emphasising the historical, institutional and methodological origins of the 
Survey, it explores the relationship its research shared to other practices and ideas prevalent 
in Britain at the time. Crucial to this approach is a recognition of the importance of the context 
within which Social Survey operated, and the distinct methodology or methodologies it 
developed to try to isolate and define public opinion. Encouraging a form of ‘publicity in 
reverse’ that provided a ‘source of information about what people are thinking and doing’,22 it 
was designed to aid government departments eager to understand how the electorate 
responded to their activities and policies. In the case of military recruitment, this reverse 
‘publicity’ involved asking respondents to questionnaires, polls and surveys what they felt 
about military service, how they viewed military advertising, and what recommendations they 
had for improving existing recruiting arrangements. Comparable to the research carried out 
by commercial advertising agencies,23 military surveys were designed to survey, categorise 
and interpret public opinion. Regarded by their practitioners as instruments of ‘scientific’24 
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measurement, they were assimilated into the broader process of producing advertisements 
and became part of the promotional field within which military recruiters operated.  
Publicity ‘in Reverse’: Theorising the History of Social Survey  
Before exploring how publicity ‘in reverse’ was applied to military advertising, it is necessary 
to consider how Social Survey came into being. A number of historians have commented on 
the organisation in general accounts of the wartime home front, with both Angus Calder and 
Paul Addison acknowledging the importance of the Survey (along with MO and the Gallup 
Poll) in establishing new ways of communicating with the public.25 Yet while their accounts 
have helped to place Social Survey within the broader context of the war, they have left 
several important questions about the work of the Survey unanswered. Both Calder and 
Addison, for example, have suggested that the work of Social Survey represented a more 
‘systematic’ form of opinion-gathering than the techniques used by earlier governments, but 
neither author has examined the system behind this work in any detail or demonstrated how 
Social Survey ‘systemised’ earlier practices.26 There has been virtually no commentary, 
furthermore, on the methodology and epistemology behind Social Survey, with most 
historians content to cite the results of individual surveys without considering how these 
surveys were produced, who produced them and with what intentions. 
By exploring not only the emergence of Social Survey but the distinct methodologies and 
epistemologies it pioneered, a more comprehensive picture of how it went about its work can 
be given. As we shall see, government polling came about because of a confluence of 
influences and pressures. Though it was formed to deal with the specific problems created by 
the war, the Survey drew from techniques and practices pioneered in the world of commercial 
opinion polling, and also came about because of a connection to a major British university 
and a particular tradition of intellectual enquiry. To its adherents, Social Survey provided a 
distinctly ‘scientific’ method of analysing public opinion that mapped the shifting contours of 
public opinion with forensic precision. However, following the work of Herbert Blumer, Jurgen 
Habermas and Justine Lewis it is possible to regard polls not as ‘scientific’ instruments but as 
indices of social practice.27 In this section, the various influences and pressures that 
combined to create publicity ‘in reverse’ will be discussed. Beginning with an analysis of the 
emergence of Social Survey and the difficulties it faced during its formative years, it continues 
by examining the influence of both commercial opinion polling and the science of statistics as 
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conveyed in academia. Since all three topics are crucial for understanding how military 
surveys were themselves produced – it was during the war that the ‘sampling method’ the 
Survey specialised in was developed – they will be explored in some detail. 
Controversies, ‘Facts’ and Opinions: The Emergence of Social Survey, 1940-45   
When Social Survey was formed in the spring of 1940 it was not intended as a means of 
examining public opinion, but rather the allocation of certain wartime materials.28 Overseen by 
the National Institute for Economic and Social Research, the majority of its executive staff had 
been drawn from the London School of Economics, an academic lineage that helps to explain 
how the body approached its work. Its director, professor Arnold Plant, was an economist in 
the mould of the liberals of the 18th century, a man who had made a name for himself 
studying the impact of state controls on labour in pre-Apartheid South Africa. Known for his 
laissez-faire views, Plant was once described by Harold Macmillan as a disciple of a ‘hard 
boiled…free Capitalism’,29 and seems an unusual choice for a post concerned predominantly 
with monitoring the use of national resources. If his appointment suggested a narrow concern 
with economies of expenditure, however, it was not long before the Survey was involved in 
matters considerably more controversial. Two crises, one in 1940 and another a year later, 
propelled the Survey into the world of public opinion polling, set the tone for its future 
research, and shaped the ways in which its work was presented to the public. 
On July 27th, 1940, the Daily Herald published an article accusing the Survey of spying on 
British citizens. Its source, an unnamed MP,30 had apparently told reporters that canvassers 
working for the Survey were instructed to ‘listen in’ to public conversations to gauge home 
morale. The technique of ‘listening in’ had been borrowed from MO, whose claim to offer a 
‘science of ourselves’ mirrored the rhetoric of the Survey,31 and suggested polls were 
designed to investigate more than just economic affairs. Indeed, while it had been overseen 
by the National Institute for Economic and Social Research, Social Survey was subsequently 
moved to the offices of the MOI sometime between March and May 1940.32 According to one 
official writing shortly after the war, the latter department had expressed an interest in 
establishing its own ‘survey unit’ to monitor the ‘impact of Government advertising 
and...investigate home morale’,33 and had created the Home Intelligence Unit under the aegis 
of the broadcaster Mary Adams to oversee it.34 Adams, who provided the Cabinet with daily 
updates on the state of home morale during the Blitz, borrowed from MO the technique of 
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employing anonymous ‘observers’ to eavesdrop on and record public conversations, but 
envisaged the Survey as a repository of more statistical (that is, quantitative) information.35  
The technique of ‘observing’, and the furtive approach to opinion-gathering it required, 
aroused suspicion in the press, and by the end of July the original Herald story had 
snowballed into a minor crisis. Duff Cooper, the minister responsible, was called to the House 
of Commons to defend what had become known, in journalistic parlance at least, as 
‘Cooper’s snoopers’, and government polling was in this way implicated in a wider debate on 
the role of the state in wartime. One MP, responding to Cooper’s assertion that the Survey 
was merely attempting to understand the wants, needs and beliefs of the people, queried 
whether that function was best left to politicians who, as the nation’s elected representatives, 
were naturally best placed to ‘represent’ public opinion. Another, suggesting the work of the 
Survey was nothing less an affront to civil liberties, claimed its tactics were perilously close to 
those of a certain, well-known continental police force, and that such behaviour could not be 
tolerated in a war fought against totalitarianism.36 Cooper, who opted to defend the Survey 
rather than deny the allegations, claimed his department aided the democratic process by 
‘keep[ing the government] as closely in touch as possible with public opinion’.37 Polls, in other 
words, allowed politicians to govern by opinion, an admirable ideal few were willing to contest 
even if there were no guarantees the state would actually listen to what it was told.  
Cooper’s defence seemed to satisfy Parliament, and by the end of August the controversy 
had all but died down. Within a year, however, Social Survey was once again mired in 
controversy, this time over budgeting. How much a department cost and whether its work 
could be considered beneficial to the war effort had been a sensitive issue since the infamous 
999 staff affair, which centred on the MOI’s supposedly extravagant staffing,38 and a Select 
Committee on Expenditures was called to review the operations of the Survey and, crucially, 
its methods. In a report released the following year, the committee acknowledged the 
‘essential service’ and ‘useful work’ performed by Social Survey, but recommended that it 
should be restricted to ‘factual’ rather than ‘opinion’-based enquiries, a judgement that 
effectively ruled out investigations of home morale.39 
Confining the Survey to ‘factual’ research gave it a semblance of objectivity, but it did not 
presage a new era in opinion polling or a new kind of ‘factual’ poll. Opinions, on the contrary, 
were still sought after the recommendations of the Select Committee had been endorsed in 
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February 1942. Within a month of that date, the Ministry of Labour and National Service had 
commissioned a study into the attitudes of women towards conscription, and by 1943 the MOI 
had itself authorised a poll into the audiences of its publicity and their newspaper-reading 
habits.40 Making Social Survey available to other departments represented a watershed 
moment in its history. Used exclusively by the MOI, publicity ‘in reverse’ could be applied only 
to those problems or issues that confronted its home department, but it took on a new lease 
of life when it was made available to other ministries. These ‘clients’ liaised with Social 
Survey as an ‘allied service agency’, which is to say they commissioned surveys with the prior 
approval of the Treasury,41 and used it for reasons that varied from study to study and 
department to department. The Ministry of Works was interested in matters of housing and 
accommodation, for instance, while the Ministry of Transport studied road safety.42 From 
1942 until 1945, Social Survey was responsible for more than a hundred ‘factual’ enquiries of 
this kind. As the war rumbled on, its list of clients grew: from the Ministry of Food to the 
Treasury, to the Board of Trade to the Ministry of Education. The expansion of its work owed 
something to the expansion of the state during the war, which assumed control of the bulk of 
domestic industry and exerted a powerful influence on everyday life through the Emergency 
Powers (Defence) Act.43 Yet it also revealed shifting conceptions of the nature of public 
opinion in the upper echelons of government. According to Calder, before 1939 the ‘old 
gentlemanly notion that the Government was doing all right if the habitués of London clubs 
approved of it’ had provided Westminster with its ‘connection’ to mass opinion.44 Another 
technique favoured by politicians was reading the editorials of popular newspapers and 
‘inferring’ popular opinion accordingly – a practice, as Addison has noted, that did not so 
much reveal ‘how many [people] read the leaders, agreed with them, or were influenced by 
them’ as what the editor or proprietor of the relevant publication ‘wanted to say’.45  
Commercial Undercurrents: Opinion Polling as a ‘Private’ Practice 
Commercial opinion pollsters, who claimed their research provided an accurate means of 
‘measuring’ public opinion, afforded the government with a new and potentially fruitful method 
for gauging the national mood. Though surveys of one kind or another had been carried out 
since the 19th century, the development of modern ‘systematic’ polling is usually attributed to 
the interwar years.46 The business historian Stefan Schwarzkopf has found evidence linking 
polling to the market research of the 1920s, which made use of both qualitative and 
quantitative research in an attempt to ‘understand’ (and thus better exploit) the consumer. 
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The advertising agency J. Walter Thompson was integral in introducing these methods as a 
service for its clients, but by the 1930s a number of purpose-built agencies had emerged in 
both Britain and the United States.47 As Gerben Bakker’s case study on Hollywood film 
suggests, the ‘growing need for market information’ within the film industry led to the adoption 
of ‘newly available research techniques’, with questionnaires and surveys used to explore 
both cinema-going habits and the popularity of film stars.48 
If polls contained a utility for corporations, they were also valued by journalists. In 1937, two 
polling agencies were established in Britain with the intention of monitoring social and political 
rather than commercial views. Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Limited, an organisation unrelated 
to Social Survey set up by the American Harry Field, was quickly followed by the British 
Institute of Public Opinion, a body established by Field in collaboration with Henry Durant.49 
These agencies carried out surveys for media organisations such as newspapers and 
newsreels, and prided themselves on ‘predicting’ election results by consulting cross-sections 
of the voting public in advance of a ballot. Newspapers found their results exceedingly useful: 
polls of political parties’ popularity, or of the popularity of individual politicians, could form the 
basis of news stories and could also be used to attack those who had fallen foul of the fourth 
estate. Pollsters themselves rarely missed an opportunity to promote their profession or to 
emphasise its supposedly ‘scientific’ credentials. The American George Gallup, usually 
regarded as an industry pioneer, is reputed to have said ‘I could prove God statistically’,50 and 
similar sentiments were expressed in Britain before the war. The British Institute of Public 
Opinion, an agency that would late collaborate with Social Survey and dominate the field of 
commercial opinion polling until the 1950s, claimed its polls, for example, allowed ‘not only 
the man in the street, but the statesman, politician and economist [to] discover within a few 
percentage points of accuracy how opinion divides on any question of public interest’.51 
Percentage points, accuracy, division: for pollsters public opinion was not something that 
arose organically in a Habermasian style rational-critical debate, but phenomena, rather, that 
could be traced to answers to pre-determined questions. These questions were structured in 
such a way as to restrict replies. Respondents might be asked, for instance, whether they 
liked the idea of military service, disliked it or felt no strong feelings either way. Restricting 
responses to questions allowed pollsters to quantify opinions: if a thousand respondents gave 
a thousand different answers, after all, no numerical conclusions could be drawn from the 
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study apart from the fact that a thousand different answers had been given. The emphasis on 
quantification extended beyond the polls themselves to the selection of the individuals 
consulted to answer them. Individuals were selected on the basis of criteria that, according to 
the pollsters, made them ‘representative’ of a wider social group or (to use the terminology of 
Social Survey) ‘universe’.52 Since this ‘universe’ could not be examined in its entirety, cross-
sections of it were sought in an attempt to convey the opinions of the whole. A cross-section 
(or sample) was chosen to represent the views or attitudes of a particular social class, gender 
or profession. The responses it gave could then be extrapolated to make generalisations 
about the wider group, or ‘universe’, of which the sample was apparently a part.53 
This approach to public opinion differed from speculative attempts to ‘infer’ mass sentiment 
from conversations in London clubs or leaders in the national newspapers, but that should not 
be taken as evidence that it was a more sophisticated or ‘systematised’ form of information 
gathering. In Parliament, Cooper had suggested the most reliable ‘channel of information’ to 
public opinion was ‘undoubtedly Parliament’ itself, because the ‘elected representatives of the 
people’ were best placed to represent the views of those people. Yet he did concede ‘limits, 
valuable and immense as is the information which can be obtained through Members, to 
[their] accuracy’ at monitoring public opinion.54 The notion that polls represented a more 
‘accurate’ alternative appealed to those who relied on public approval for their livelihoods, and 
it is not surprising, in retrospect, that the institutions of government showed a willingness to 
assimilate new-fangled methods of ‘measuring’ or ‘monitoring’ opinions that had been 
developed outside government.55 The history of military advertising tells a similar story itself, 
and by bringing the practice of polling into government the government could afford to 
surreptitiously conceal the results of its investigations. 
In any case, figures behind Social Survey were unequivocal that their work was based on the 
pioneering practices of Gallup, Field and Durant. Accounts of the Survey’s work designed to 
inform politicians of its activities trumpeted the same ‘[s]ound statistical methods’ that the 
British Institute of Public Opinion highlighted when describing its methodological bent,56 and 
when Cooper defended the Survey in Parliament in 1941 he claimed his department drew 
inspiration from the ‘newspapers and commercial firms’ whose method of sampling the public 
preceded the Survey by ‘at least thirty years’.57 A similar defence had been made of 
recruitment advertising during the First World War (see chapters one and four), and when the 
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future of Social Survey was subjected to a Cabinet review in 1946 the use of polls by bodies 
like the British Institute of Public Opinion was put forward as a raison d’etre for continuing 
government polling in some form or another.58 
The ‘Science’ of Statistics: Social Survey and Academia 
While Social Survey made use of techniques pioneered in the commercial world, it also drew 
from the wellspring of British academia. Tasked with monitoring public opinion and the 
distribution of wartime materials, it required experts in the same way that the Services 
demanded laboratory scientists to commandeer their wartime ‘operational research’ units.59 
Whereas the ‘warfare state’ needed physicists, engineers and biologists in order to properly 
function, however, Social Survey required economists and statisticians.60 Plant and the staff 
he drew from the London School of Economics were not pollsters in the traditional sense of 
the term, but economics graduates; and the Survey also appointed a Scientific Advisory 
Committee, chaired by the provost of the London School of Economics Sir Alexander Carr-
Saunders, to keep it abreast of the latest developments in scientific method. Carr-Saunders, 
who trained as a biologist before working under the renowned statistician Karl Pearson, had 
fashioned a career applying modern, ‘mathematical’ statistics to the study of human 
populations. Like other early statisticians, Carr-Saunders’ work hinged on eugenicist 
interpretations of human behaviour and evolution, and like his mentor Pearson he believed 
Western societies were undergoing a process of ‘racial’ degeneration brought about by a 
combination of massive population growth and low birth rates amongst the upper-classes.61 
Social Survey does not appear to have been involved in anything quite so controversial, but it 
did rely on the same methodological procedures to carry out its research and appealed to the 
same higher authority of mathematics when asked to justify it. Both social Darwinism and 
public opinion polling applied mathematical models to the study of human behaviour, and 
both practices reified their objects of analysis, which is to say they converted abstract 
concepts into material things. Reification allowed eugenicists and pollsters alike to reduce 
complex phenomena into simple figures: intelligence could thus be condensed into a single 
‘quotient’ that apparently defined an individual’s intellectual worth, while opinions (which were 
by their nature diffuse, conflicted and variegated) could be consigned to unambiguous 
categories. Reification was a pre-requisite of ranking, and of quantification in general. By 
reifying opinions or attitudes, pollsters could assign a value to them on a pre-determined 
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scale. In eugenics, the process of ranking led to thinly veiled attacks on the poor, on women 
and on ethnic minorities generally, but in Social Survey its use was, with a want of a better 
word, ‘democratic’. Those opinions which were held by the highest number of people were 
regarded as the most significant or portentous expressions of ‘public opinion’, while minority 
opinions, by the same token, were disregarded as ‘statistically insignificant’.62 
Searching for majority opinions gave the Survey a veneer of democratic respectability, but it 
is worth remembering that both the questions and the answers of surveys were determined 
by pollsters, not the public. When responding to an open-ended question, interviewees’ 
opinions would be categorised by Survey staff; if the opinion did not fit into a pre-defined 
category, it would be listed under the catchall phrase ‘other’. This method differed markedly 
from the kinds of techniques applied by MO, relying on what Pierre Bourdieu has called a 
‘series of epistemological and methodological procedures whose factual appearance 
significances a survey rationality’.63 Expanding on Bourdieu’s argument, historians might 
argue that Survey staff gave the appearance of reasoned, ‘scientific’ analysis, and eagerly 
cultivated this image whenever their methods were placed under question. In 1946, when the 
future of the Survey was debated by Clement Attlee’s Labour government, the MOI compiled 
a report describing its wartime work that stressed the ‘really disinterested scientific approach’ 
the Survey took to its subject matter, and the knowledge about ‘social facts’ the organisation 
acquired.64 This emphasis on ‘facts’ came to define the presentation of the government’s 
promotional work in the postwar era, as the following chapter will demonstrate.  
Yet perhaps the biggest problem associated with Social Survey was the failure to address the 
question of what public opinion actually was. Writing after the war, the American sociologist 
Herbert Blumer and the German philosopher Jurgen Habermas each attacked opinion 
pollsters for losing sight of what it is they were (in the former’s words) ‘supposedly seeking to 
study’. Blumer, who picked up on the theme of polling as a ‘science’, argues that since polls 
adopted a method of sampling the public that ‘intrinsically [determined] its own objective’, they 
conflated the object of their investigation – the study of public opinion – with its results.65 In so 
doing, pollsters never addressed the crucial question of what constitutes public opinion. 
According to Habermas, public opinion was not something that could be elicited by answers 
to predetermined questions. Rather, it was a phenomenon that came about organically 
through rational-critical debate between informed citizens.66 Could a meaningful engagement 
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of this nature exist in a climate of total war, when the government censored news and when 
even Social Survey concealed the results of its own investigations from the very people it was 
supposed to be ‘sampling’? There is little evidence in the official files that pollsters examined 
these problems seriously.67 Indeed, though criticisms of polling methodology and 
epistemology would be aired after the war by those unconnected to the polling 
establishment,68 the Royal Statistical Society’s wartime review of the Survey championed the 
‘very young science’ it specialised in. According to the Society, polls only suffered from two 
difficulties: the ‘danger of asking for an opinion where in the majority of cases no formed 
opinion exists’, and ‘framing opinion questions...[that] suggest an answer to the informant’ or 
respondent.69 The sampling method, in other words, need only pick the right respondents and 
structure questions in such a way as to ensure their responses were not implied by the 
interviewers themselves.  
Social Survey in the Postwar Era: ‘Sampling’ the Public  
When the war ended in 1945, Social Survey was among the services transferred from the 
MOI to the COI. The individual responsible for this decision, Herbert Morrison, had replaced 
Sir John Anderson as Home Secretary during the war before taking up the mantle of Lord 
President of the Council in the wake of Labour’s general election triumph. Morrison played an 
important role in reforming the government’s communications infrastructure, a subject that will 
be examined in the following chapter, and was similarly influential in shaping the future of 
Social Survey. The only ‘doubt’ that could be expressed about the Survey’s post-war work, he 
claimed, was not whether it was accurate or useful, but whether it ‘would not be enough to 
rely on commercial agencies to carry out such survey work as was necessary’.70 The 
‘sampling method’, like advertising, public relations and press relations, had established itself 
as an integral part of modern government, and since this method (to quote another official 
summarising the utility of the Survey to the government) was ‘developing in the United States 
and in India very fast indeed’, it was considered extremely ‘important that we should not be 
left behind in this country but rather that the Survey should have highly trained statisticians 
capable themselves of introducing improvements and economies’.71    
This belief explains why the Survey was continued into the postwar era, although it was 
agreed by the Labour government that the first two years of peacetime would function as a 
trial period for Social Survey after which its operations would be reviewed. That ‘trial’ actually 
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began in July 1946, and turned out to be little more than a formality, as the Survey set to work 
on a number of projects that confirmed its apparent usefulness to the state. A monthly digest 
of the economy was organised by the Board of Trade; a Survey of Sickness provided 
information for medical authorities and the Registrar General; and there was even a study of 
the recruitment publicity of the mining industry after it had struggled to attract the required 
number of volunteers.72 As in 1939-45, the kinds of research Social Survey produced 
revealed as much about the preoccupations and problems of the state as it did about the 
citizens whose attitudes and opinions were sought. Like the COI, the department to which it 
would be attached until 1976, the Survey was implicated in the struggle to reform and 
reconstruct Britain, and although it lost its Scientific Advisory Committee (a decision that 
enjoyed the approval, incidentally, of Saunders) it retained a veneer of factual impartiality 
befitting an agency ostensibly concerned with the ‘scientific collection of social facts’.73 
The Military Survey: Constructing Polls and Drawing ‘Conclusions’ 
How did the military make use of these facts, and what role did the Survey have in 
recruitment? Judging by the spread and frequency of surveys, they were considered useful 
for a number of reasons. In 1947, the same year the National Service Act was passed (see 
chapter eight), the Air Force commissioned a survey into the ‘attitudes of young men into re-
enlistment into the RAF’. Like the other Services, the Air Force was interested in targeting 
veterans to make up for the loss demobilised regulars, and consulted both Social Survey and 
the British Institute of Public Opinion (which appears to have collected the responses and 
tabulated them) in order to do so.74 In 1949, at the start of the post-war civil defence 
recruitment campaign, the Survey was asked to draft a question on behalf of the Ministry of 
Health for its National Hospital Service Reserve campaign. Its authors got straight to the 
point, opening with following: ‘Have you seen any posters, leaflets, or adverts about [civil 
defence]?’.75 In the 1950s, three surveys were carried out for various departments, including 
one for the Ministry of Labour that explored the relationship between National Service, 
voluntary enlistment and civilian employment (1951) and another for the War Office exploring 
the main attitudes towards voluntary enlistment in 1957.76 The previous year, the Ministry of 
Defence had ordered an enquiry into the publicity of all three services with the intention of 
seeing whether the ‘attitudes’ of potential recruits squared with the ‘themes’ of recruitment 
publicity, and by 1960 the Air Force had once again used the Survey to try to understand why 
those seemingly interested in a Service career never followed up their enquiries.77 
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Confidence in the ability of polls to ‘scientifically’ analyse society did not, it would be fair to 
say, wane in aftermath of the war,78 and though military surveys represented an innovation of 
a sort when compared to work of the wartime years the methods they used did not. In place 
of questions on home morale and rationing came related enquiries, for example, on how 
many respondents ‘approved’ or ‘disapproved’ of the Services or what (out of a pre-
determined list of categories) were the main ‘attractions’ or ‘shortcomings’ of military life. All 
the surveys examined, or aspired to examine, what drove or pulled men and women to the 
forces, and what drove them away from them, though they also examined subjects that were 
peculiar to their own time. In 1957, for instance, the same year the abolition of conscription 
was announced by the Macmillan government (see chapter nine), the attitudes of young men 
towards regular Army service became the main driver for research. In 1961, after the 
recruitment of children had been accelerated as part of the attempt to replenish the Services 
with regulars, school children who had requested information on recruitment to the Air Force 
but not followed up their interest represented the main problem area.79  
Given the shortcomings associated with polling mentioned above, these enquiries might not 
seem significant, particularly in the context of the Survey’s wartime work. However, because 
surveys were designed to inform policy they need to be treated seriously. It was on the basis 
of the results they gave that military advertisers organised future campaigns; and like the 
‘pitches’ advertising agents gave to government departments to try to win contracts, the 
reports the Survey produced for its clients were promotional devices in their own right. Putting 
forward recommendations or ‘conclusions’ intended to improve existing publicity 
arrangements, they became part of the process of making advertising and therefore, of 
bringing the military to the public. These conclusions varied from study to study, and in most 
cases were fairly obvious. In the tri-Service report for the Ministry of Defence, for example, 
each Service was said to have its own ‘special’ appeal. The Navy attracted those who 
believed it offered the freedom of movement and travel and (more plausibly) the ability to go 
to sea; the RAF appealed to those who wanted to fly or develop a special knowledge of 
planes; and the Army’s ‘main attraction’ was offering the opportunity to ‘learn a trade or make 
a career’. Each Service was thus advised to focus on different themes in their publicity.80  
Yet they were also sometimes shrewd. In the 1947 Re-enlistment in the Royal Air Force 
survey, the business of recruitment advertising was related specifically to the broader social 
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context within which recruiters worked. ‘The problem of recruitment’, the report’s author Leslie 
Wilkins claimed, ‘is not unique to the Armed Services’ and if the ‘Royal Air Force can offer 
terms and conditions which when compared with those offered by others competing in the 
labour market seem...preferable, then we may expect these men to volunteer’. Advertising, in 
other words, counted for little ‘when few rates of payment are below the poverty line’ and 
when ‘the general level of wages [was] high’. Yet it was also important to acknowledge that 
men were not inclined to ‘sell their services necessarily to the person or organisation which 
offer[ed the] most money’. The ‘amount of pay received will always remain important, but it 
meets stronger competition from other factors when the general level of wages is high’, 
factors that included family accommodation, job security, good conditions for advancement, 
social prestige, desire for self-expression and recreation.81 
It is worth asking how Wilkins drew such a comprehensive criticism from the seemingly 
limited ‘data’ his report proffered. Though questions were asked regarding the pitfalls of 
Service life and the attitudes of recruits’ dependents towards it, the ‘general conclusions’ 
Wilkins listed veered from the results his report presented. They also chimed with certain 
views espoused by economists and social scientists in the 1940s and 1950s. The notion that 
job satisfaction and not just remuneration determined the appeal of a given job, for example, 
was put forward by the management consultant Frederic Hooper at roughly the same time 
Wilkins released his report, and would be incorporated into the review of military recruitment 
examined in chapter nine. It is difficult to reconcile these views with the more circumscribed 
‘social facts’ generated by surveys, and it is possible that Wilkins drew from his evidence a 
conclusion that was actually rooted in his own experiences of military recruitment rather than 
the evidence or ‘data’ his report had accumulated.  
Whether Wilkins’ ‘general conclusions’ flowed naturally from the evidence or not, however, it 
is important to recognise that all polls and surveys performed the important discursive 
function of translating the myriad tables, figures and formulae that accompanied surveys into 
the language of politics. Though statistics were utilised, and though the ‘science’ behind 
statistics was presented as a general framework through which recruiters could view military 
advertising, it was in passages of text that the results or ‘general conclusions’ of surveys were 
presented. These passages, designed to convey the ‘social facts’ Social Survey gathered, 
were intrinsically promotional, in that they were designed to convince recruiters of a particular 
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course of action. Feeding into broader discussions on recruiting policy, they tended to offer 
broadly similar ‘conclusions’. Clients were often told, for example, that their promotion needed 
to change or ‘improve’ in some way; that respondents had a tendency to disbelieve military 
advertising (though this was often qualified with a claim that disbelief was not ‘crystallised’);82 
that each Service had its own peculiar shortcomings in the eyes of recruits; and that there 
was a fairly small number of reasons why people enlisted or did not enlist. What impact these 
‘conclusions’ had on the process of military advertising will be discussed below. 
Negotiating with Clients and Assimilating Polls into Advertising Campaigns 
Of course, whether the Services actually heeded the advice of Social Survey is another 
matter. In the files examined during the course of this chapter, little evidence has been found 
connecting the work of the Survey to changes of policy. While this does not, of course, 
suggest policy was not affected by sampling, it does emphasise the need to treat surveys with 
a degree of caution. To draw a parallel with the history of commercial advertising, polls and 
other forms of market research were rarely regarded as authentic insights into consumers’ 
minds, and though they were considered beneficial for clients, who desired research to 
provide a firm ‘empirical’ footing to their campaigns, they were often disregarded by creative 
staff, who viewed such research as an impediment to the process of constructing 
advertisements. The advertising scholar Jib Fowles has spoken of the tensions or ‘churning 
dynamics’ that exist between those tasked with research and those charged with developing 
appeals in the advertising industry, and there may have been a similar ‘dynamic’ at play in the 
interrelations between the Services and Social Survey.83 What can be deduced from official 
records is a complex and nuanced interplay between the Survey and its clients that mirrored 
the interaction between the COI and the defence departments in matters of advertising, and 
was characterised by negotiation rather than unilateral decision-making.  
In the only survey concerned with civil defence, for example, the Survey was called upon to 
complement the drive for recruits by providing ‘evidence of the extent of existing public 
interest [in civil defence] and the desire to know more about [its] role’. Such evidence, the 
campaign organisers claimed, would prove ‘useful in working out a theme for the 
[forthcoming] winter campaign’, which ran from 1949 until 1950.84 The resulting enquiry gave 
the advertisers evidence of ‘general public opinion towards civil defence’ and the ‘most 
promising groups of the population on which recruiting publicity should be concentrated’.85 
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Apparently, only between four and seven percent of those eligible for service would be 
attracted to the idea of civil defence and, crucially, suited for it, and so the campaign would 
need to focus on those ‘inclined to view Civil Defence favourably’, and who picked amongst 
the reasons given by the pollster for joining up as ‘helping to protect one’s own family’ and a 
‘sense of duty [and] patriotism’ as major incentives.86 Framing recruitment appeals in relation 
to families, patriotism and a sense of duty did not, as we have already seen, represent a 
significant departure from existing recruiting practice (see chapter six), and the Survey’s 
recommendations did not so much revolutionise the approach taken by the Ministry of Health 
to recruiting as confirm it. In an advertisement released months before the Social Survey had 
completed its enquiry, ‘duty’ and ‘patriotism’ were used as the main appeals.87 
Shortly after the civil defence campaign, another recruiting drive was organised by the 
Defence Publicity Committee for all three Services, and Social Survey was called upon by the 
Admiralty to examine what discouraged civilians from joining the Navy. Interestingly, the 
Admiralty had ordered an internal enquiry of its own into the reasons why current sailors 
enlisted, but suggested an additional enquiry overseen by the Survey to ask ‘why people do 
not join the Navy’ and to provide a ‘very desirable compliment’ to their own internal 
investigation.88 Far from allowing Social Survey to carry out research on their behalf, 
however, Navy officials compiled a dossier for the Survey suggesting its main lines of enquiry. 
The dossier, which was designed to ‘anticipate, so far as possible, the kinds of answer to be 
expected’ from respondents, emulated the Survey’s own techniques for measuring opinions. 
There were apparently four reasons why civilians did not to enlist: because they have ‘not 
heard of the opportunities offered’, have ‘not heard in sufficient detail, or...in a form suitable 
for action’, have ‘heard, or believe in a general way, that the prospects are not attractive, 
either generally or in respect of some specific Branch or aspect of [service]’, or, despite 
having the ‘relevant information’ do not view the Navy as a ‘possible career for them’.89  
Conclusion: Social Survey and the Construction of Public Opinion 
From its beginnings as a body tasked with gauging home morale and monitoring the 
allocation of wartime materials to its standing, in the post-war era, as a ‘research organisation 
whose work...provide[d] data to be used in policy formation’,90 Social Survey was engaged 
not so much in the measurement of public opinion as in its construction. Opinions, though 
they could not be subjected to the kind of quantification desired by pollsters, were 
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nevertheless reified and ranked. During the war, this process served a clear function: to give 
the state a more accurate and supposedly objective way of measuring the wants, needs and 
desires of those who made up the home front. After it, the utility of publicity ‘in reverse’ was 
still broadly accepted even though there were no ‘emergencies’ comparable to those 
witnessed in 1940. Departments could use polls to better understand the public reception of 
their policies, and the Services could utilise them to try to boost enlistment by improving the 
kinds of appeals they used in advertisements and public relations materials. The need for 
polls, according to the COI, ‘arose out of the new functions which departments assumed 
during the war’, but since those ‘functions’ were continued and in some cases even extended 
in the post-war era Social Survey was deemed ‘essential to administrative and executive 
efficiency’ well after 1945.91 Its work continued, indeed, into the 1970s, and there is also 
evidence that the armed forces consulted private opinion polling firms during this period.92   
Military recruiters, whose work was regarded as a matter of both policy and administration, 
made use of the Survey almost as soon as voluntary recruitment resumed in Britain. Through 
studies of different groups of people or ‘universes’, the opinion poll was thus assimilated into 
the practice of military advertising, which used surveys to try to produce more compelling and 
effective recruiting appeals. In the absence of corroboratory evidence, it is difficult to say 
whether these surveys had a lasting effect on the ways in which recruitment was promoted to 
the British public in the post-war era, although on the basis of the material examined here it 
seems likely that polling did not so much revolutionise military advertising as become part of 
the broader process of promotion. In the realm of commercial advertising, as Anne Cronin 
has shown, ‘research’ into the targets of campaigns represents just one of the many forms of 
discourse that the advertising industry produced.93 This discourse began to take shape during 
the interwar years,94 and would soon be applied to the problems of democratic government in 
the wartime era. For some observers, the adoption of polls and surveys represented a 
positive step in the direction of greater democracy.95 Yet such a characterisation does not 
necessarily hold in the realm of military advertising, which was concerned not so much with 
democracy but with matters of persuasion. In the next chapter, how the government 
responded to the challenges posed by the postwar era, and how military recruitment was 
itself subjected to a substantive reform, will be discussed. 
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Chapter Eight 
From Advertising to ‘Information’: Military 
Recruitment in an Era of Reform, 1944-51  
On December 17th 1945, Clement Attlee, Britain’s new Prime Minister, introduced what he 
called a ‘new organisation’ of the ‘information services’. Attlee’s government is often 
remembered for steering Labour to its first absolute majority in the House of Commons, and 
for embarking on an ambitious programme of social and economic reform that helped to 
establish a ‘postwar consensus’ in Britain that was only seriously challenged in the 1970s.1 
Yet it can also be credited with reforming the ways in which the state interacted with the 
public and the mass media. The ‘information services’, a term used by civil servants to 
describe the collective endeavours of the government’s press officers, public relations officials 
and advertisers,2 was popularised by the Attlee government, and the Central Office of 
Information (COI), successor to the wartime Ministry of Information (MOI), was established 
under Attlee’s watch. These reforms to ‘information’ policy were not accidental but part of an 
expansive review of how politicians and civil servants organised their communications work 
and how this work was subsequently presented to the outside world. Incorporating both the 
Public Relations Departments (PRDs) that had been established during the interwar years 
(see chapter six) and the single, centralised ‘propaganda’ ministry that had come into being in 
1939, this review was as bold as any of Labour’s reforms. It was also, like those reforms, 
designed to reflect what Attlee called the ‘modern conditions’ that prevailed at the time. 
[T]he information services...have an important and permanent part in the machinery 
of government under modern conditions. It is essential to good administration under a 
democratic system that the public shall be adequately informed about the many 
matters in which Government action directly impinges on their daily lives, and it is in 
particular important that a true and adequate picture of British policy, British 
institutions and the British way of life should be presented overseas.3           
There was something of the fourth estate in Attlee’s description of the postwar information 
services: the government, a source of impartial and apparently innocuous ‘facts’, would 
spread information and in so doing enlighten the public; the COI, which would take on some 
but not all of the functions of the MOI, would perform ‘certain common technical and 
production functions’; and the whole system would run on the circulation and dissemination of 
‘information’, both between the COI and its departmental clients and between departments 
[145] 
 
145 | P a g e  
 
and the wider public they served. Perhaps because the Opposition was still reeling from its 
shock defeat in the general election of July,4 or perhaps because it was close to 
Parliamentary recess, Attlee’s announcement passed without much controversy at the time. 
Most of the ensuing debate, indeed, centred on the implications of the reforms for relations 
with the British Council and the renewal of the British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC) 
Charter;5 and although the COI would come in for considerable criticism in the following year 
(see below) the notion that Labour had introduced a ‘new organisation’ of political 
communication quickly became an orthodoxy in postwar literature. In The Civil Service and 
the Changing State (1947), for example, the political scientist H. R. G. Greaves described the 
rise of ‘educative publicity’ in Britain in the wake of the war and the corollary need to ‘organise 
and foster, at every level of the execution of [government] plans, the understanding and 
cooperation of the public’.6 Writing four years later in The Civil Service and the Public, the civil 
servant T. A. Critchley put forward an almost identical assessment that suggested the events 
of 1939-45 forced governments to curry the ‘full understanding and cooperation of the 
public’;7 and a similar view can be found in Fife Clark’s The Central Office of Information 
(1970), a book that claimed that the   
need for a free market for information and criticism [represented] the surest guarantee 
of continuing accuracy and rectitude [in government, and that]...the methods used to 
[establish this free market] must be acknowledged to be right.8  
Historians have tended to take a more sceptical view of the claims of the Attlee government, 
not least because the rhetoric surrounding Labour’s reforms leaves little room for exhortation 
and manipulation. In Coercion or Persuasion? (1989), William Crofts has claimed that the 
Attlee governments’ flagship social reforms were promoted by a massive campaign of 
‘economic propaganda’ that made a mockery of any claim to impartiality. While 
acknowledging the presence of ‘information’ in the government’s communications arsenal, 
Crofts suggests the ‘proper role of information...is to create or to maintain states of mind that 
are conducive to the required end’; though ‘[g]overnments prefer the term “information 
services”’, they fail to mention that ‘information is a necessary component of propaganda’.9 
The press historian John Tulloch, meanwhile, has poured scorn on the ‘self-serving myth’ that 
1945 heralded a new era in political communications, arguing that this interpretation was 
‘concocted for political convenience, serviced by an information establishment that stretched 
from the BBC, through Fleet Street and Reuters to the COI, and faithfully regurgitated in 
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accounts like Sir Fife Clark’s account of the COI’.10 Mariel Grant, finally, has highlighted the 
important transitional role played by the MOI in establishing its postwar successor and the 
continuity and change at the heart of the information services.11 
The latter interventions, based on detailed analyses of the campaigns of PRDs and the COI, 
have painted a more pessimistic picture of the role of the postwar information services. Yet 
while they have sought to draw attention to the range and extent of government promotion in 
aftermath of the Second World War, they have not addressed the impact of Labour’s reforms 
on military recruitment. No research, furthermore, has sought to examine how the discourse 
of ‘information’ embodied in the government’s reforms impacted on the practices of individual 
PRDs, or how military recruitment was itself promoted and endorsed under the two Attlee 
governments. A cursory glance at official records suggests that a number of advertising 
campaigns were waged between 1946 and 1951. These campaigns extended beyond the 
realm of military recruitment to promotion which stressed the essential ‘rationality’ of rearming 
for another war.12 The introduction of conscription or ‘National Service’ in 1947 was also 
promoted in official publicity, which portrayed compulsion as a means of protecting British 
interests and preventing another world war even as British troops were sent to Korea to fight 
alongside Americans in the summer of 1950.13 
It is not possible to examine the scale and breadth of this promotion here, but we can sketch 
out the relationship these campaigns shared to the reforms of the government’s 
communications infrastructure. These reforms endeavoured to portray the work of all 
advertising and public relations staff as a ‘technical’ activity shorn of bias and impartiality, but 
the case of military advertising belies this interpretation. Recruiters, indeed, continued to 
practice and organise promotion using the methods and procedures witnessed before the war 
– utilising ‘paid-for’ advertising for multi-media campaigns, for example, and lobbying the BBC 
to include promotional material in its normal schedule of broadcasting. The absence of any 
substantive change in the ways in which recruiters operated suggests the ‘new organisation’ 
Attlee announced in 1945 belied its epithet, and contains some important implications for 
historical understandings of the postwar Labour governments. While much of the commentary 
on 1945-51 has stressed the ‘progressive phase’ this period represented,14 the attempt to 
recruit for and justify the existence of the postwar armed forces indicates a less progressive 
[147] 
 
147 | P a g e  
 
undercurrent to the government’s work that is typified by the attempt to recruit children into 
the armed forces using a variety of cadet programmes and scholarships.     
The Origins of the Postwar ‘System’ of Communications, 1944-45 
Discussions about the future of the information services in peacetime had been held in 
government since 1942, and were among the many subjects examined by the Machinery of 
Government Committee created in 1944 under the aegis of the War Cabinet.15 The latter 
committee, which was comprised of the most senior figures in British government and 
included amongst its members the future Prime Minister and Chancellor,16 was presented 
with a report by Sir Alan Barlow, a Treasury mandarin, arguing for the continued existence of 
public relations in peacetime and for some kind of central coordinating authority to oversee 
them.17 Barlow’s report reignited old debates about the centralisation of government 
communications, but what distinguished earlier discussions from the present 
recommendations was sensitivity to the expansion of the information services in peacetime.18 
There could be ‘no doubt’, Barlow claimed, that ‘an elaborate or blatant government publicity 
policy on the home front would arouse suspicion and antagonism’ amongst the general 
public, partly because it would occur in a context where ‘Party Government’ existed, and 
partly because ‘Parliamentary opinion’ on the matter remained ‘extremely sensitive’.19 
Attitudes towards the information services appear to have been ‘sensitive’ for some time. 
While the First World War was still being fought, the Conservative minister Stanley Baldwin 
suggested that the term propaganda was ‘not a word that has a pleasant sound in English 
ears’.20 Propaganda may have been a necessary evil of war, but it was to Baldwin a vulgar 
and ‘un-English activity’ in peacetime. The historian of propaganda Phil Taylor has suggested 
that ‘overwhelming degree of prejudice’ in Britain against the continued use of ‘propaganda in 
peacetime’ contributed to the dismantling of the First World War propaganda bureaus, and 
has even claimed that ‘British government was prepared to forfeit the considerable lead it had 
gained by 1918 and surrender the initiative to other governments’ to appease the electorate.21 
Misgivings about the use of propaganda in peacetime might explain why planning for the 
Second World War MOI, begun 1935, remained a closely kept secret, and why the MOI was 
itself designed to deal with the special circumstances created by war only.22 By continuing the 
body into peacetime, the government would seem disingenuous, if not duplicitous: that was 
certainly the view taken by the Postmaster-General Harry Crookshank,23 and there were 
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enough journalists on Fleet Street who would echo it following Attlee’s announcement. Yet it 
was not a view endorsed in 1944 by the Machinery of Government Committee or the War 
Cabinet. According to a minute of the latter body dated June 22nd, despite being politically 
contentious the information services were considered ‘an established feature of government 
and one essential to its success’.24 The proliferation of PRDs in the 1920s and 1930s was not 
something the Cabinet wished to reverse, and according to Grant planning proceeded on the 
assumption that the ‘status quo ante bellum would not only be revived but also solidified in 
the postwar period’ – that is, that the information services would in peacetime operate with 
‘greater coordination and professionalism’ than they had done so before the war.25 
The drive for greater coordination and professionalism would have important repercussions 
for military advertising in the years to come, but it was not until March 1945 that the basic 
components of the new system had been ironed out. Winston Churchill, who had ensured the 
future of the information services could be settled by the Prime Minister and the Prime 
Minister alone,26 outlined a strategy for the operation of the information services in peacetime 
that hinged on three proposals. Firstly, the MOI would be abolished when war with Japan 
ended. Secondly, other departments would resume control over their public relations work in 
peacetime; and finally, a common service agency, a term used throughout Whitehall to 
describe a department formed to provide assistance to other departments,27 would be set up 
to provide ‘technical’ assistance to any department that required it. The emphasis on the 
‘technical’, a term that carried none of the negative connotations of propaganda and implied 
matters of practical construction,28 was a sign of what was to come. 
The Central Office of Information and the Emergence of a ‘Technical’ Service Agency 
Designed to produce advertising on behalf of its ‘clients’ and to provide services such as 
lectures and public exhibitions,29 the COI may have required a degree of ‘technical’ expertise 
to operate, but it traded in matters of rhetoric and persuasion. The Coalition government 
seems to have been aware of this, and so too was Attlee who announced the formation of the 
COI in Parliament in 1945 in language derived from the Churchill’s proposals. All post-war 
governments, Attlee claimed, would require ‘certain common technical and production 
functions’, and an ‘information unit’ would be formed to provide them. It soon became clear, 
however, that the COI would not be a unit but an office, and that this office would employ 
almost as many staff as its predecessor – and effectively more when making an allowance for 
[149] 
 
149 | P a g e  
 
wartime censorship.30 The Conservatives, despite supporting the idea of a common service 
agency in 1945, attacked Labour in 1946 for creating a ‘propaganda bureau’ in peacetime, 
while the press began recycling old stories about the extravagance of government press 
officers, public relations officials and advertisers. One newspaper, the Evening News, even 
branded the COI a ‘Ministry of Culture and National Enlightenment’,31 and the criticism the 
new department received mirrored that which had been directed towards its predecessor.  
The ‘technical’ services the COI provided may have involved a degree of information, as 
Attlee and others have claimed, but they were ultimately concerned with the passage of 
policy. All government information staff, whether they were described as advertisers, public 
relations officials, press officers or propagandists, were tasked with a clear and well-defined 
objective of serving the departments to which they were attached, and by extension the 
government as a whole. In 1945-51, this work tended to fall into two categories: publicity 
designed to ease the transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy, and promotion 
intended to endorse Labour’s programme of social and economic reforms.32 The latter, which 
have dominated the discussion on the Attlee governments, were, as Crofts has shown, the 
subject of massive advertising campaigns that demonstrated the Attlee governments’ 
commitment to an expansion of ‘economic propaganda’.33 Yet they were not the only subject 
to receive official endorsement in the aftermath of the war. 
The Return of Voluntary Recruitment and the Continuation of Conscription 
In 1946, while wartime veterans were still being demobilised, the Services began recruitment 
for regulars once more.34 In the same year, the decision to continue conscription into the 
post-war era was announced, and the information services of the relevant departments were 
mustered to justify that decision while at the same time promoting voluntary enlistment. In a 
broadcast by the Secretary of State for War Jack Lawson, the importance of voluntary service 
with or without conscription was emphasised. There was, Lawson claimed, a ‘great difference’ 
between the call for volunteers made in ‘earlier years’ and the present recruitment drive, a 
difference that centred on a shift from ‘patriotism and [an] urge for adventure of the young’ to 
an appeal to ‘good sense when…choosing a career’. The Army, Navy and Air Force would 
now offer a ‘really attractive, healthy, interesting, useful and properly paid career’, and what is 
more they were as important to post-war recovery as the ‘civilian’ work required to rebuild 
Britain’s cities and essential industries.  
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[L]et us get this matter quite straight. Security and world stability are necessary if we 
are to get on with any real reconstruction and prosperity. If your house has been 
burgled you naturally want to replace your lost property and get your house tidied up 
as soon as you can but, the first thing to replace is the lock on the door.35  
Replacing the ‘lock on the door’ became the official narrative for justifying military service in 
the years to come, with Britain’s armed forces portrayed as benign peace-keepers that 
ensured the world remained safe and secure. This narrative did contain a kernel of truth; 
under the terms of the Potsdam Agreement and other treaties, Britain was obligated to 
occupy the territories of former Axis enemies.36 Yet it could not account for the aggression or 
grandstanding of Britain’s military and its role as an occupying power in the colonies. In 1945, 
Britain stationed troops across the world, from Austria to Tanganyika (Tanzania), and treated 
some of these nations, continuing Lawson’s metaphor, as Empire ‘property’.37 Countries like 
Malaya were regarded as lucrative assets. The raw materials and cheap labour they proffered 
were crucial for Britain’s export industry, which would allow the government to repair its 
finances and repay the debts Britain had accrued during the war. The military, for its part, 
would provide Britain with the means of protecting these assets, and would extract from them 
the raw materials and commodities necessary to bring about a state of ‘prosperity’ at home. 
Tasked with informing the British public about the country’s global commitments, the 
information services would try to justify Britain’s global military presence.   
The attempt to reinvigorate the Empire would ultimately end in failure, but before the process 
of decolonisation had begun to accelerate the British armed forces were confronted with 
another challenge. In 1948, after a coup in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet blockade of Berlin, 
Britain entered the Cold War on the side of the United States. Pitting the capitalist societies of 
the West against the communist nations of East, this conflict was not as deadly as the world 
wars that had preceded it, but it was equally influential in shaping how the government 
organised and promoted recruitment.38 Civil defences were once again established after the 
passage of the 1948 Civil Defence Act, and recruitment of conventional forces was hastened 
after Britain deployed troops in Korea in 1950. These developments presented the reformed 
information services with their first real challenge, and will be examined in this chapter’s final 
two sections. In what follows, how the reforms of the information services discussed under 
the wartime Coalition government impacted on individual departments, and how PRDs were 
themselves implicated in them, will be explored.  
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Managing ‘Information’: Herbert Morrison and the Information Service Committees  
Before the Cold War had begun to change the complexion of Britain’s post-war recovery, a 
series of discussions were held in the Labour Cabinet to determine how ‘information’ would 
be used to promote the government and how the government would coordinate the reformed 
information services. During the war, the subject of government publicity had only infrequently 
figured on the Cabinet agenda,39 but in the post-war era it became a topic of some concern. 
Senior figures in the Labour government, including in particular Herbert Morrison, took a 
special interest in advertising and public relations. Credited by his biographers Bernard 
Donoughue and G. W. Jones with being ‘in advance of his time in his awareness that 
governments in the twentieth century must communicate to the people and that public 
relations had become an essential instrument of modern mass politics’,40 Morrison was 
chosen by Attlee to put the plans of the Coalition (and now Labour) into practice. His 
response centred on six key proposals, delivered to the Cabinet in 1945. 
1. Overseas publicity should be continued in peace-time. 
2. Subject to vigilance against abuse by the government of the day, provision must be 
made for the continuance of Government information and publicity services at home. 
3. The Minister…should be responsible for the publicity of his Department, and 
Departmental Public Relations or Information Divisions, whose staffs should be 
strictly limited in numbers but should be of good quality and status, should continue 
as the primary instrument for Departmental publicity and for keeping Ministers…in 
touch with public opinion. 
4. There should be a single organization – which might be called a Central Information 
Office41 – to carry out centrally certain common technical and production functions… 
It should not be under close day-to-day direction of a Minister appointed exclusively 
for this purpose, though there would have to be a responsible Minister… 
5. There should be machinery for the coordination of both overseas and home publicity, 
so that the different Departments concerned with overseas publicity present a 
“common line”, which, where necessary, is related to home publicity, and so that, as 
far as possible, publicity at home is consistent and overlapping and conflicts are 
avoided…  
6. For political as well as financial reasons, there should be a substantial reduction in 
the total government expenditure on different kinds of publicity.42 
These proposals, with minor alterations, were ratified by the Cabinet, and Morrison tasked a 
committee of civil servants with creating the administrative machinery necessary for executing 
them. This committee, chaired by Barlow and known as the Official Committee on 
Government Information Services,43 made several of its own recommendations. Firstly, in 
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order to achieve the desired ‘common line’ between home and overseas publicity, two 
ministerial committees would need to be formed to examine these subjects and keep publicity 
‘constantly under review’. (These committees would be chaired by Cabinet ministers and 
would contain representatives from many of the major departments in Whitehall.) Secondly, a 
detailed outline of the function and remit of the COI would need to be developed; Barlow 
wrote one himself. Finally, individuals involved in the information services would need to be 
elevated to a position of authority within their respective departments because they required 
access to senior staff in order to work effectively.44 
Together with the Morrison proposals, these recommendations helped to establish the main 
direction of official publicity in the post-war era. The ‘constant review’ of the information 
services would be realised through various committees, some chaired by civil servants tasked 
with organising promotion, others overseen by Cabinet ministers.45 The COI would be formed 
from the remnants of the MOI, and though it would lose its censorship staff it would retain 
other divisions, including Social Survey (see chapter seven). In the summer of 1947, a third 
and final report was commissioned to gauge the feasibility of imposing ‘one Information 
Service’ across government. That report, known as the Crombie Report after its chairman,46 
made a series of recommendations that did represent a meaningful reform of existing 
departmental procedure and practice. Information staff, for a start, should be allowed to move 
freely between departments; their pay and recruitment should be regimented according to 
existing civil service criteria; and a ‘coherent’ system of promotion should be enforced to 
ensure all departments paid equivalent rates for equivalent work.47  
Existing literature on the COI and the postwar information services has acknowledged the 
significance of the Crombie Report, but since both Crofts’ and Grant’s work concludes in 1951 
while Tulloch’s veers from the information services to the secretive propaganda agency, the 
Information Research Department,48 little is known about the impact of the report on political 
communications post-1951. What can be determined, on the basis of reactions recorded at 
the time, is that Crombie’s recommendations did not sit well with many departments. The War 
Office (WO), for example, was unhappy with the notion of formalising criteria for hiring staff, 
was unsure about the feasibility of allowing staff to be transferred from department to 
department, and contended that its promotional work required military experience and an 
awareness of the ‘individual’ (that is, unique) character of publicising the armed forces.49 As 
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the experience of the MOI demonstrated, departments tended to regard centralised 
information machinery as an infringement on their right to organise and control their own 
communications apparatuses,50 and it is perhaps unsurprising that the WO, which possessed 
one of the oldest and largest PRDs, was reluctant to relinquish control.   
Yet by far the greatest controversy centred on the language used in the reforms. Picking up 
where Churchill, Attlee and Morrison had left off, Crombie claimed that government 
advertisers, press officers and public relations officials were employed to ‘create and maintain 
an informed public opinion about the subject with which the [government] deals’, and 
therefore that their work was in reality ‘much wider in scope than what is usually associated 
with the term “Public Relations”’. Suggesting the latter term should be replaced with the more 
inoffensive ‘information’, he urged all ministries to abandon public relations in their job titles 
and in the titles of their PRDs in favour of two new coinages: the Information Officer and the 
Information Department.51 Information, which had not yet been tainted by association with 
government communications, would substitute existing terminology and provide a catchall 
phrase for every kind of political communication. 
Since it appeared to absolve PRDs from their more controversial activities, we might expect 
departments to accept this facet of Crombie’s report. Yet by November 1947, only 17 out of a 
total of 28 departments had accepted Crombie’s recommendations, and there were still a 
number of ministries (the WO included) that pointedly refused to redefine their agencies.52 
Information, according to the WO, seemed to ‘be far more restricted than Public Relations’ 
and since the Army had ‘built up a very good atmosphere with the Press and with the public 
under the present title’ there did ‘not seem to be any great reason for altering it’.53 Echoing 
these sentiments, an official from the Post Office, which had the distinction of being both a 
commercial and a governmental concern, suggested public relations was more widely 
accepted amongst ‘most large businesses’, and therefore more desirable for the purposes of 
its work. A representative of the Home Office, meanwhile, was concerned that an 
indiscriminate application of the term ‘information’ to all government departments would lead 
outsiders to regard all PRD staff as agents of the COI.54 
There seemed to be, as one official remarked in a letter to the Treasury dated November 5th 
1947, a ‘burning question of “Information” versus “Public Relations”’ which showed little signs 
of resolution even after the first information officers had been appointed by the government in 
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1950.55 Yet in all the wrangling over nomenclature there was no indication that the transition 
from ‘public relations’ to ‘information’ involved any corollary changes to how the government 
actually organised its advertising and public relations machinery. The main thrust of 
Crombie’s report, on the contrary, was the promotion (in the sense of rank and status), 
recruitment and remuneration of staff. At no point in his recommendations does he make 
sweeping recommendations regarding a change in the ways in which such staff interacted 
with public or the mass media. Yet to both Crombie and Morrison the issue of how PRDs 
were defined was of crucial importance to presentation. In a memorandum to all public 
relations officials dated November 22nd 1947, the latter claimed there was ‘no basis in fact’ for 
some departments to retain public relations while others used information, and gave a hint as 
to why he – and perhaps Labour as a whole – might have objections to the use of ‘public 
relations’ in official titles. Information, he claimed, was more ‘modest and less open to 
[political] objection’ than its counterpart, and the title ‘Information Officer’ was ‘less 
provocative’ for the same reason.56 Since public relations had acquired negative connotations 
in the wake of the two wars – one official suggested it had ‘come to suggest in most people’s 
minds a function of manipulation’57 – information would allow the government to deflect 
criticisms that it was manipulating the public. This was an essential pre-requisite of justifying 
the existence of an expanded postwar communications apparatus; by portraying the staff 
appointed to PRDs as arbiters of impartial information, the Labour government sought to free 
the leopard of its spots. 
Military Advertising in an Era of Reform and Consolidation 
The ‘burning question’ of information versus public relations occurred against a backdrop of a 
series of massive advertising campaigns organised by both military and non-military 
departments. Since they extended into the 1950s these campaigns provide a useful resource 
for examining how Labour’s reforms of government communication impacted on military 
advertising. As we shall see, though recruiters did make an effort to convey information in 
various educational media, the lion’s share of their work was still geared towards promotion. 
Moreover, though the Attlee government promised a new ‘organisation’ of government 
communications, compared to the campaign work of 1913-19 or 1938-39 recruitment 
advertising was characterised not so much by a departure from existing practices and 
procedures but by a maintenance and continuation of them. How these practices and 
procedures will be the subject of the remainder of this chapter. 
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Negotiating Recruitment in an Era of Shortages 
When the COI was established in 1946, a long line of departments from the Ministry of 
Agriculture to the WO requested the use of its Advertising Division. Following the MOI’s 
model (itself derived from the BBC) the COI was subdivided into Divisions overseen by 
Controllers, with a single Director General (at that time, Sir Eric Bamford) positioned at the 
top of an institutional hierarchy.58 The COI’s Advertising Division incorporated all ‘paid-for’ 
publicity across all media, but most departments, including the three Services, were 
interested in newspaper advertising only. Before the age of commercial television, 
newspapers and magazines represented the medium of choice for many advertisers.59 The 
COI, which had been formed expressly to deal with such enquiries, was relatively well 
equipped to juggle the demands of several departments simultaneously. However, what it 
could not do (and what military recruiters quickly discovered) was control how much space 
newspapers gave to the government for its advertising. Paper and ink had continued to be 
rationed since the war, and the UK’s press, in a very literal sense, had shrunk because of it.60 
Because there was less space, moreover, competition between departments increased. 
By 1947 the ‘demands of departments’, according to Crofts, ‘had reached unprecedented 
proportions’;61 and while the Service departments were involved in their own internal wrangles 
– the new National Service Act was in the process of being passed through Parliament and 
the Ministry of Defence had just been established62 – they quickly discovered that their needs 
would not, for once, trounce others’. Ahead of the Service departments, and a reflection of the 
shifting priorities of the state in the period before the Cold War, came the Ministry of Food, the 
National Savings Committee and the Board of Trade.63 The latter departments were all 
involved in work judged crucial for Britain’s economic recovery, and though the Services had 
vigorously lobbied the COI for a greater proportion of the existing advertising budget they 
received a fraction of the overall amount. This arrangement did not endear the COI to the 
Services, and demonstrated that although the information office was conceived of as a 
‘technical’ agency it contained the ability to determine which departments (and therefore 
which policies) received the oxygen of publicity.64 
That decision, in truth, was not made by Bamford or his successor Sir Robert Fraser. The 
various information committees, which had been established in 1946 and continued to 
operate until the return of Conservative government in 1951,65 determined not only how much 
[156] 
 
156 | P a g e  
 
the COI had to spend on staffing, but how much individual ministries could spend on 
advertising and what proportion of the COI’s annual advertising budget they would receive. 
The Services, which were in competition with each other for the same recruits – under the 
terms of the National Service Act, volunteers could choose any Service while conscripts were 
by default sent to the Army66 – were now effectively competing with other departments for 
advertising space.67 While this arrangement did not signal an end to recruitment drives, it did 
limit the scale of recruitment work. There were no giant campaigns of the kind witnessed in 
1915 and 1939, and though a Services Recruiting Publicity Committee was established in 
1946 it was not involved in a large-scale advertising campaign until Britain had decided to 
commit to another war in South-East Asia.68  
The Return of Civil Defence: National Service in All But Name 
Before Britain was involved in Korea, however, steps were taken revive the wartime civil 
defences. In 1948, the Civil Defence Act was passed, and by the following year, after the 
Soviet Union had successfully tested its first H-bomb, recruitment officially began for the 
Auxiliary Fire Service, the Civil Defence Corps, the Special Constabulary and the National 
Hospital Service Reserve.69 The initial campaign, waged in the latter half of 1949, proved a 
disaster. The Home Office, which had been given control over civil defence in a reversal of 
the 1939 arrangement, complained about the lack of interest shown by journalists in civil 
defence.70 As in the campaign for national service, potential recruits were targeted via 
advertisements placed in the mass media and the editors of major newspapers were lobbied 
to include civil defence more regularly as an item of news. When this failed, and it is worth 
noting the campaign did rely on a degree of ‘information’ to inform the public of the roles and 
functions of the civil defences, a large-scale campaign was authorised in the spring of 1950. 
This too proved a disappointment, however, and by autumn an even larger campaign had 
been authorised – and instigated, as in 1939, by a press conference.71  
Designed to ‘ensure that the general public were [sic] aware of the need for recruits’, the last 
of these campaigns was waged in the same year in which Britain committed troops to Korea, 
and against a backdrop in which expenditure on civil defence ‘almost doubled’ when 
compared to 1949.72 Emulating the campaign for national service in the interwar years, 
recruiters operated on both a national and a regional level, and as in the interwar years a 
balance was struck between the needs of local authorities, which were made responsible for 
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the enrolment of staff, and the work of central government, which organised all the major 
publicity including the advertising and editorial publicity in the national newspapers and any 
promotions that appeared on the BBC.73 The COI, which handled all paid-for publicity on 
behalf of the Home Office and the local authorities, worked in conjunction with the public 
relations staff or ‘information officers’ of the Home Office, including T. A. O’Brien, a civil 
servant who chaired a committee from his office in Horseferry House, London.74  
Apart from obvious differences in content – the absence of a mention of the threat of 
Germany, for example – little separated the post-war civil defence recruitment drive and the 
work of 1938-39. Both campaigns made use of ‘information’, which is to say they utilised 
leaflets and pamphlets to inform members of the public about certain aspects of the civil 
defences, but since civil defence required an informed public in order to function properly75 it 
is unlikely that the post-war reforms had any impact on this aspect of promotion. Both 
campaigns, furthermore, made use of more conventional appeals to emotion and feeling, with 
one advertisement (appearing in the national and provincial press in March-April 1950) 
claiming civil defence is a ‘commonsense [sic] peacetime precaution against war’ (see figure 
fourteen).76 Other advertisements made appeals related to specific services. According to 
one, released as a poster at some point between 1950 and 1953, there was ‘a “special” job 
waiting for you. Join your local Special Constabulary’ (see figure fifteen).77  
Remarking on the function of these images, the commercial advertising agent which 
produced them suggested the ‘national publicity’ utilised for civil defence in 1950-51 served 
two functions 
besides attracting recruits directly; one is to lead and encourage local authorities in 
their own efforts [to promote civil defence], and another is to sustain the morale and 
enthusiasm of those already enrolled so that may in themselves act as recruiting 
agents.78 
Another recruiter connected to the National Hospital Service Reserve campaign emphasised 
the value of ‘free’ publicity inserted in the press and the BBC. According to this official, steps 
should be taken to ‘secure free publicity in the local press’ because this allowed the 
government to insert recruitment into ‘local news items’.79 In the same year, the Cabinet itself 
had examined the use of ‘un-paid, non-official media’, with Morrison endorsing their use in a 
meeting with Chief Information Officers held at 11 Downing Street on January 17th 1951. 
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Public relations, he claimed, ‘was often more effective than paid publicity, and it was more 
desirable in view of the further cuts which it was necessary to impose on the [information 
services] in the interests of the economy’.80 Since the material that appeared in the press and 
on the BBC Rearmament had induced those cuts, and it is perhaps ironic that the retrenched 
information services were expected to promote them. Yet more significant than the subjects 
military advertisers were expected to promote was the manner in which they were expected 
to promote. Envisioning advertising as a means of bolstering morale and sustaining 
enthusiasm clearly had little to do with ‘information’ and a lot to do with persuasion, and 
making use of ‘free’ publicity in newspapers and on the BBC, which was inserted without the 
knowledge of the audiences who consumed these media, suggested a more secretive form of 
promotion that did not so much inform the public as exhort and inveigle them.  
Recruiting for the ‘Forgotten War’: The Defence Publicity Programme of 1950-51 
The Korean War, which is often referred to as the ‘forgotten war’ because of an apparent lack 
of public interest in it,81 represented Britain’s first major conflict of the postwar era. Almost 
100,000 British troops were involved, many of them conscripted national servicemen, and 
though this number paled in significance when compared to the mobilisations of the two world 
wars, it was large enough to have a significant impact on the Labour government and the 
British economy. The rearmament programme that helped to finance it, some £4,7000 million 
spread out over three years,82 led to the resignations of Nye Bevan and Harold Wilson, both 
of whom were aggrieved at the diversion of public resources to the arms industry, and is 
usually credited with taking the wind out of the sails of Britain’s recovery, although that 
argument has recently been challenged.83 In terms of casualties, Britain lost only a fraction of 
the troops sent – a little over 1,000 men – and a minute proportion of those killed from Korea 
itself, whose deaths both north and south of the 38th parallel numbered not in the thousands 
or even the hundreds of thousands, but the millions. 
To conflict of 1950-53 is sometimes regarded as a ‘limited war’ that did not did not involve (for 
Britain at least) the mobilisation of the entirety of the nation’s resources, and did not leave the 
same enduring impressions on British society. For historians of military advertising, however, 
Korea and the ‘war’ in Egypt that followed it (see chapter nine) are important for other 
reasons. Representing the last wars Britain fought with a partly-conscripted, partly-volunteer 
Army, they epitomised a period in recruitment in which the armed forces, and the Army in 
[159] 
 
159 | P a g e  
 
particular, struggled to attract enough volunteers. Conscripts, who arrived in relatively stable 
numbers and whose terms of service had been increased from 12 to 18 months by the time of 
the Korean War,84 required Regulars to train them; Regulars, for their part, occupied the 
senior positions in the command structure but required national servicemen as subordinates. 
The War Office, which had energetically campaigned for conscription in 1945, found it 
exceedingly difficult to recruit volunteers and believed that the Army was identified, in the 
public mind, with compulsion. Aside from the immediate need to recruit regulars, there was 
thus an additional need, according to one official, to develop a ‘long-term policy…to build up 
the right atmosphere for successful recruitment’.85 
 
The first steps towards creating this atmosphere were taken in June 1950, a week before the 
Korean War started.86 The Home Information Service (Official) Committee, which coordinated 
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all home publicity and had recently taken to categorising its work into three categories – 
defence, social and economic87 – set up a Defence Publicity Sub-Committee that became 
known, in government, as the Defence Publicity Programme.88 This programme incorporated 
both armed forces and civil defence publicity, but its remit stretched beyond conventional 
recruiting work. A number of long-term measures were discussed with an eye to improving 
the public relations of the forces because, according to one memorandum prepared by the 
sub-committee, recruitment represented only part of the problem. Just as important for the 
programme, and listed as the first of its two objectives, was the provision of a ‘continuous flow 
of information and explanation’ to foster ‘understanding and goodwill between the forces and 
the general public which they serve’.89  
Such ‘goodwill’ was deemed necessary because of awareness within Britain of the cost of 
rearmament. In his meeting with senior public relations officials, Morrison had warned of the 
prospect of ‘economic disturbances’ as a result of rearmament, and claimed the main gist of 
future government publicity would be divided between two, related subjects: the economic 
consequences for rearmament and Britain’s place in the wider world.90 The Festival of Britain 
(1951), an event personally overseen by Morrison to commemorate the centenary of the 
Great Exhibition, fell firmly into the latter category, and was designed, in the Lord President’s 
words, to allow Britons to ‘take pride in themselves’.91 The Defence Publicity Programme, in 
contrast, was concerned not so much with how Britain related to the rest of the world, even if 
it had obvious implications in that regard, as with how ordinary members of the public 
perceived and understood the armed forces.  
The public’s estimation of the sailor, soldier and airman, the Services’ own idea of 
what the public knows and thinks about them, the serving man’s conceit [sic] of 
himself, and the job he is doing for his country, these intangibles influence the 
barometer of recruitment just as much as the potential recruit’s picture of the material 
conditions he will find inside the Service in which he is interested. Without such a 
climate of general opinion, reasonably well-informed and sympathetic, no recruiting 
campaign can succeed.92 
‘Informing’ the public took many guises, from describing rearmament as a necessary 
counterpoise to ‘Russian imperialism’, to emphasising the role the forces played in local 
communities, to the development of campaigns on the basis of Social Survey investigations.93 
One of the more controversial measures, and something that had been in place for virtually 
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the entirety of the first Attlee government,94 was the targeting of children in schools and 
colleges. Each of the three Services ran cadet programmes designed to encourage 
enthusiasm in the armed forces and increase adult enlistment,95 but the public relations 
officials within the Service departments felt that there was an additional need to correct the 
‘very great ignorance of life in the Services’ betrayed by young people in 1950.96 In 1946, the 
Services had approached the Ministry of Education to try to gain access to schools, receiving 
the latter’s ‘general blessing’ to do so.97 By 1950, opposition from certain headmasters and 
headmistresses, and from Education Committees, had scuppered this work, as had 
‘competition’ with the Youth Employment Service, a body charged under the Youth 
Employment and Training Act (1948) with finding employment for school-leavers.98 
 
Recruiting children for the armed forces was not a new phenomenon,99 but the expansion of 
recruiting programmes for children under the Attlee governments warrants additional 
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attention. In its 1945 general election manifesto, Labour made no mention of conscription or 
another war – indeed, it made several, explicit references to peace100 – and there was no 
indication that the ‘very great ignorance of Service life’ betrayed by children would be 
confronted head on. In popular memory, the Attlee governments are remembered as great 
reformers of the 20th century, and the reforms of their information services were designed to 
construct a narrative that chimed with this representation. Nevertheless, there was nothing 
‘democratic’ about lobbying schools to include recruitment material as part of secondary 
education, and nor were the various attempts to justify Britain’s rearmament programme 
borne of a progressive attempt to ‘inform’ the public. As Crombie himself claimed in his 1947 
report, government ‘information’ contained a single overriding purpose: to ‘help the 
Department to achieve its purpose’.101 That purpose, though it might have required 
‘information’ in order for consent to be given, was determined not by the people to whom the 
government directed its campaigns, but by those who acted, ostensibly, in their interest. 
Conclusion: The ‘Postwar System’ in Historical Context 
This chapter, which has explored the origins of the postwar ‘system’ of communication and its 
subsequent application to military recruitment, has revealed how key figures within the 
wartime and postwar governments tried to redefine official promotion in order to justify its 
continued existence as part of the administrative machinery of the state. Aware that any 
attempt to expand or continue the work of the wartime MOI would attract public censure, 
steps were taken to change how members of the public viewed the information services. The 
MOI was speedily wound up and replaced with an apparently innocuous successor billed as a 
‘technical’ production body; PRDs, whose existence can be traced to the interwar years and 
ultimately to the First World War itself, were renamed Information Offices – although certain 
ministries, including the WO, resisted this change. At the same time, the many vehicles of 
government promotion that had been developed in preceding years, including the ‘paid-for’ 
advertisements displayed on hoardings and in newspapers, the editorial publicity conveyed in 
print and on radio, and the public events designed to promote the government interpersonally, 
were couched in terms of a discourse of ‘information’ that sought to redefine advertising, 
public relations and propaganda as conduits of impartial facts. This discourse was evident in 
the kinds of language officials used, and in the ways in which the work of the information 
services was presented to the wider public and outside world. In a speech to journalists on 
June 15th 1964, Clark (by then Director General of the COI) captured the key tenets of this 
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redefinition well. Suggesting it was necessary to arrange a ‘flow of information out of as well 
as into official institutions’, he claimed governments not only had a ‘need to spread 
information...to oil the wheels of administration and...make new schemes work more 
smoothly’, but a ‘duty’. A 
democratic government has a duty of popular enlightenment. Members of the public 
need information in two capacities – as householders and consumers who have to 
find their way around a complicated and quickly changing world and as citizens who, 
without facts, cannot understand what is going on in public affairs and form their own 
opinions.102 
The terminology adopted by individuals like Clark suggested a willingness to conceal behind 
a facade of objectivity the rhetorical or promotional functions of government communications. 
Yet a closer analysis of how PRDs and the COI actually operated in the 1946-51 period 
suggests ‘information’ did not lead to a ‘new organisation’ of the information services. On the 
contrary, many of the practices and techniques associated with the business of military 
advertising in earlier times were continued in the postwar era. Just as they had done so 
during the 1938-39 period, the Services organised multi-media campaigns, and once again 
they lobbied both the BBC and the national newspapers to include the subject of recruitment 
as a regular news item. Admittedly, the scale of this work paled in significance when 
compared to the recruitment campaigns of the First World War (see chapters four and five), 
but after the decision to commit Britain to the Cold War the pace of promotion accelerated. 
Advertising campaigns were soon organised not just for recruitment for the conventional 
armed forces and the branches of the civil defence, but for the subject of rearmament as well. 
Conscription, a necessary component of Labour’s commitment to retaining a British colonial 
presence across the globe,103 was presented as a means of ‘protecting’ the nation.  
In the context of existing debates about the nature of government communications in the 
postwar era, the work of recruiters between 1946 and 1951 lends credence to the notion, 
advocated in separate accounts by Crofts, Tulloch and Grant, that there was actually a 
greater degree of continuity than change between the wartime and postwar information 
services. According to Grant, the campaign work of the post-1945 era could even be traced to 
the interwar period, with the war itself acting as a ‘catalyst for, rather than the source of 
change’.104 In the context of the history of military advertising, however, we can regard the 
reforms of 1944-51 as the first of two attempts in the postwar era to ‘rebrand’ how recruitment 
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advertising was perceived by members of the public. The second attempt, which occurred 
against a backdrop of large-scale reform of the military, will be examined in the following 
chapter which explores how WO and the MOD responded to the transition from a National 
Service to an all-volunteer Army with new advertising and public relations. 
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Chapter Nine 
Civilising the Services: Frederic Hooper, the 
Termination of Conscription and the 
‘Modernisation’ of the Military, 1957-63 
[Today] we are between two worlds, one dying and the other struggling to be born.1
                   Frederic Hooper, 1948 
A cartoon after the [1959 general] election showed the prime minister sitting back and 
saying “well, gentleman, I think we all fought a good fight” to the “colleagues” who 
had made victory possible – a motor car, a television set, a vacuum, and so on.2 
               T. O. Lloyd, 2002 
The notion that Britain stood on the precipice of a ‘new world’ became something of a cliché 
in the mid-20th century. Talk of a ‘new Jerusalem’ dominated the general election of 1945, 
and a similar theme was resurrected in 1964 after Labour promised to create a ‘New Britain’ 
forged from the ‘white heat’ of a scientific revolution.3 Politicians were of course in the 
business of making promises, and had a well-earned reputation for breaking them, but they 
were not alone in thinking (or at least asserting) that Britain was on the cusp of something 
new. Talk of a ‘space age’ infiltrated popular culture and the mass media,4 and newspapers 
and hoardings were filled with futuristic portrayals of everyday household items – washing 
machines, television sets, microwave ovens, and so on – that both symbolised and helped to 
create the modern ‘affluent society’.5  
Compared to the doom and gloom of the 1940s, this society seemed a brighter and altogether 
more prosperous place for many Britons, not least because it marked an era of full 
employment, high levels of economic growth and a series of sweeping technological 
advancements.6 Yet while there may have been a general sense that the world as a whole 
was moving forward, some observers felt that Britain as a nation had begun to lag behind.7 Its 
major continental rivals, France and West Germany, were in the ascendency, and the 
prospect of catching up with the great powers that had risen to the west and east of Britain’s 
shores had almost disappeared by the time the Soviet Union and the United States entered 
the space race.8 Britain barely had the wherewithal to develop its own nuclear weapons, let 
alone satellites, and spent a greater proportion of its GDP on ‘defence’ than its resources 
strictly allowed. In the first half of the 1950s, pressure grew on the government to slash 
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military expenditure, and by 1957 a new direction in defence policy had been announced by 
the Macmillan government. Billed as the ‘biggest change’ to military strategy in modern 
peacetime history, the Sandys Doctrine, as it has since become known,9 embodied the 
futurism of the times: National Service, which had defined the experiences of a generation of 
British men,10 would be terminated; the armed forces, swelled by various international and 
imperial commitments, would be slashed; and a new emphasis on ballistic missiles and a 
nuclear ‘deterrent’ would help to offset the reduction in the numerical strength of the 
conventional armed forces.11 
Judging by the reaction of the popular press, the Sandys Doctrine was a policy broadly 
supported by Britain’s media establishment. The Daily Mirror, which had campaigned for an 
end to conscription since 1956 and had even employed the military commentator Basil Liddell 
Hart to draft a ‘defence policy’ that pre-empted the government’s, responded to the 
announcement with dramatic imagery of nuclear weapons and guided missiles: high 
technology that came to symbolise the new age the military was apparently embarking on. 
The Times, usually an ardent supporter of British military power, also endorsed the reforms, 
claiming they would ‘balance the budget’.12  
However, while some journalists regarded the restructuring as a step in the right direction, the 
transition from a partly-conscripted to an all-volunteer military created a problem. Throughout 
the 1950s, and despite the reform of the ‘information services’ ushered in by Labour (see 
chapter eight), the Services and the Army in particular had struggled to attract enough 
regulars. From 1962 onwards, the scheduled date for the demobilisation of the last national 
serviceman,13 they would be expected to rely exclusively on volunteers to make up their 
respective trained requirements. Given the approach taken to recruitment by successive 
governments since August 1914, it is perhaps unsurprising that a series of advertising 
campaigns were planned for the 1957-1962 period.14 Yet that was not the only response to 
the ‘radical reappraisal’ of military policy demanded by the Macmillan government.15 At some 
point in the late 1950s or early 1960, Sir Frederic Hooper, an industrialist and industrial 
relations expert, was appointed by the War Office (WO) to carry out a review of their 
recruiting machinery and advertising and public relations activities. Author of a series of 
articles and a book on management practice, Hooper was not an advertiser in the mould of 
Hedley Le Bas (see chapter four) or a ‘scientist’ of the kind consulted by Social Survey (see 
[167] 
 
167 | P a g e  
 
chapter seven), but a businessman who had made a name for himself espousing a 
philosophy of management that regarded the welfare and wellbeing of workers as paramount 
to the success of all hierarchical organisations.16 That he was appointed to review military 
recruitment, with a brief to explore not just promotion but all aspects of military life, was in 
itself a remarkable development.  
In the summer of 1960 Hooper delivered his recommendations, in the form of two reports, to 
officials at the Ministry of Defence (MOD). Suggesting an exercise in ‘rebranding’ comparable 
to the reform of the information services undertaken by the Attlee administration, he proposed 
overhauling not just the presentation of the Army in the media but how recruits were trained 
and treated within the Services. Adopting a more expansive approach to the problem of 
recruitment than many of his predecessors, Hooper’s proposals were largely ignored by 
officials within the MOD, even though Hooper was himself credited with singlehandedly 
revolutionising the Army’s public ‘image’ and accelerating the rate at which recruits enrolled in 
a Times obituary.17 
A great deal has been written about the Sandys Doctrine and its relationship to the social, 
political and economic climate of 1950s and 1960s. Historians from David French to Frank 
Myers, to Martin Navias have examined different aspects of the termination of conscription,18 
and the subject has routinely figured in discussions on the rise of a ‘youth culture’ in Britain 
and in general social and political accounts of the period.19 Nevertheless, little is known about 
Hooper’s work for the military or how the Army responded to the events of 1957 with 
recruiting campaigns. Furthermore, though much has been written about the impact of the 
Sandys Doctrine on military strategy, no work has yet sought to trace the effect the doctrine 
had on the military’s advertising and public relations.  
This chapter, which explores Hooper’s reports and their place within military advertising in the 
years 1957-63, aims to fill in some of these gaps. Beginning with a discussion of Hooper’s 
philosophy of management as articulated in his published works, it continues to examine 
Hooper’s recommendations and their subsequent impact (or lack thereof) on military 
recruitment in the early 1960s. Arguing that Hooper’s reforms were for the most part 
disregarded by recruiters in the Army, it suggests the Army passed up the opportunity to (in 
Hooper’s words) embrace the ideals of ‘modernity’, preferring rather to continue the methods, 
techniques and practices it had utilised in earlier times. The rejection of the lion’s share of 
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Hooper’s proposals can help to reveal how the military dealt with the reorganisation and 
restructuring of the military initiated in 1957, and can also demonstrate how military recruiters 
responded to the challenges presented by the ‘affluent society’. 
Managing the Military: Civilianisation and a ‘Modern’ Approach to Recruitment  
Though it is unclear who appointed Hooper, one can speculate with a reasonable degree of 
accuracy as to why he was appointed. Managing Director of a major British company with a 
reputation for creative advertising,20 he was also known as a writer and lecturer on 
management studies and as an authority on what he called ‘internal public relations’: the 
ability to manage relations between employers and employees in large institutions.21 Since 
these relations were deemed crucial to the ability of the armed forces to attract recruits – the 
subject of discipline alone had spawned a full-blown parliamentary enquiry that reported 
before Hooper published his recommendations22 – Hooper’s ideas on reforming institutions 
had a clear utility to the ‘radical reappraisal’ of military organisation desired by the 
government. His experience of advising politicians, furthermore, which began with a post as 
Director of Business Training at the Ministry of Labour and National Service and included 
appointments on the Committee on the Employment of National Servicemen and the 
Resettlement Advisory Board, gave him an awareness of military procedure he would not 
otherwise have acquired working as an executive of a private company.23 
There was, it would be fair to say, a common theme running through all of these 
appointments. In the broader sense, they were concerned with the relationship between the 
armed forces and society; in the narrower, they explored the difficulties of moving from 
military to civilian life after a period of fixed service. Since Hooper was considered an expert 
on employment – his work for the Ministry of Labour centred on finding jobs for ex-
servicemen – he may have been picked to provide an insight into the shortcomings of the 
Services’ arrangements for attracting civilian recruits. However, whether he was chosen for 
his political experience, his commercial experience or both, there can be little doubt that 
Hooper based his recommendations – which appeared in two reports on military recruitment, 
the first on the enlistment of Other Ranks in the Army, the second on recruitment in the Navy 
and the Air Force24 – on the general philosophy of management articulated in Management 
Survey (1948). The latter book, originally published by Hooper in 1948 but re-released as a 
Penguin title in the same year he was appointed to advise the military, made a strong 
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argument for reforming the ways in which employers (or ‘managers’) liaised with their 
employees.  
At times like the present, when we are between two worlds, one dying and the other 
struggling to be born, the daily, quiet, common-sense human influence of sound and 
steady management may stabilise millions of people and thousands of homes without 
any fuss being made about it or indeed anyone recognising consciously that a job of 
such magnitude is being done.25 
Hooper’s conception of management was not unique, and had a precedent in the work of the 
Australian psychologist Elton Mayo. Mayo, whose studies of workers’ behaviour in factories 
inspired the ‘human relations movement’ in the social sciences,26 suggested that a change 
within western societies from the ‘village or small town type of social economy to the city or 
industrial centre type has occurred without attracting the attention of intelligent management’. 
Both the Great Depression and the second world war had demonstrated the drift within 
nations and between them ‘not only toward chaos but also toward anarchy’, and it was 
paramount for governments and corporations to reassert social order by recognising the 
importance of good leadership. This involved acknowledging the ‘social needs’ of workers 
and citizens, and it also required a greater degree of accountability within hierarchical 
institutions. As with Hooper, Mayo viewed ‘intelligent management’ as a solution to certain 
social problems and a safeguard against class conflict.27  
For Hooper, management was thus about more than simply exercising ‘power over’ 
subordinates. It was about changing the culture of a workplace to promote harmony between 
employers and employees. ‘Nothing’, he claimed, ‘has done more to widen and embitter the 
cleavage between capital and labour than the economic materialism of the last century, which 
degraded human beings into “hands”, into units in an economic structure’.28 This view, part 
and parcel of the post-war consensus ushered in by the 1945 Labour government, was 
articulated by a number of contemporaries; even Winston Churchill adopted a conciliatory 
approach to industrial relations that recognised the legitimacy of trade unions.29 Yet Hooper 
may have been the first to apply it to the military, at least in the context of the material 
examined in this thesis. Indeed, while calls for the improvement of the working conditions of 
soldiers and terms of service had been made before,30 few recruiters had publicly 
countenanced introducing a collectivist approach to military life. In this respect, Hooper’s 
recommendations for reforming the military are worth considering.  
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Management, Modernity and the Reform of Military Recruitment 
Hooper’s reports, which brought to a conclusion a review of enlistment that probably began in 
early 1960, were aimed for the most part at the Army. Though the second report described 
the organisation of recruitment in the Air Force and the Navy, it was considerably shorter than 
its predecessor; the Air Force and the Navy, according to Hooper, were ‘getting the recruits 
they need’ and were therefore spared comprehensive ‘criticism…of the methods by which 
they get them’.31 The Army, however, required nothing short of a complete overhaul of its 
recruiting machinery, and its public relations and advertising activities. The majority of 
Hooper’s recommendations concerned the former – how civilians were attracted to, 
processed at and subsequently trained by various military stations and depots – but since he 
considered public relations an activity that extended beyond the world of media 
representation he included many of his recommendations under the general category ‘public 
relations’.32 Moreover, though he took great pains to spell out the ways in which the armed 
forces could improve their ‘internal public relations’, he was clear that in order for recruitment 
to be successful a reliance on ‘ephemeral tricks’ and ‘artificial gimmicks’ would need to be 
abandoned.33 The Army, in short, would need to reform itself before it could begin advertising, 
and such an exercise in re-branding would require more than just a deft hand at presentation. 
Recruiting Machinery: The Need for Good First Impressions 
Each of the three Service departments maintained a number of recruiting stations or ‘depots’. 
Tasked with processing new recruits and liaising with individual members of the public, these 
depots performed an important function in the recruiting process.34 To enlist in the military, 
civilians had to visit one such depot to sign up; if interested in additional information – a detail 
that could not be obtained from advertisements, for example, or something that could not be 
gleaned from the news – they could consult the recruiting staff deployed within. Military 
advertisements actively encouraged civilians to visit their nearest recruiting station, having 
done so at least since the first world war, and all depots possessed an important promotional 
function: their staff, as Hooper said in the first of his reports, were effectively ‘unofficial Public 
Relations Officers’ tasked with presenting the Services in a favourable light.35 They were also, 
in the vast majority of cases, the first human point of contact between the civilian potentially 
interested in joining up and the serving soldier; the first place, that is to say, where civilians 
came into contact with members of the armed forces.36  
[171] 
 
171 | P a g e  
 
For Hooper, these depots were as important as advertising and public relations in the struggle 
to attract civilians to the forces. The first impressions of military life were gained there, and 
the staff civilians met would require what he called ‘social talents’ to ‘bridge the gulf between 
Army and civilian life’.37 A recurring theme in his reports and something that, as we have 
already seen, entered his work for the Ministry of Labour, civilian life was considered crucial 
for enticing men and women to the Services. With Britain on the cusp of an era of affluence, a 
so-called ‘golden age’,38 Hooper believed the Services should emulate all that was revered in 
the civilian world. Staff at the recruiting depots, furthermore, would need to convince 
prospective recruits that the values of military life chimed with their own aspirations and 
desires. The Services, however, already did this. The Air Force, regarded by Hooper as the 
best ‘recruiting system’ of the three, offered its recruiting staff a series of training courses 
designed to improve their powers of persuasion, gave control to its recruiting apparatus to a 
‘young Captain’, and ensured there was a regular turn-over of recruiters so that no member of 
staff served in depots for longer than three years. The Navy also delegated control of its 
machinery to a single Director, but its regional apparatus was overseen by retired officers ‘of 
middle seniority’ and recruiting staff were mostly older men.39 The Army, which according to 
Hooper possessed the worst of the three systems, decentralised its recruiting machinery, 
sharing the responsibility among the WO, the Adjutant-General40 and the Home Commands, 
and making recruitment ‘but one function among many’, a policy, he claimed, that ensured it 
lacked the ‘attention and encouragement’ it deserved.41 
As the largest of the three Services, the Army possessed the most voluminous recruiting 
machinery. As many as 128 recruiting depots were established in the United Kingdom, and 
while each of these stations was governed by a national policy dictated by the WO and the 
Adjutant-General Hooper believed their proliferation across Britain represented ‘too 
cumbersome a machinery’ for the job at hand. Echoing calls made between the wars for a 
more streamlined and centralised apparatus (see chapter six), he suggested adopting a 
system closer to the Air Ministry’s: overseen by a ‘central recruiting organisation specialising 
in its task’, and staffed with ‘officers and other ranks…[who would] receive a standard training 
in their duties designed to animate them with an esprit-de-corps [sic] and a sense of mission’. 
At the time, the Army pitted individual recruiting depots in competition with each other, with 
incentives offered for good results, and Hooper believed this created ‘wasteful rivalry’ 
between recruiters and a ‘duplication of effort’. Competition between staff in the same 
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organisation was anathema to his attitudes towards ‘internal public relations’, and Hooper 
proposed a more collaborative system of mutual cooperation. He also described in some 
detail the importance of making appointments. In the past, Hooper claimed 
the tendency has been for recruiting to be considered a dead-end job suitable for 
middle-aged officers and NCO’s [sic] who have not yet completed their engagements; 
for those considered in other ways unsuitable for combatant appointments; or for 
those who have already retired.42  
This gave an unfavourable impression of the Army, not least because it suggested a 
generational gap between recruiters and civilians. Keen to stress the importance of appearing 
‘modern’ (something that, he claimed, the RAF managed to do simply by being the youngest 
of the Services), Hooper recommended overhauling the Army and Navy systems to ensure 
recruiters were well versed in what he called (but did not elaborate on) ‘the problems of 
modern youth’.43 Young people had grown in both numbers and stature in Britain in the wake 
of the post-war baby boom, and had acquired a degree of economic and cultural power that 
their predecessors lacked.44 Since the Army required young men for the vast majority of its 
regular posts, a focus on youth was understandable. Yet there were other reasons for 
prioritising the ‘rising generation’.45  
By employing young people, the tri-Service could present itself as a youthful institution. By 
training young people to act as recruiting sergeants, it could improve its chances of recruiting 
their peers. The Air Force, which ran a series of courses designed specifically for this 
purpose, was again held up by Hooper as a model of good practice, partly because it sent 
recruiters on courses dedicated to teaching good communication practice and partly because 
these courses personally impressed Hooper (who attended three of them). Teaching 
recruiters to be aware of body language and facial expression might sound remarkable, but 
the other Services ran similar courses. The Navy even tasked its most ‘senior psychologist’ 
with training recruiters on the ‘technique of interviewing’ applicants, while the Army 
outsourced its training to an unnamed private ‘sales consultant’.46  
Hooper regarded the first of these courses as too ‘concentrated and specialised’ for its own 
good, and claimed the Army’s emphasis on ‘recruiting young men by means of “sales talk”’ 
undermined its activities.47 ‘Sales talk’ appears to have been a euphemism for conventional 
advertising pitches, and though Hooper did not discount advertising or promotion he was 
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unequivocal that such ‘talk’ cheapened the Services. Though he referred elsewhere to the 
business of recruitment as a business centred on the sale of a ‘product’,48 he did not 
advocate emulating the practices and techniques of private industry. Recruiters, on the 
contrary, should not regard their ‘work as a “sales job”, but as an exercise in public 
relations…[which] present[s] the facts about the [military] and the advantages of a Service 
career over civilian employment’. The emphasis on ‘facts’ might be interpreted as a product of 
the earlier attempted reform of the information services (see chapter eight), but it is clear from 
the context that Hooper regards public relations as something that involved more than just 
presentation. There could be no question of ‘pulling the wool over the eyes of prospective 
recruits’ because public relations ‘should never overtake reality’, and for this reason it was 
paramount that the Services did possess certain advantages over their civilian competitors.49 
How these advantages were conveyed in mediated promotion will be examined below. 
Public Relations, Advertising and the Importance of Being Earnest  
Many definitions of effective promotion had been articulated in the history of military 
advertising, but for Hooper the ‘true concept’ of public relations was an ‘ability to discover 
what grips the public imagination, coupled with the administrative skill necessary to meet this 
demand’.50 On the face of it, this definition was not unlike those articulated by military 
advertisers in earlier years (see chapters one and two) and it was similar in both tone and 
content to what the American commentator Walter Lippmann had to say about the 
‘manufacture of consent’ in the early 1920s:  
When public affairs are popularised in speeches, headlines, plays, moving pictures, 
cartoons, novels, statues or paintings, their transformation into a human interest 
requires first abstraction from the original, and then animation of what has been 
abstracted. We cannot be much interested in, or much moved by, the things we do 
not see. Of public affairs each of us sees very little, and therefore, they remain dull 
and unappetising until somebody, with the makings of an artist, has translated them 
into a moving picture.51 
Translating words into pictures and policies into stories became a lifelong concern of 
Lippmann’s, who, as Stewart Ewen has shown, was one of many early 20th century liberal 
commentators interested in the question of ‘how to mediate between the democratic 
aspirations of ordinary men and women and the conviction that elites must be able to govern 
without the impediment of an active or participatory public’.52 Public relations, according to 
Lippmann, was not simply about understanding the public mind. It was about manipulating 
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‘symbols’ and ‘pictures’ to transform what people believed.53 In America, this attitude served a 
clear purpose: the suppression of an increasingly vocal working-class. In Britain after 1945, it 
became, in the words of one official connected to the reform of the information services under 
Attlee, a ‘struggle of ideas’ involving governments on the one hand and those that they 
claimed to represent on the other.54 
Like Lippmann, Hooper believed in the power of media to transmit compelling messages, and 
recommended television to ‘tell a story of this kind’.55 Where he differed from Lippmann, 
however, was in the belief that public relations required more than just a deft hand at 
manipulating the press or constructing persuasive ‘pictures’. Public relations, for Hooper, 
demanded an appreciation and consideration of material conditions that would have seemed 
alien to Lippmann. Indeed, while the latter believed ordinary people were essentially irrational 
entities incapable of reasoned thought,56 Hooper was convinced that the targets of military 
recruitment campaigns would only respond to appeals if you gave them a presentation of 
Service life that was empirically accurate. ‘No campaign of public relations’, he claimed, ‘can 
succeed unless the product we are advertising is (a) good, and (b) all we say that it is’, and to 
that end the Army, Navy and Air Force were advised to look beyond the work of their 
information services to the material conditions that hindered further enlistment.57 
Many of these dissatisfactions and disgruntlements had already been unearthed by Social 
Survey (see chapter seven), but Hooper was more concerned with what he called the ‘image’ 
of the forces in public life. This image needed to be ‘brought more up-to-date’, and recruits 
would need to move beyond both the pre-war Regular Army (identified as ‘providing a career 
only for those unable to find fruitful employment in civilian life’) and the post-war National 
Service Army (‘too often…judged through the eyes of those who found its restrictions both 
irritating and frustrating’) to achieve this.58 In Management Survey, Hooper had spoken of a 
‘revolution whose full implications may be harder to assimilate than all the combined 
technological changes of the century’,59 and it is not hard to see the genesis of this idea in his 
reports, which announced new ‘habits of modern civilian life’ and a ‘modernity’ per se.60 In his 
book, Hooper suggested the ‘scales of power’ that balanced relations between employers and 
employees had ‘veer[ed] over from management to men’. ‘People’, he argued, ‘are no longer 
content to do as they are bid, just because they are told to. They will question and revolt if 
answers do not square with their views of sense and justice’, and individuals in positions of 
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power would do well to bear this in mind.61 The ‘strong-arm methods’ of the past, by which 
management exercised ‘“power over” the working group’, were being superseded by a 
‘modern conception’ of ‘“power with” the working group’, which heralded a greater degree of 
collectivism in the workplace, a rise in collective decision making or ‘joint consultation’, 
improved working conditions, better pay and the cultivation of a working environment where 
no employee 
dreads the return of Monday, hates work, goes to it reluctantly, feels exploited while 
doing it, wishes while at it that he was elsewhere, and would leave it gladly at once if 
it were not that he needed the money.62 
These ideas reflected a broader shift in attitudes and values associated with the post-war 
settlement,63 and were not, when Hooper wrote Management Survey, intended expressly for 
the armed forces. Nevertheless, when he reported on recruitment Hooper was explicit that a 
‘close parallel’ should be drawn ‘between what has taken place in industry since the war and 
what, in some form, ought to take place in the Army. Before the war’, he continued, 
‘employers relied on the threat of the sack as their main inspiration in getting men to work; 
today, no business can thrive unless there is mutual trust between employers and the people 
they employ’.64  
The need to cultivate ‘trust’ between new recruits and those who trained them was necessary 
not only because conscription was in the process of being phased out. In an ‘age of full 
employment’, Hooper claimed, the Services will be unable to attract volunteers if they 
continue to rely on what he called an ‘out-of-date code of discipline’.65 Discipline had been a 
concern of the armed forces for some time. Stories of authoritarian and dictatorial drill 
sergeants littered the press in the mid-1950s, and were among the critiques of National 
Service voiced by its detractors in the run up to 1957.66 Citing the Grigg Report of 1955, an 
investigation into the future manpower of the armed forces, Hooper identified ‘unnecessary 
parades…over-frequent kit inspections, guard duties which have no obvious purpose, [and] 
excessive fatigues’ as ‘breeders of discontent’ amongst the ranks. His solution was an end to 
those ‘irksome regulations and customs’ which clashed with the ideals of ‘modernity’ and an 
attitude towards discipline that reflected the civilian ‘way of life’.67 
On their own terms, these suggestions for the improvement of military recruitment departed 
radically from other suggestions for boosting enlistment considered in this thesis. Yet Hooper 
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did not stop there. The deployment of military police in public places was, he claimed, an 
‘instrument of intimidation’ which succeeded only in repelling potential recruits. Military 
language, examples of which were given as ‘fatigue’ and ‘desertion’, carried ‘undertones of 
menace and harsh discipline’, and would not compare favourably with the language of private 
industry. Court-martials were given similarly short thrift, because they represented the 
clearest expression of military authority, and because they amounted to ‘bad publicity for the 
Army’. The military’s intransigence, finally, and its general reluctance to introduce a system of 
‘joint consultation’ whereby ‘comments are invited from men on [the] means of achieving 
greater efficiency or of removing unnecessary causes of irritation’, was critiqued. The vision of 
an Army driven by collective decision-making destabilised the very concept of the command 
structure, and Hooper was careful to hedge his words. He did not, he claimed, wish to ‘raise 
the spectre of Soldiers’ Soviets’, or indeed to abolish discipline per se, but to  
emphasise that the modern soldier is an intelligent human being devoting his life to a 
career of supreme importance, and that he deserves to be treated as such.68 
Public relations, for Hooper, was not simply about changing perception; it was about changing 
the ‘reality’ upon which that perception was based. How his ideas were received by the 
military, and what impact they had on military recruitment, will be the subject of this chapter’s 
final section. 
Business as Usual: Promoting the Services After Hooper  
A week after Hooper’s reports were published, the Minister of Defence Peter Thornycroft 
called a meeting with the Secretary of State for War, Christopher Soames, to ‘consider what 
action should be taken to secure early improvements in recruitment’ for the Army.69 Hooper’s 
report, according to one official, had caused something of a stir in the WO, although not 
because of its call for an end to excessive discipline and a relaxation of military hierarchy. 
The one recommendation that had, in the same official’s words, ‘engendered’ the most ‘heat’ 
amongst recruiters was the centralisation of recruitment machinery,70 a proposal roundly 
rejected by Thornycroft, Soames and Soames’ successor, John Profumo. According to the 
latter politicians, it would take around 9 months for the centralisation of existing machinery to 
be imposed, by which point the ‘recruiting battle might well have been lost’. The Army had 
only recently decentralised its recruiting machinery, furthermore, after a centralised system 
controlled by the WO had been wound up in June 1958, and the existing system, whereby the 
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Home Commands oversaw recruitment in the country’s nine defence regions, was already 
apparently ‘highly centralised’ in nature.71  
The subjects of discipline and military hierarchy, on the other hand, were conspicuous by their 
absence. Indeed, beyond a brief reference to having ‘[o]ver-strict’ discipline ‘stopped’, neither 
subjects featured prominently both in the July 26th meeting and in subsequent 
correspondence between the various officials involved in recruitment. Since Hooper’s reports 
were intended for those who, through political office or military rank, dictated how the military 
was run, it is perhaps unsurprising that the latter issue was not raised. Of all Britain’s 
established institutions, the armed forces were most used to exercising ‘power over’ their 
subordinates, and showed little desire to relinquish this authority in the spirit of ‘modernity’. 
Indeed, in both the meeting and the correspondence between the various officials tasked with 
overseeing recruitment in the WO, only one reference to hierarchy was made in the official 
records: an oblique allusion to a ‘new outlook on our all-Regular Army’ which incorporated the 
Army’s ‘method of dealing with recruits’.72 
Where concrete suggestions were made, and where the vast majority of firm commitments to 
new policies appeared, was in the realm of advertising and public relations. Hooper had made 
it abundantly clear that recruitment drives should only proceed after certain ‘defects’ in the 
Services had been corrected. Claiming the aim of any recruitment campaign would be to 
present the military as ‘important, patriotic, manly and adventurous’, he had put forward 
television as the most appropriate medium for these purposes. Despite a convincing counter-
argument from a chief information officer, which indicated that any further reduction of the 
press advertising budget would ‘emasculate’ the entire campaign, steps were taken to 
introduce a programme of television advertising on an ‘experimental basis’ during 1960-61, 
and the BBC would also be lobbied (as in 1939 and 1946) to ‘make feature programmes of 
the Army at work overseas’.73 Within a few years, the three Services had begun producing 
films of their own, intended to be screened at cinemas and broadcast on television. Jubilee 
1912-62 (1962), Youth Gets Wings (1965), Jungle Lifetime (1965) and Falls Patrol (1966) 
were produced in conjunction with the Services’ Photographic Units, though there is evidence 
that the BBC was also involved in the production of at least one of these texts.74 
Since the work of British soldiers abroad was a matter of ‘public interest’, including 
recruitment material as part of the BBC’s normal schedule of programming was not hard to 
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justify. Yet recruiters were in little doubt that these texts were designed to promote rather than 
to inform and entertain in the Reithien sense of the words, and that they would form part of a 
wider recruitment campaign that made use of multiple media, including newspapers and 
posters.75 While television was increasingly prioritised, however, doubts were expressed over 
the direction of the campaign as outlined by Hooper. The Director of Public Relations at the 
WOclaimed it would be difficult to portray the Army as a life of a ‘manly, adventurous nature’ 
because the vast majority of soldiers led a life that was ‘anything but’ – ‘and this fact is well 
known throughout the country’. In keeping with Hooper’s general philosophy on public 
relations, the Director suggested the Army should be  
very careful not to present a brand image which is, in a considerable number of 
cases, not only manifestly, but also demonstrably, biased or untrue.76   
To ensure the Army’s ‘brand image’ cohered with public opinion, steps would need to be 
taken to improve pay, accommodation and leave, end excessive discipline, and water down 
hierarchy. Apart from a vague reference to keep the issue of ‘discipline in mind’, these 
reforms were not considered seriously. Indeed, of the five key proposals put forward by the 
MOD for improving recruitment, none concerned issues not directly connected to matters of 
media representation. The reluctance to implement Hooper’s proposals might be interpreted 
as a rejection of the fundamental principles of his approach to ‘management’, although in the 
absence of corroboratory evidence it is impossible to draw a firm conclusion. What can be 
determined, on the basis of production records and correspondence between recruiters is 
what impact the actual reforms had on military advertising.  
By 1961, it had become clear that the measures introduced by Soames had not produced the 
desired effect. While voluntary enlistment had increased, a development attributed to 
television advertising,77 wastage had also increased to such an extent that gains in enlistment 
were being ‘neutralised’ by poor retention. This was blamed partly on the right to purchase 
discharges, afforded to new recruits within the first three months of service, and steps were 
taken to remove that right with the introduction of a clause in the Army Bill.78 Other plans to 
reduce wastage included a relaxation of medical standards to decrease the quantity of 
discharges and a reduction of discharges per se, but these alone could not resolve the 
problem. The recruiting situation, according to Profumo, gave ‘rise to considerable concern’.79 
With the last National Servicemen scheduled to leave their posts in December 1962, and with 
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no new conscripts arriving to replace them, the Army required what Profumo called in a note 
to his staff a ‘new and radical attack on the whole problem of voluntary recruiting’ that 
involved a number of different campaigns.80 
 
Since this ‘attack’ hinged on proposals lifted from Hooper’s reports and from his work on the 
Committee on the Employment of National Servicemen, it would be inaccurate to describe it 
as ‘new’. Nevertheless, some novel proposals were put forward. Using the Territorial Army as 
a recruiting agent was suggested, because the ‘Territorial Army has the Regular Army at 
heart’,81 and an attempt to increase the recruitment of so-called ‘coloured personnel’ was also 
mooted. The latter suggestion presented problems for Thornycroft. While non-white recruits 
could fill the gap left by departing conscripts, questions were raised about the ‘loss of 
prestige’ the British Army would apparently suffer if it recruited too many non-white soldiers. It 
was even suggested, in fact, that by recruiting black soldiers in large numbers the 
government would effectively hinder the recruitment of their white counterparts. An informal 
(and entirely illegal) 2% limit of non-white personnel had been imposed on the Army,82 but the 
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pressures to meet the shortfall led the Minister of Defence to reconsider this figure. However, 
since the Army was not close to breaching it anyway, a debate on whether it should be 
increased was regarded by the latter politician as ‘academic’83. 
 
Women, turned to in times of shortages throughout the 20th century, were also the subject of 
a new recruiting drive. However, as with the appointment of ethnic minorities the Army was so 
far away from filling posts already allocated to them that any attempt to expand the role of 
women in the post-war Army ‘would not, even if they were available in sufficient numbers, 
assist in lowering the demand for men’.84 It was not until the late 1970s that women were 
permitted to occupy combat roles,85 and since their service was typically restricted to 
administrative, clerical or secretarial duties it was suggested that civilianisation of these kinds 
of posts – whether occupied by men or women – would represent a more profitable avenue 
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for increased enlistment.86 Hooper had of course called for a wave of civilianisation in 1956, 
although there were many problems associated with it, not least increased costs. While 
transferring military jobs to civilian ones would help reduce the overall number of military 
personnel, and would thus reduce the number of individuals the WO needed to recruit on 
conventional terms of service, civilians commanded higher salaries than soldiers, worked 
fewer hours, enjoyed more leave and were not obliged to work under the threat of court 
martial. While Hooper had claimed such a policy would bring the Services in line with modern 
conditions,87 it would thus also cost more, something that would be hard to justify given the 
emphasis placed on cost-cutting as a principal reason for abolishing conscription. 
 
In the event, the MOD did try to ‘devise new ways of linking the Army with the community’, 
largely by improving liaisons with schools and by expanding the ‘youth work’ soldiers 
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undertook in local areas. Such proposals, Thornycroft claimed in a note to the WO, 
represented ‘one of the best ways of putting the idea of an Army career into the minds of 
young men’,88 though like increased civilianisation and the recruitment of women it was not a 
particularly novel suggestion. Children had been targeted for apprenticeships, trainee 
programmes and military educational courses since the first Attlee government (see chapter 
eight), and the same programmes were offered to minors under successive Conservative 
administrations.89 In 1958, an intensification of recruitment activities in public schools was 
authorised after a decline in the quality of applicants. One official even claimed the 1957 
White Paper had precipitated the decline, though left no explanation as to why.90 In any case, 
according to Major-General Gordon Lennox only 10% of the current Cadet Force was 
deemed suitable for a future commission, a figure that threatened the ‘Army of the future’ 
being ‘officered largely by mediocrities’. The response of the WO was two-fold: redoubled 
efforts were made to improve recruiting in the so-called ‘officer producing schools’, and a 
headmaster was appointed as a ‘schools liaison officer’ to lobby schools.91  
Historically, the British Army had drawn a significant proportion of its senior staff from public 
schools, and had earned a reputation for elitism because of it. Yet while recruiters in the WO 
continued to regard private education as the best source of future ‘officers’, they required 
secondary technical and secondary modern schools for positions that were, by comparison, 
less glamorous. As mechanisation in the tri-Service increased, the demand for semi-skilled 
and skilled tradesmen – mechanics, technicians, machine operators and so on – also 
increased. Though the latter positions were precisely those earmarked for civilianisation, the 
armed forces maintained a network of schools, colleges and universities to train young men 
on the principles of military life well into the 1970s, and endorsed these institutions in official 
advertising.92 Between 1961 and 1962, for example, the RAF ran a series of advertisements 
in national newspapers aimed at entrants to the Service’s ‘university of the air’ at Cranwell, 
Lincolnshire, and at apprentices (for Other Ranks) for its various schools and colleges. Both 
kinds of advertisement emphasised travel, adventure and the importance of learning a trade 
or profession, and each, in its own way, stressed the importance of the future: applicants 
were continually informed of what to expect after completing their prospective courses. But 
what distinguished each kind of advertisement was where they were displayed. Promotions 
targeting officer entrants tended to appear in mid-market and broadsheet newspapers such 
as the Telegraph, while those aimed at Other Ranks were exhibited in the red-tops.93  
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The 1960s was a time of reform or ‘liberalisation’ in both secondary and higher education.94 
The tripartite system of schooling, whereby children were sent to different categories of 
schools on the basis of their performance in the 11+ examination, was partially overhauled 
under the 1964-1970 Labour government; new ‘redbrick’ universities were built; and leading 
technological colleges were rechristened ‘polytechnics’. The recruitment campaigns of 1960-
63 preceded these reforms, but they should not be divorced from the broader context with 
which they occurred. Prior to Labour’s return to power, Britain was said to be a ‘stagnant 
society’ that failed to embrace the ideals of progress, and was particularly reluctant to nurture 
the growth and development of science.95 A belief in a fundamental opposition to change 
provided the backdrop to the 1964 general election, and explains why Labour, after winning 
that contest in convincing fashion, proceeded to set up a Ministry of Technology to fuel the 
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‘white heat’ of the scientific revolution they had promised voters. It also explains why so many 
recruitment advertisements of the period conveyed lavish images of military technology – 
planes, tanks, helicopters and so on – that presented the armed forces as progressive and 
forward-looking vehicles of change. ‘The future is with the R.A.F.’ declared a series of 
recruiting advertisements released in 1962-1963 (see figures sixteen and seventeen), the 
implication being that by enrolling in the Service applicants would become part of that future.  
However, while the imagery and rhetoric of recruitment advertisements embodied the futurism 
of the times, the structures and practices of recruitment advertising remained intrinsically 
reactionary. Targeted via the newspapers their parents read, children were offered positions 
in the forces that recruiters believed befitted their social standing. With newspapers regarded 
as accurate barometers of social class and, by extension, military potential, those born into 
moneyed families were encouraged to join as commissioned officers while children of parents 
who did not read the so-called ‘quality’ papers were urged to apply for less prestigious 
positions. This approach to recruitment reflected long-standing attitudes towards social class 
in British society,96 and found expression in the language of recruitment advertisements. In 
texts displayed in the News of the World, the Sunday Pictorial and other popular newspapers, 
for instance, the target audience – ‘a trained man with a good trade’ – was inveigled on the 
assumption that he would want the same life for his son ‘when he is your age’.97 In a separate 
advertisement targeting officers, potential recruits were invited to apply to have a chance to 
become ‘future leaders’.98 Those attending training schools could expect a ‘valuable trade’ 
and ‘good money when so many of the necessities of life are provided free’,99 while their 
counterparts (and future superiors) in Cranwell were told to ‘take command’ by joining the 
‘executive arm’ of the RAF (see figures eighteen and nineteen).100  
Advertising, in this instance, was not so much a portent of a ‘New Britain’ as something that 
reflected, in Hooper’s words, the ‘struggle’ of the ‘New Britain’ to be ‘born’.101 Tensions 
between old and new, between parents and children, and between social class and social 
mobility were hallmarks of British society in the 1960s, and would erupt in the latter half of the 
decade in a series of protest movements involving feminists, students, anti-war activists and 
campaigners for nuclear disarmament.102 In the period immediately following the recruitment 
campaigns of 1960-63, Britain embarked on what is sometimes called a cultural revolution 
whose denunciation of the various pillars of the Establishment included opposition to the 
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Services. How the military responded to this revolution falls outside the scope of this study, 
and more work needs to be done to examine the response of recruiters to the ‘New Britain’ 
Howard Wilson prophesised in 1964. What can be concluded from the campaign work of the 
preceding years is that the image of military service presented in advertisements and public 
relations materials tried to embrace the broad currents of feeling that ran through British 
society, but that the methods of attracting recruits and of recruiting for the armed forces ‘of 
the future’, belied the modernity so frequently portrayed in the media.  
Conclusion: The Return to Voluntarism and the ‘Modernisation’ of the Military  
When the last National Serviceman left his post on May 1963, a new era in the British military 
armed forces commenced. The old partly-conscripted, partly-volunteer Army was drastically 
reduced in size as part of a series of reforms designed to ‘streamline’ the military and 
emphasise ‘strategic deployment’ over a global military presence. Excluding a number of 
small-scale ‘limited wars’, it was not until the 1980s that the new forces would be involved in a 
major military conflict. Before then, in a crucial transitional period between 1957 and 1963, 
steps were taken to reform how the military interacted and communicated with the wider 
civilian public. The Public Relations Departments that had been established during the 
interwar years (see chapter six) were part of this review, but its main inspiration came from a 
man who had no previous connection to military advertising. Sir Frederic Hooper, whose 
expertise lay in industrial relations and an approach to management that embodied the 
‘human relations’ movement of the 1930s and 1940s,103 was in many respects an unusual 
candidate to bring forward the ‘modernisation’ of the military. Though he had held various 
advisory positions on committees concerned with improving men’s transition from Service to 
civilian life, he had no experience in the area of trying to encourage civilians to switch to 
khaki. Yet his work for the military made, according to some, a vital contribution in the 
transition to an all-volunteer military. Recounting the ‘great success of the 1961-62 [recruiting] 
campaign’, the Times claimed it was ‘largely due to [Hooper’s] advice and imagination, and to 
the expert knowledge which he contributed’, that the military was able to make up the 
projected shortfall in recruiting numbers.104 
In light of the WO and MOD response to Hooper’s reports, historians might challenge this 
interpretation. The main substance of Hooper’s recommendations was not, after all, 
implemented. Suggesting that the Army should abandon unnecessary discipline, promote a 
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greater degree of equality in the ‘workplace’ and look to private industry and civil society for 
inspiration on how to treat its staff, Hooper painted a picture of a kind of armed forces that 
probably seemed alien t those in senior staff positions. While his recommendations for 
improvements in accommodation, pay and terms of service were not particularly radical – 
similar proposals had been recorded as early as 1904105 – dampening down military hierarchy 
certainly was, and ran against the grain of what had defined the armed forces as an institution 
for at least 50 years. The muted response to Hooper’s reports and the fact that most of the 
resulting ‘reforms’ centred on changing media representations rather than the material 
conditions of service, indicates that the projected ‘modernisation’ of the military only went so 
far. Rather than overhauling the ways in which the Services treated their staff, a series of 
measures were considered which in some cases veered towards desperation. National 
servicemen were implored to extend their terms of service with ‘bounties’, children were 
targeted for cadet programmes and educational courses before they had even left school, 
and women and so-called ‘coloured’ entrants were put forward as temporary replacements for 
absent men.106 The Army, in this instance, did not so much embrace the ideals of the ‘new 
Britain’ as follow the rest of Britain’s ‘Establishment’ in vigorously resisting change. 
Reflecting on the campaign work of 1960-63, we can argue that while advertisements 
conveyed a sense of modernity based on what seemed to be, at the time, a defining feature 
of a ‘new Britain’,107 the military recruitment machinery did not itself embrace the ideals of this 
society. In this sense, a tension between the image of the armed forces as conveyed in 
advertisements and the structure and organisation of the armed forces can be discerned in 
the early 1960s. 
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Chapter Ten 
Conclusion: Military Advertising in Perspective  
In 1998, a year into Tony Blair’s first term as British Prime Minister, a series of recruiting 
advertisements appeared on hoardings and in newspapers and magazines. Images of 
soldiers staring ominously into the distance under the now-famous slogan ‘Your country 
needs you’, these advertisements bore a striking resemblance to Alfred Leete’s original 
design save for one significant detail. In place of Field-Marshal Horatio Herbert Kitchener 
stood either Warrant Officer Ashok Kumar Chauhan or Captain Fedelix Datson of the Royal 
Artillery. Neither individual was regarded as a ‘military hero’ in the sense in which Kitchener 
once was,1 but more significant than their apparent lack of celebrity was the colour of their 
skin. Both Chauhan and Datson were black soldiers, and had been chosen to spearhead a 
recruiting campaign in Britain that specifically targeted ethnic minorities. This campaign, 
which was organised by the Ministry of Defence in conjunction with Saatchi & Saatchi, a 
major advertising agency, represented one element of the official response to mounting 
concerns that the armed forces were plagued with institutional racism. In 1997, after evidence 
had emerged of bullying and racial discrimination in the Household Cavalry the Ministry of 
Defence was threatened with a non-discrimination notice by the Commission for Racial 
Equality.2 The department’s response, and the fruit of its collaboration with Saatchi & Saatchi, 
was summed up in the small-print of the advertisements released the following year. ‘Britain 
is a multi-racial country’, they claimed, ‘[i]t needs a multi-racial Army’ (see figure twenty).3 
Designed to evoke a ‘patriotic response from those who might otherwise feel excluded from 
the national collective’,4 this campaign can serve as a useful reminder of the need to probe 
beneath advertisements to unearth the conditions of production and reception that surround 
and envelop them. Black soldiers in a predominantly white Army, Chauhan and Datson were 
chosen as figureheads of a recruitment drive not because they represented (as with 
Kitchener) past glories, but because they personified an image of a new and apparently 
inclusive Army that welcomed all recruits irrespective of ethnicity or heritage. This image was 
popularised through a range of mass and interpersonal media, and like the campaigns 
examined in preceding chapters was fashioned by a number of individuals working across 
several institutions. A special recruiting ‘cell’ comprised of ethnic minority personnel in the 
armed forces was set up in 1997, and by the close of that year pilot initiatives to target 
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members of ethnic minority groups had been launched in Newham, East London and 
Sandwell in the West Midlands. Chauhan, one of the figureheads of the campaign, would 
later move from the Royal Artillery to work as a recruiting officer himself, while Saatchi & 
Saatchi, an agency with an established history of working for politicians,5 would win an 
Effectiveness Award from the Institute of Practitioners of Advertising in 1999.6 Reflecting on 
the results of the campaign in the House of Lords, the Minister of State for Defence 
Procurement John Gilbert lauded the ‘considerable efforts which have been made over the 
last two years’ by the Ministry of Defence to stifle racial discrimination, and suggested that 
such efforts demonstrated the willingness on the part of the military ‘to make real, permanent 
progress’ towards racial equality in the ranks.7 
 
This was not the first time the armed forces responded to a problem in manpower by 
organising a recruitment campaign, and nor was it, as we have seen, the first time the military 
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turned to private enterprise to improve its ‘brand image’. From 1913 until 1963, the armed 
forces turned to advertising agencies and to promotion in general for all kinds of different 
reasons. During the First World War, the need to swell the ranks of the New Armies led to 
perhaps the largest advertising campaign in the history of the practice, and certainly the most 
extensive campaign examined in this thesis in terms of the number of advertisements 
produced and the number of recruiters involved.8 During the interwar years, and again in the 
postwar era, recruitment campaigns were waged to boost enlistment in the various branches 
of civil defence set up to protect Britain’s home fronts. From 1945 onwards, campaigns were 
organised not just for recruits but for controversial policies such as rearmament and 
conscription; and by the time National Service was phased out in the early 1960s a new 
attempt had been made to reform the Army’s image in order to attract youth.  
Ideas about promotion shifted during this period in line with changes to social, political and 
economic context. During the First World War, when the state lacked the in-house resources 
to organise large-scale recruitment campaigns it turned to the machinery of the political 
parties and to the expertise of private advertisers. In the interwar years, steps were taken to 
institutionalise government promotion with the formation of Public Relations Departments in 
the major ministries, institutions that would go on to be deployed, and subsequently adapted, 
in the 1938-39 and 1944-51 periods. By the postwar era, pressure on the incoming Labour 
government to justify the continued existence of government promotion led to an elaborate 
exercise of rebranding that endeavoured to portray all official publicity as a form of impartial 
‘information’. By the close of the following decade, the military and the Army especially was 
once more subjected to review, this time regarding its advertising and public relations work 
and the material conditions of military service.  
There are many parallels between the attempt to boost enlistment of ethnic minorities in 
Britain in the 1990s and the work of earlier recruitment campaigns. Perhaps the most obvious 
of these lies in the realm of media imagery and rhetoric; Saatchi & Saatchi, after all, made a 
conscious decision to play on intertextuality by resurrecting an historic and well known 
recruiting poster to suit the requirements of a new era. But apart from similarities in media 
form and function there lies an organisational equivalence. In 1913, as in 1998, individuals 
working across media and political cultures and as part of institutions produced promotion to 
try to effect a change in public opinion. Their work, referred to in this thesis with the phrase 
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‘military advertising’, involved not only conventional (that is, ‘paid-for’) advertising, but public 
relations, news management and (after 1940) public opinion polling as well. Carried in 
newspapers, magazines, leaflets and films, on posters and television, over the airwaves and 
via public meetings, marches and rallies, military advertising infiltrated virtually every channel 
of mediated communication utilised in Britain in the first half of the 20 th century. Though it is 
difficult to pass judgement on the impact this work might have had – any evaluation of its 
‘effects’ runs against the grain of media studies9 – the very fact that it appears to have 
occurred warrants historical attention. Recruitment campaigns and the discursive practices 
associated with them represented important interventions into civil society and the public 
sphere, and this thesis has tried to examine how they came into being and evolved.  
Theorising Military Advertising: ‘Effects’, Promotion and Production  
As the case of the original ‘Your country needs you’ suggests military advertisements have 
been implicated in some of the key debates regarding the relationship between war and 
society, advertising and democracy and politics and the mass media. Artefacts that 
apparently symbolise the ‘national self’,10 they both celebrate the common soldier and 
implicitly or explicitly castigate those who choose not to enlist.11 A great deal has been written 
about these artefacts, particularly in the literature on the First World War poster which, 
according to Joseph Darracott and Belinda Loftus, perpetuated a ‘psychology’ whose 
‘undertones’ may not have been recognised by the audiences to whom they were directed. 
‘Today’, Darracott and Loftus wrote in 1981, ‘a constant barrage of publicity has created a 
critical awareness of the means of persuasion which must then have been largely absent; 
further, our eyes can translate a more abbreviated visual language and often find war posters 
over-emphatic’.12 Given the rate at which posters were produced during the Great War, with 
one estimate suggesting that the government alone produced 11,886,560 copies of 164 
designs,13 it seems likely that the eyes of past observers were also subjected to a ‘constant 
barrage’ of publicity; and recent research into the history of commercial advertising has 
suggested that this ‘barrage’ predated the war by many decades.14 Yet it also seems 
probable that these advertisements affected onlookers in different ways according to the 
beliefs and principles they ‘brought’ to them, and that onlookers themselves were actively 
involved in deciphering their imperatives. The response of certain New Army soldiers to 
recruiting images is well-known: having faced the ‘enemy’ in the trenches, they regarded the 
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means used to ‘sell’ the war with ironic bemusement. ‘Your country needs you’ became a 
stock phrase in the trenches, although not a phrase that was used to inspire patriotism: 
By 1915 British soldiers were already using the catchphrase ‘Kitchener Wants You’ 
whenever anyone was selected for an especially filthy job or a particularly dangerous 
duty, and this was not the only such adaptation from the recruiting campaign. The 
slogan ‘Remember Belgium’...was also used by soldiers with bitter irony, often 
attracting the reply ‘As if I’m ever likely to forget the place!’15 
Recent historical scholarship has revealed the complex ways in which civilians interacted with 
and responded to recruitment advertisements,16 and combined with the shift within media 
studies from self-contained messages to polysemic ‘texts’ capable of being interpreted in 
myriad ways suggests the approach to studying recruitment advertisements for their ‘effects’ 
is beset with limitations. Audiences, media theorists have been keen to point out,17 do not 
absorb the meanings imprinted onto media texts unconsciously, but are rather active 
contributors to the process of meaning making. Such findings suggest the need to move 
beyond ‘effects’ to other aspects of promotional culture, and to move beyond advertisements 
themselves, which remain only part of what marketing theorists sometimes call the 
‘promotional mix’,18 to other kinds promotion and communication. Advertisements are part of 
wider recruitment campaigns, and campaigns themselves are products of what James Aulich 
has called the ‘shifting and symbiotic relationships’ between governments, armed forces, 
commercial culture and the media industry in Britain in the 20th century.19 
This thesis has chosen as its main subject area the work that goes on behind recruitment 
advertisements, and has thus eschewed questions of media texts in favour of analyses of 
media institutions. Offering a history of military advertising rather than a history of military 
advertisements,20 it has placed a particular primacy on the institutions, individuals and 
discursive practices involved in the production and dissemination of advertisements rather 
than the vehicles through which promotion was ‘carried’ or conveyed. An account rooted in 
the perspectives and experiences of those who produced and planned military advertising, it 
has explored a range of recruitment campaigns waged in Britain in the first half of the 20th 
century, as well as some of the institutions, policies and social developments associated with 
these campaigns. This approach has emphasised the interactions, interrelations and 
connections that lie beneath advertisements, and has entailed an examination of a number of 
activities not usually considered part of advertising. Under the umbrella of military advertising, 
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it has explored public relations, opinion polling, aspects of manpower policy and the broader 
role of politicians and civil servants in the government’s ‘information services’. These 
subjects, where they have been discussed, have tended to be explored in relation to detailed 
case studies, or as part of analyses that only indirectly relate to the subject of armed forces 
mobilisation.21 There remains no wide-ranging history of military advertising. 
Furthermore, in accounts that do consider recruitment advertising historians have often 
pointed to a lack of sophistication and complexity of recruitment campaigns. This strain of 
criticism is evident in some of the commentary on ‘Your country needs you’, and it is also 
apparent in accounts of the development of war propaganda which have tended to overlook 
the subject of recruitment. Since the 1960s, various arguments have been put forward to 
explain the emergence of propaganda in Britain in the 20th century. One argument, found in 
the work of Arthur Marwick, Cate Haste, Peter Buitenhuis and Lloyd Clark, has suggested 
that the business of recruitment advertising during the First World War was a matter of mere 
‘routine’ when compared to the more significant and apparently more portentous activities of 
the wartime propaganda agencies.22 Another argument, voiced by authors such as Phil 
Taylor, Iain McLaine and Michael Balfour although convincingly critiqued by Mariel Grant, has 
contended that, apart from the work associated with the ‘projection of Britain’ to foreign 
nations and the planning of the Ministry of Information (MOI), little propaganda work was 
carried out in the interwar years.23 Yet another argument, critiqued by both William Crofts and 
John Tulloch, has suggested that the postwar era signalled an end to large-scale propaganda 
work, with only the clandestine Information Research Department (an anti-Soviet, Cold War 
propaganda agency) continuing the work of the wartime information services.24 
The research presented here has critiqued these interpretations and, following in the 
footsteps of Crofts, Tulloch and Grant, has sought to examine the under-explored and, for the 
most part, under-theorised work of military recruiters. Moving beyond the established 
propaganda agencies, most of which have been subject to detailed historical monographs, it 
has shined a light on organisations such as the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee (PRC) 
(1914-15), the Caxtons Publishing House (1913-15), the Department of Recruiting (1915), the 
Irish Recruiting Council (1918), the Public Relations Departments of individual ministries 
(circa 1938-63), the Central National Service Committee (1938-39), Social Survey (1940-60), 
the Central Office of Information (COI) (1946-63), the myriad Information Services 
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Committees (1948-51), and the Defence Publicity Programme (1948-51). In addition to these 
institutions, it has also explored the role of individuals in the production and planning of 
recruitment campaigns, from Eric Field and Hedley Le Bas during the First World War, to Sir 
John Anderson and Sir Humbert Wolfe during the interwar years, to Herbert Morrison and Sir 
Alan Barlow in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, to Sir Frederic Hooper in 
the transitional period in the 1950s/1960s when National Service was gradually phased out. 
The kinds of promotion produced by these organisations and individuals, and the extent of 
their role in the development of new forms of political communication, should not be 
overestimated. Nor should the complexity of the work in which they engaged. Recruitment 
campaigns were structured events organised by a range of participants and stretching across 
a number of institutions. Involving ‘outside’ advertisers or experts and internal institutions they 
cannot be dismissed as purveyors of ‘fairly routine’ activities or as attempts to manipulate 
opinion that lacked the ‘organisation’ of other forms of communication.25 In the case of the 
PRC, (admittedly an exceptional example) the scale on which promotion was carried out 
rivalled any campaign of propaganda or information, governmental or otherwise, in Britain in 
the 20th century.26 However, though the PRC has attracted a wealth of attention, perhaps 
because of the scale of its work and perhaps because of its connection to two of the war’s 
most famous images, other institutions have been cast to the fringes of historical writing. 
Furthermore, while the PRC has inspired a number of case studies, the lion’s share of 
historical writing on it – as with military advertising in general – has been dedicated towards 
detailed textual analyses of its poster and leafleting work. This emphasis on advertisements 
rather than advertising has served to distract historians’ attention from other aspects of its 
operations, and has contributed to the enduring belief that no major attempts were made to 
manufacture opinion during the early stages of the First World War.27   
Techniques of Persuasion and Discourses of Promotion  
Interpreted in this light, the history of military advertising can be used to challenge existing 
understandings of the emergence of propaganda in Britain in the 20th century. Yet it also 
carries important implications for how historians understand the development of advertising 
and public relations. In the literature on promotional culture, advertising and public relations 
tend to be studied as forms of commercial communication that originate in, and help to 
sustain, private enterprise (see chapter two). Though some research has been done 
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examining the interrelations between the commercial and the political in the literature on the 
war poster, this has tended to offer a history of advertisements rather than a history of 
advertising.28 Furthermore, while the field of promotional culture has itself expanded in recent 
years to consider a range of promotional activities not directly connected to the development 
of commercial communication,29 the field of military promotion remains under-developed and 
under-theorised when compared to its commercial counterpart. In both the literature on war 
propaganda and the literature on promotional culture, in other words, there has been a 
marked tendency to overlook or undervalue the subject of military advertising, although some 
work has been carried out into the use of military advertising in the present day.30 
Through a series of case studies, this thesis has show the wide variety of promotional 
techniques used by recruiters and the prevalence of promotion in matters of recruitment. 
These case studies explored different aspects of military advertising, and though several 
points of intersection linked them together each case study was intended to function as a 
discrete ‘snapshot’ that revealed what Liz McFall has (elsewhere) called the ‘diverse, 
haphazard, and uneven array of institutions [and] practices...adapted to fit specific contextual 
circumstances at different historical moments’.31 This approach has called attention to the rich 
variety of techniques, methods and devices adopted by recruiters in the 1913-63 period. 
As chapters four-five demonstrated, the authorities organised not only a major poster and 
leaflet-based recruitment campaign, but a series of activities that transcended the normal 
parameters of conventional advertising. The Householders’ Return and the canvassing of the 
British population conducted on behalf of Lord Derby’s ‘group system’ of voluntary enlistment, 
for example, represented an early attempt at gathering information on the targets of 
government promotion. They were also important in laying the groundwork for conscription: it 
was only by surveying the population that the government established a rough estimate of 
how many men would be available for service in the advent of conscription. The recruiting 
meetings and rallies which made up a significant proportion of the PRC’s campaign, 
meanwhile, demonstrated a willingness to move beyond the ‘paid-for’ publicity produced by 
Caxtons to public spectacles designed to catch the eyes of passersby. These ‘spectacles’ 
performed an important function in recruitment promotion, which was conveyed both 
interpersonally and in mass media. The formation of Joint Recruiting Committees, on the 
other hand, provided a link between central and local government, while the attempt to insert 
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recruitment promotion into the newspapers as an ordinary ‘news’ story demonstrated the 
close relationship recruiters shared (or at any rate tried to share) with journalists. 
Chapter six illustrated that many of the devices and techniques adopted by recruiters would 
be continued into the interwar era, but it also revealed the general proficiency of recruiters 
when working across several departments for the same campaign. Involving multiple media 
and multiple institutions, the idea of a ‘people’s war’ was carried in a range of ‘paid-for’ and 
‘above-the-line’ promotions, including the National Service Guide (printed and distributed to 
every householder in the country using the machinery of the Stationary Office and the Post 
Office); a series of oratorical speeches to the public by senior politicians and civil servants; a 
new batch of local committees equivalent to their PRC predecessors; a Central National 
Service Committee comparable to the PRC; a programme of public meetings and events, 
held both locally and nationally; advertisements carried in the national newspapers; 
promotional material conveyed in the programming of the British Broadcasting Corporation 
(BBC); and, to round the entire campaign off, an important march or ‘Royal Review’ held in 
Hyde Park in London in the summer of 1939. 
In the early stages of the Second World War the government sought to work out more 
accurate ways of monitoring and measuring public opinion, and chapter seven explored this 
topic. In the run up to the war, most attempts to divine public opinion centred on ‘inferring’ that 
opinion indirectly. As Angus Calder remarked in The People’s War (1969), the ‘old 
gentlemanly notion that the Government was doing all right if the habitués of London clubs 
approved of it’ provided Westminster with its ‘connection’ to mass opinion, and politicians also 
took to reading opinion pieces in newspapers in an attempt to ‘read’ public opinion via the 
material they could find in the press.32 The unique strains placed on the government during a 
total war encouraged a review of these informal procedures, and Social Survey was formed in 
1940 to monitor public opinion inspired by the work of commercial advertising agencies, 
which had carried out ‘research’ on behalf of clients since at least the 1920s,33 and by the 
‘mathematical statistics’ favoured by key figures in the London School of Economics. Applying 
this method to the subject of recruitment helped to create a new discourse of advertising 
effectiveness that portrayed promotion as something that could be measured and predicted 
using methods derived from the ‘science’ of statistics. 
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Chapters eight and nine, finally, highlighted the willingness on the part of governments to 
apply the methods and techniques of recruitment advertising to policies related to it, and to 
consider reforming these methods and techniques to suit the requirements of new situations. 
When the decision to extend conscription into the postwar era was made, for instance, steps 
were taken to promote that policy as a sensible means of ‘replacing the lock on the door’.34 
When a substantial rearmament programme was ordered by the first Attlee government, the 
staff at the information services were ordered by Morrison to use their ‘ingenuity’ to get 
‘stories of news value into the press, on the wireless, and in other media’ that portrayed that 
policy as a level-headed decision.35 More committees were established during this period, 
and the COI was formed as an in-house advertising agency that could be used by any 
department that saw a need for it – recognition of the continued importance of state 
advertising. Newspapers and the BBC were lobbied, a ‘continuous flow of information and 
explanation’ designed to foster ‘understanding and goodwill between the [armed] forces and 
the general public which they serve’36 was orchestrated, and a more expansive approach to 
public relations within the Services was considered but rejected in the 1960s. 
As well as making a contribution to general historical understandings of the development of 
advertising, propaganda and public relations, these techniques and methods can shed light 
on a series of specific ideas and concepts associated with the historiography of contemporary 
Britain. The work of recruiting organisations in England, Scotland and Wales during the First 
World War may explain why those countries experienced a prolonged bout of ‘war 
enthusiasm’. In Ireland, the difficulties recruiters faced in the wake of the Easter Rising might 
be interpreted as evidence of the profound social, political and religious changes that 
occurred in that country after 1916. At the tail-end of the interwar years, the government’s 
attempts to cement the idea that Britain would be fighting a ‘people’s war’ should conflict with 
Germany resume may explain why that notion was popularised widely during and indeed after 
that war had actually taken place. By the same token, the emergence within government of 
an internal opinion polling agency and its subsequent continuation after the war can be used 
as evidence that the war changed how political leaders and civil servants viewed and 
understood public opinion. The attempt by the postwar Attlee governments to redefine official 
promotion as a form of ‘information’, and the subsequent role of advertisers and public 
relations officials in promoting rearmament, conscription and Cold War-era recruitment 
campaigns can shed light on a series of reforms not often associated with that government. 
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Finally, the response taken to the termination of conscription in 1957 can show how the 
armed forces used promotion to try to convey an air of ‘modernity’ to the Services that was 
designed to appeal to the changing customs and habits of Britain’s ‘affluent society’.  
Researching Military Advertising: Archival Research and Discourse Theory 
Crucial to each case study, and to this thesis as a whole, has been a reliance on a range of 
archival materials. In order to get to grips with how recruitment campaigns were planned, 
organised and executed at particular historical moments, a decision was made to consult the 
holdings of the Public Records Office, the Imperial War Museum and the British Library (see 
chapter three).37 The review of the resources held in these institutions revealed an uneven 
spread and diffusion of sources, with the Public Records Office holding vast quantities of 
records on various aspects of recruitment advertising, and the Imperial War Museum and the 
British Library holding a small number of recruiting advertisements and other texts. The 
historical reconstruction of military advertising made extensive use of these records, and each 
chapter could not have been written without the range of archival sources that have been 
incorporated into the thesis and studied through the prism of discourse analysis. 
In this respect the work of McFall, Anne Cronin and Guy Cook proved particularly important. 
All three authors stressed the importance of the notion of discourse when studying 
advertising, and from their writings several concepts and theories were taken and applied to 
the research presented here. McFall’s Advertising: A Cultural Economy (2004), which made a 
case for a discursive history of commercial advertising that eschewed a developmental or 
‘teleological’ narrative in favour of one that shows ‘what it is possible to think, say and do 
under various contingent conditions’, has been especially important.38 Yet it has also drawn 
from the writings of Cronin, which suggest that the business of advertising was constructed 
through and by discourses that determined at any given moment how promotion was 
practiced and organised, and from Cook’s The Discourse of Advertising (1992) which 
provided a method for analysing discourse that sought to place the language of 
advertisements into the wider social, political and economic context of its use.39 
These authors have all restricted their analyses to studies of commercial communication, but 
comparable methods can be applied to the history of recruitment advertising. This thesis has 
made an effort to combine discourse theory (or rather theories of discourse) with archival 
research. This approach has not gained currency in the literature on war propaganda (which 
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may explain why the commentary on military advertising emanating out of that discipline 
tends to be restricted to advertisements), but it has gained traction in the study of promotional 
culture. Envisioning discourse as a means of analysing the relationship between language 
and social action and as a social construction of reality that determines not only what it is 
possible to say at any given moment in time but what is excluded and prohibited from 
discussions, this methodology has been applied to the various records this thesis examined. 
These records have included, but have not been limited to, memoranda, production logs, 
letters of correspondence, minutes of meetings, reports, memoirs, autobiographies, opinion 
polls, White Papers, newspaper articles, and a host of original advertisements. When studied 
together, these sources can provide an insight not only into how recruitment campaigns were 
planned and organised but how recruiters viewed advertising, and how ideas towards 
advertising shifted and changed across the six case studies. 
Furthermore, though McFall, Cronin and Cook approach the subject of discourse from 
different epistemological frameworks – with McFall and Cronin operating very much within a 
Foucauldian perspective and Cook adopting a critical discourse stance – this thesis has 
incorporated elements from the writings of all three authors. In that respect, it has advocated 
an interdisciplinary approach towards the study of military advertising that cuts across many 
of the epistemological boundaries that have separated the literature on promotional culture, 
war propaganda and social and political history. Key to this approach was the recognition of 
the importance of social, political and economic context which shapes how military advertising 
was thought about and produced and how its discourses were constructed and maintained. 
Limitations of the Present Study and Criticisms of its Methodology  
As with all historical research, the findings presented here are open to criticism. The 
emphasis placed on the planning and organisation of campaigns has diverted attention from 
their subsequent execution; there is a difference, after all, between how promotion worked in 
theory and how it worked in practice. Furthermore, though studies of advertisements have not 
been excluded from the analysis, they appear with less frequency than studies of advertising, 
and although the case study on Social Survey tried to introduce the problem of audience 
reception this thesis cannot be used to demonstrate how audiences responded to recruitment 
campaigns or adapted and appropriated the ‘messages’ they received from recruiters.  
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A third criticism centres on the use and application of sources. In offering a discursive history 
of military advertising, this thesis has placed great stock on archival sources and on the 
holdings of the Public Records Office in particular. The records that have been accessed via 
the latter institution have given a particular shape and complexion to the research presented 
here, and even though every effort was made to use a variety of sources (and to counteract a 
general overreliance on archival sources by consulting academic literature) there can be little 
question that each case study was fundamentally reliant on the kinds of ‘official’ records 
preserved in the archives. Here some general observations can be made about the nature of 
these records and their limitations. Most of the material on recruitment campaigns is written 
prior to these campaigns occurring; though some documents are written retrospectively (that 
is, looking back at recruitment work) the majority serve to sketch out what will or might 
happen. Of the records that do describe the consequences or ‘results’ of recruitment 
campaigns, both the ‘official’ reports found in the Public Records Office and the ‘unofficial’ 
memoirs and autobiographies found elsewhere have tended to exaggerate and embellish the 
apparent ‘effects’ of recruitment advertising. This is not surprising – recruiters were paid to 
change people’s minds, after all, and were prone to claiming great success at doing so – but 
it should nevertheless serve as a reminder of the fallibility of these kinds of source.40 Last but 
not least, the ways in which records have been preserved has influenced how the research 
was carried out. The Public Records Office, as chapter three noted, has tended to separate 
records of advertisements from those pertaining to the business of advertising. This has 
reinforced the distinction between advertisements and advertising, and while this distinction 
has been accepted it has had the effect of excluding a great deal of valuable archival 
material. Hundreds of advertisements stored in the archives have not found their way into this 
thesis, many of which could have formed the basis of new case studies.  
A fourth criticism, and one relevant to the structural composition of the thesis, can be directed 
towards the case studies that were chosen. As we have seen, each case study grew out of a 
preliminary survey of archival materials, and all were chosen in the initial stages of the 
research and subsequently redrafted after an analysis of available literature. As in all wide-
ranging analyses, some case studies are more effective than others. Chapter seven, for 
instance, stands alone as an analysis on opinion polling and therefore departs to some 
degree from the main subject area of the thesis. It is also heavily reliant on a small selection 
of official files created between 1940 and 1945 which, though they provide a good indication 
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of the particular method Social Survey took towards studying public opinion, reveal 
comparatively little about how this method was appropriated by military advertisers. By 
examining Ireland, chapter five also embarked on something of a detour, although unlike 
chapter seven this detour concerned social context. Ireland, as a quick review of the 
historiography reveals, was a world apart from the rest of Britain towards the end of the war, 
and one might question why it appeared as a standalone chapter in a thesis on Britain. By the 
same token, it is worth asking why no other studies of Irish recruitment advertising were 
carried out; there is evidence that recruiters targeted Ulsterman during the Troubles.41 
A fifth and final criticism might be levelled at the length of the sample considered during this 
thesis, and at the particular approach taken towards dividing up and categorising that sample. 
Each chapter, as we have seen, was intended (following McFall) as an individual ‘snapshot’ 
of military advertising, and no attempt was made to impose a ‘teleological’ narrative onto all of 
them. Yet in order to write a single thesis a number of connections between the case studies 
needed to be drawn. These connections – such as the development of Public Relations 
Departments during the interwar years and their subsequent continuation into the postwar era 
– may stand at odds with the notion of a history composed of self-contained ‘snapshots’. 
Since there is a degree of continuity between the case studies, furthermore, it seems 
reasonable to ask what happened between the various periods considered in this chapter. 
There is some evidence, for example, that the British army continued recruiting in Britain in 
1919,42 although it is unclear how it did so; the wartime machinery for recruitment had been 
wound up, and even the Caxtons Publishing House had folded by the end of the war.43    
Contrasting Interpretations and Implications for Future Research 
With these criticisms in mind, it is worth briefly considering what kind of alternative 
explanations might be given for the research presented here. One of these explanations 
could emphasise the power recruiters exerted over the targets of their campaigns. Recruiters 
used a wide variety of techniques and devices to get the subject of enlistment into 
newspapers, onto television screens and over the airwaves, and it is not beyond the realm of 
possibility that this promotion affected its audiences. To demonstrate this kind of ‘effect’, more 
research would need to be carried out, perhaps by consulting the diaries of servicemen and 
servicewomen. In With a Machine Gun to Cambria (1969), a servicemen’s account of the First 
World War written by George Coppard, an overt example of the kind of influence recruiters 
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had was recounted by the author: ‘Rumours of war broke out and I began to be interested in 
the Territorials… News placards screamed out at every street corner, and military bands 
blared out their martial music in the main streets of Croydon. This was too much for me to 
resist, and as if drawn by a magnet I knew I had to enlist straight away’.44  
Another explanation might take a conflicting stance by maintaining that the accounts of 
military advertising given by its practitioners were deliberately exaggerated, because it was in 
the interest of recruiters to overstate the scale and reach of their work. Though certain kinds 
of promotion have left an identifiable trace for historians – posters have been preserved by 
the Imperial War Museum; newspaper advertisements can be found in digitised archives and 
in library microfilms – other kinds have not. The subject of ‘editorial publicity’ is particularly 
hard to trace because of the manner in which authorship is deliberately concealed. Recruiters 
were routinely keen to stress the acquiescence of newspaper editors and journalists to 
include promotional material in articles and editorials, but it is impossible to tell whether 
articles that advocated enlistment were produced under the influence of political pressure, or 
whether they were written independently of government duress. 
By eschewing the notion of media effects, this thesis has left such questions unanswered, 
and more work clearly needs to be carried out to fill in some of the gaps that have appeared. 
At the same time, the research presented here carries important implications for how we 
understand the use of promotion in Britain in the 20th century. Whether it was ‘effective’ or 
not, existing explanations do not do justice to the breadth and range of recruiters’ work, which 
extended from national to local government and from the state itself to private enterprise.  
As noted above, some historians have sought to account for the rise of ‘modern’ propaganda 
by describing the unique pressures placed on the state by total war, but attempts to mould 
and fashion public opinion actually began before the Great War commenced, and before any 
of the major propaganda agencies had been formed. Certain commentators on commercial 
advertising, on the other hand, have tended to regard early forms of advertising as somehow 
less sophisticated attempts to mould public opinion as those found in later years of the 20th 
century. The history of military advertising presented here challenges both arguments by 
highlighting the myriad ways in which governments tried to attract men, women and even 
children to the armed forces and civil defences. The techniques, methods and devices of 
persuasion deployed by recruiters cannot be explained solely by the development of modern 
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political propaganda, but nor can they be accounted for with resource to the ‘language’ of 
commercial advertising identified by Nicholas Hiley.45 They came about, rather, because of a 
symbiotic relationship of the state and private industry which not only changed the ways in 
which the military was represented in the mass media, but also collapsed the distinctions that 
had historically prevailed in British society between public and private, politics and commerce 
and military and industry. This symbiosis extends beyond the world of mass media 
representations to the many institutions of Britain’s ‘warfare state’, as the military historian 
David Edgerton has made clear in a spate of recent publications. Perhaps it is high time, as 
Edgerton argues, to do away with the vocabulary used to describe how the state operates, 
vocabulary that tends to emphasise the dichotomies and oppositions that distinguish 
government from private industry, to demonstrate instead interactions and connections.46  
It remains only to be said that the material examined here is only one part of a wider range of 
‘official’ promotion that extended far beyond military recruitment. In the First World War, 
campaigns for war loans, tobacco funds, recruitment to essential (war) industries, and various 
charitable causes were organised, with either direct or tacit state support. In the interwar 
years the various socio-economic problems caused by the Great Depression led to more 
permanent attempts to ‘manufacture’ or ‘engineer’ consent. In the postwar era, social and 
economic reforms were advertised alongside the (less admirable) venture of full-scale military 
rearmament. Whilst the latter are not wholly unchartered territory,47 the academic research 
they have attracted pales in comparison to the wealth of publications on subjects like the 
Second World War MOI. It is hoped that the approaches to studying military recruitment 
developed and applied here might encourage others to redirect their attention to other areas 
of official publicity, and in so doing shed new light on how governments interact with citizens.  
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Chapter Five 
‘The Irish Problem’: Recruiting, Rebellion and Conscription in a Divided Country, 1914-19 
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Chapter Ten 
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